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PART 1 – THE RESEARCH WORK 
1.1. THE CHOICE OF THE SUBJECT 
As a lecturer at the University of Hertfordshire - Szamalk School of 
Economic Studies, I taught International Financial Management from 2001 to 
2007, then I joined Dennis Gabor College, where my subjects and research 
field included economic integration in the EU and international finance. At 
present, I teach finance at the Budapest University of Technology and 
Economics. Previously, I did research in international banking and institutions. 
My doctoral dissertation (1986) deals with World Bank projects in Hungary. 
In 2006, I studied the issue of the euro- adoption in Hungary with regard 
of the Convergence Programme including the goals to be achieved in order to 
fulfill the Maastricht criteria and the Hungarian government’s economic 
policy.  
My research focused on the impacts of the global financial crisis, the 
sovereign debt crisis and the escalation of Greece’s fiscal problems in 2010. I 
dealt with the institutions set up to rescue ailing eurozone member countries, 
the German proposal for establishing a rescue fund: the European Monetary 
Fund (EMF), the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Questions addressed were efficacy, 
feasibility and moral hazard.  
The global financial and the subsequent economic crisis raised the issue 
of responsibilty from many aspects. In 2013, my research work focused on the 
lessons that can be learned to prevent such a big shock in the future. It implies 
answering whether financial regulations are needed and how the global 
financial system can be reformed to become more resilient to shocks through 
implementing financial sector reform steps. 
The crisis brought to the surface both the structural and the operational 
weaknesses of EMU, and challenged it in fields, where the Monetary Union 
9 
had not been challenged before. The future of the European monetary 
integration is vital for Europe. Therefore it is essential to gauge the eurozone 
from the aspect of its vulnerability and susceptibility to crises to prevent a 
recurrence, or to forecast the economic, financial and political developments 
in Europe for the decade to come. 
Critical discussions on the design of EMU have been going on ever since 
the Maastricht Treaty was signed. The financial and subsequent sovereign debt 
crises have had a deep impact on the level and pace of economic growth and 
macrofinancial stability in Europe. They have forced to rethink the architecture 
of the Monetary Union and economic governance arrangements, as well as the 
main macroeconomic forces prevailing in the euro area. 
The crisis has posed new challenges to fiscal and monetary policies in 
all the countries, including the euro area. Numerous and creative monetary and 
fiscal policies or financial interventions have been deployed either in the 
European Union or in the US, China and Japan to limit the damage and mitigate 
the crisis. In my dissertation, I intend to give a broad overview and assessment 
of the responses of monetary, and to some extent fiscal policies to the crisis 
and provide comparisons of the reactions in different economies.  
The euro area's exposure to the global and sovereign crises was 
exacerbated by faulty concepts on synchronization of EMU member states’ 
business cycles and on macroeconomic stability. It motivated me to research 
the topic and examine how to enhance the stability and prosperity of the 
European monetary integration. 
1.2. THE GOAL OF THE RESEARCH 
The overall aim of my research is to examine and analyze the monetary 
policy responses given to the challenges of the recent global financial crisis 
with the redesign of the European monetary integration as a priority. Lessons 
drawn from the pre-crisis flaws and failures may create a basis for shaping the 
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next stage of operating the single currency system. The examination is based 
on the comparison of monetary policy responses to the challenges of the global 
financial crisis including unconventional policy tools and central bank 
responsibilities in the light of the new objectives. My comparative analysis has 
been extended to the two main Asian central banks: People’s Bank of China 
and the Bank of Japan. These parts of the thesis are based on my previous 
research work to a great extent. 
Taking into account the comments of my opponents and the remarks 
discussed on the public debate, I examined the issue of the expanded balance 
sheets of central banks with special regard of exit strategies from the 
unconventional monetary policy. 
The past two decades have seen a significant growth in financial 
liabilities in advanced economies. The financial deepening increased the 
fragility of the euro area leading to concentration of risks, which remarkably 
increased the euro area's vulnerability to shocks and cross-border contagion. 
Fiscal policy errors in certain member states contributed to escalating the crisis 
and prevented these countries from pursuing countercyclical stabilization 
policies.  
My research aims to analyze the response of monetary policies to the 
global crisis within EMU and in other major economies including the US, the 
UK, China and Japan. Focusing on the European monetary integration, 
comparison of responses with those of other economies will contribute to better 
understanding of alternatives under certain conditions.  
My research question is whether common fiscal and monetary policy was 
successful in contributing better to financial stability. Without the bold use of 
central banks' tools, cutting rates and providing abundant liquidity in 2008 and 
2009, the meltdown of the financial system could not have been avoided. The 
Europen Central Bank was the first major central bank to cut the interest rates 
below zero in Europe. A number of central banks, including those of Sweden, 
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Denmark and Switzerland, pushed their benchmark interest rates to negative. 
The dissertation will discuss what the consequences of such unconventional 
measures will be and how central banks fight deflation. 
The framework of monetary policy shows differences in individual 
central banks’ main goals regarding price stability. Central bank forecasts 
played a significant role in monetary policy decision-making. When capital 
markets are presumed to be efficient, financial imperfections and their 
potential macroeconomic effects are disregarded. Monetary policy 
intervention happened only after financial crisis to mitigate damage.  
The research aims to find out whether and to what extent monetary policy 
should take into consideration financial market developments before a crisis 
occurs. As a result of that, monetary policy could better contribute to financial 
stability. It can be asked if price stability takes any specific form owing to the 
crisis. Macroprudential policy is about strengthening the resilience of the 
global financial system so that the procyclicality and interconnectedness of 
financial institutions can be managed appropriately. Should monetary policy 
be overburdened with other objectives? Would not that mean exaggerated 
expectations about the effectiveness of monetary policy tools without going 
against credibility? The answer to these questions implies examining the tools 
for adjusting monetary and macroprudential policies. 
The economic performance of the euro area countries shows a widening 
divergence. Should heterogeneity be a challenge for the single monetary 
policy? The financial crisis has brought some unsustainable shortcomings in 
some member countries to the surface, which had been neglected before. How 
can the ability of these economies be restored to meet the requirements of the 
single monetary policy?  
The dissertation refines the analysis of EMU's design flaws from the 
aspect of EMU's fiscal and monetary policy maneuvering, asking whether it 
was constrained by its structural and operational weaknesses. Research focuses 
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on the question whether EMU will be able to pass the serious challenges it is 
confronted and what options are available to policymakers.  
My central research question addressed the five selected central banks 
challenged by the financial crisis. Central banks were given special attention 
as they had to maintain financial stability under unprecedented circumstances 
and took particular responsibility when dealing with financial stability issues. 
The research aims at examining central bank independence from the aspect of 
their new macroprudential tasks.  The role of the central bank balance sheet is 
a relevant issue in respect of the exit strategies. The dissertation intends to 
outline the new stage of the monetary policy after the years of employing the 
unconventional tools. 
1.3. METHODOLOGY  
My main research question was how the financial crisis had challenged 
the five selected central banks to maintain financial stability under 
considerable and unprecedented duress. As illustrated by the changes and 
reforms, which were made during the last few years, they have taken particular 
responsibility for dealing with financial stability issues. The main question has 
been answered through a comparative analysis. I have compared five major 
central banks: the European Central Bank (ECB) (i); the Bank of England 
(BoE) (ii); the US Fed (iii); the People’s Bank of China (PBC) (iv) and the 
Bank of Japan (BoJ) (v). Due to China’s apparent speedy resilience, I gave 
special attention to the PBC. I applied critical assessment concerning the 
strengths and weaknesses of its regulation. 
My research is based on analyzing qualitative and quantitative data. I have used 
literature review and analysis, therefore I have collected data from diverse 
sources, including books, journals, newspapers, conference papers, reports 
from international organizations, government policy records and websites to 
test my hyphotheses. 
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My secondary data include quantitative data from financial data sources, 
databases, graphs and charts. It is not a simple presentation of such materials, 
rather I have integrated different arguments systematically and have developed 
critical assessments of their meanings and value. My study comprises logical, 
explanatory, exploratory and evaluative methods of analysis. 
This study will focus on employing data to gain insights into the five 
central banks’ policy responses to the global financial crisis. My work aims to 
analyze the effects of the factors, policies and measures on the economy to 
reveal deep context. 
To support my conclusions on the impact of unconventional monetary 
policy tools on the economy, I examined and presented the changes in GDP 
and unemployment data of the economies subject to my dissertation during the 
financial crisis and in the subsequent years. I made graphs to display my 
results. 
To measure the impact of central bank macroprudential tools, I did 
statistical research and analyzed financial statement information of 
systemically important financial institutions to examine the effectiveness of 
capital adequacy rules through financial statement data. Limited access to 
accounting databases of central banks made the research difficult. 
Nevertheless, I managed to get access to financial statement data to nine 
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) with headquarters in 
Hungary, which enabled me to analyze the annual changes in the relevant ratios 
in each of the selected banks. I examined 11 ratios, out of which I dealt with 
two profitability indicator ratios: the Return on Net Assests (ROA) and the 
Return on Equty (ROE) in detail. As a macroprudential authority, the 
Hungarian Central Bank (MNB) applies its mandate to manage financial 
systemic risks at the national level proactively and in line with the regulatory 
framework of the European Union.  The commitment of the MNB, the 
14 
economic environment of the country as well as the findings underpin the 
extension of the conclusions of research to other economies. 
I used R statistical software and adapted panel regression to make my 
analysis. Analyzing panel data enabled to reveal the cause-effect relation in 
financial statement data of the selected banks. As a particularity of the method, 
it enables us to divide the dependent and independent variables relation i.e. to 
examine idiosyncratic effect. Both fixed effects and random effects panel 
regressions were run with calculating their unidirectional and two-directional 
versions. R includes different variance estimation methods for random effect 
panel regression. I employed Swar and Amemiya methods. I used the Hausman 
test to select the panel model best corresponding to data in the examination. 
The dissertation consists of nine parts. Part 1 addresses the research 
work. Part 2 introduces the theoretical framework. My analysis will start in 
Part 3 with the assessment of the cyclical and structural components of the 
crises, introducing various approaches used for measuring the real impacts. In 
this part, I examine the euro area's greater exposure to the global and sovereign 
crises with special regard of its structural and operational weaknesses, and the 
roots of the recent global financial crisis. Part 4 provides an overview of the 
monetary policy responses and crisis management of the ECB, the BoE and 
the Fed, while Parts 5 and 6 deal with the PBC of China and the BoJ. Due to 
the specific features of the Asian economies, I will analyze this region 
separately, before making my comparative analysis of the five central banks in 
Part 7. Part 8 introduces the implications of the expanded central bank balance 
sheets and presents the different aspects of the exit strategies. Part 9 includes 
the research I conducted based on statistical data to examine and show the 
impacts of unconventional monetary policies on the economies of the selected 
countries. The second part of the research focuses on the new commitment of 
central banks in ensuring financial stability. It includes revealing the relation 
15 
between makroprudential tools, the profitabilty and risk taking of the banking 
sector through financial statement indicators. 
I provide the results of the research and the assessment of the hypotheses 
at the end of my dissertation. My research is based on studying a great amount 
of relevant literature, the majority in English, due to the wide range of 
professional work including publications of Hungarian authors in the topic, a 
smaller part in Hungarian, or in Swedish. 
1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 How did the EMU deal with the effects of the global financial crisis? 
 Was EMU's fiscal and monetary policy maneuvering constrained by its 
structural and operational weaknesses? 
 Did common fiscal and monetary policy result in success in contributing 
better to financial stability? 
 To what extent can central banks be burdened?  
 Will EMU be able to pass the serious challenges it faces?  
 Whether convergence or divergence pathways characterize the conduct 
of the selected central banks’ approaches to facilitating systemic 
stability. 
 How do central banks support financial sector development in 
developing countries? 
 How to exit from unconventional monetary policies? 
 How did the global financial crisis affect the central bank 
independence? 
  
16 
1.5. THE HYPOTHESES 
With regard of the research questions I aimed to analyze and test the 
hypotheses as follows. 
The 1st Hypothesis: 
The global financial crisis has widened the existing divergences, as well 
as the gaps between the respective legal frameworks and prevailing two-tier 
relationships of the central banks in the examination. The prevailing two-tier 
relationship is challenged by the financial crisis: the central bank moves closer 
to government, while increases its direct control over the markets.  
The 2nd Hypothesis: 
The incomplete design and the structural weaknesses of EMU 
constrained its fiscal and monetary policy maneuvering. 
The 3rd Hypothesis: 
With the global financial crisis in general and its impact on financial 
stability in particular, the indipendence of central banks was weakened by their 
respective governments. Reduced independence can mitigate the central 
banks’ market-oriented principles. 
1.6. The 4th Hypothesis: 
One leading goal for central banks in developing countries is to support 
financial sector development. This has been further confirmed as a reform 
principle for developing countries in the post-crisis era. 
1.7. The 5th Hypothesis: 
Central bank balance sheets have got a special emphasis in their role as 
the new tool of monetary policy instead of interest rates.  
17 
PART 2 – INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC AND THEORETICAL 
BACKGROUND 
Burst of financial bubbles, which brought underlying economic 
problems to the surface, developed into a financial and economic crisis at 
global level in 2008. The financial crisis turned into a debt crisis and a euro 
crisis.  There were three main factors existing in the pre-crisis period that 
contributed to escalating the economic and financial crisis in the euro area: 
 
i.) the macroeconomic risks inherent in a large, highly interconnected and 
lightly regulated banking system, which were largely ignored,  
ii.) a range of emerging macroeconomic imbalances and market failures, 
which was overlooked and  
iii.) imprudent fiscal policy mistakes in the Monetary Union member states. 
 
The crisis has posed new challenges to fiscal and monetary policies in 
all the countries, including the euro area. Numerous and creative monetary and 
fiscal policy or financial interventions have been deployed either in the 
European Union or in the US and Japan to limit the damage and mitigate the 
crisis. It should be noted that this crisis, although it demonstrates features 
similar to those in the past, is much greater in its severeness and intensity. In 
terms of falling output and rising unemployment, it has proved the most serious 
recession since the war. Taking the impacts on the banking system and the risk 
for sovereign debtors into account, the economies had to face a new situation, 
which aggravated the conduct of monetary policy.  
Nevertheless, the 2008 financial crisis was worse than the Great 
Depression the recovery seems to be better than 25 to 30 percent fall in the 
GDP that happened in the Depression (Bernanke, 2014), owing to the 
appropriate response to it.  The way of recovery also differs in the US and the 
UK from that in the Euro area. The correct assessment of the crisis is vital in 
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terms of setting the right monetary policy, which may determine the depth of 
the impacts and the manner or the speed of recovery. For instance, estimating 
the output gap i.e. calculating the effect the crisis has had on the level and 
potential growth rate of the economy. Different sizes of output gaps require 
different policy measures. 
The dissertation focuses on the monetary and partly on the fiscal 
responses to the global financial crisis in the Economic and Monetary Union. 
To obtain a thorough assessment and conclusion, the reactions of policies in 
the US, UK, China and Japan are compared with that of the monetary union. 
The financial crisis turned into a sovereign debt crisis and a euro crisis. In the 
times of a soaring global economy activity, several of the underlying problems, 
stemming from the incomplete design of the Economic and Monetary Union, 
remained concealed. The recession and the financial crisis have brought its 
structural and operational weaknesses to the surface.  
My argument is that the economic situation within the euro area in 2007-
09 stemmed from its vulnerability and fragility owing to its architecture. At the 
union level, the crisis has highlighted that institutional reforms are necessary 
to implement for two main reasons. One is that the euro area should develop 
effective mechanisms of fiscal supervision and policy co-ordination to prevent 
a crisis as severe as the recent one from occuring in the future. The other is: 
should a recession occur in any EMU country, it is important to stop its 
escalation in the particular country and its contagion to other countries.  
In my dissertation, I first document the impacts of the global fiancial 
crisis as well as the underlying economic problems which contributed to its 
escalation and provide a correct assessment. The fourth part analyzes and 
compares the fiscal and monetary policy responses in the euro area, in the US 
and in the UK, then the study proceeds to introducing the implications and 
assessesing the impacts of the measures and steps taken to mitigate the crisis. 
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The following parts address the central banks and their monetary policies 
in reponse to the crisis of two main Assian economies, China and Japan, 
respectively. To assess the directions of the unconventional monetary policies, 
I compare the five selected central banks concentrating on their two-tier 
relationships. Then I devise the potential exit strategies from the monetary 
policies during the crisis with regard of the shape of the future policies in the 
post crisis priod. In the last part, I examine and analyze the impact of the non-
traditional measures on the ecnomic performance of the economies my 
dissertation deals with. In the framework of my research, I explore the relation 
between the central banks’ macroprudential tools and the profitability and risk 
taking of some systemically important banks. Finally, I draw the conclusions 
regarding the changes the global financial crisis has brought in central banking. 
To understand the weaknesses of the European monetary integration it is 
necessary to study the Optimum Currency Area theory. Initiated by Mundell 
(1961), the theory has received increased attention in recent years in the 
analyses criticizing EMU. At the top of the criteria list a monetary union must 
meet is the absence of frequent, large-scale asymmetrical shocks. 
The elimination of the exchange rate among members in the monetary 
union no longer allows the exchange rate to absorb shocks that affect different 
regions asymmetrically. The first criterion is followed by production factor 
mobility and the system of sufficient ﬁscal transfers. These three criteria were 
completed by two other: a certain degree of economic openness (McKinnon, 
1963) and export diversification. As for the factors of production, labor 
markets in most European countries are rather rigid with the labor factor 
having little mobility. 
Mundell represented the „monetarist approach”, according to which 
fixing exchange rates and the adoption of a common currency will ensure 
sufficient convergence of the economies that seek membership, particularly of 
their inflation and interest rates. EMU's pre-crisis design demonstrated the idea 
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that macroeconomic stability was essentially an issue of fiscal and price 
stability and that a common currency would progressively bring about a 
synchronization of the business cycles of the participating economies. As 
argued by Obstfeld and De Grauwe, the financial dimension of macroeconomic 
stability was largely overlooked (De Grauwe, 2013), (Obsfeld, 2013). The 
2000s saw profound changes in the global financial system and significant 
growth in capital flows and banking, which was extremely strong within 
Europe. It was partly due to the deepening integration of the financial markets 
in the euro area.  
Obstfeld suggests a new policy trilemma for currency unions: All three 
of (i) cross-border financial integration, (ii) financial stability, and (iii) national 
fiscal independence cannot be simultaneously maintained within the union 
after a certain level of the financial integration has been reached.1 
Conclusively, financial integration and independent national fiscal policy do 
not create financial stability. 
The euro area crisis that began in 2009 stems from this financial/fiscal 
trilemma (Obstfeld, 2013). Countries without a single currency have the option 
of turning to the tool of money creation to support their financial systems in 
hard times. Financing public debt in such a way leads to destabilized price level 
and ends up in a quadrilemma: at least one of (i) strong capital market 
integration, (ii) financial stability, (iii) national fiscal independence, and (iv) 
price-level stability must be given up. 
As it comes to discussing the fragility of EMU by examining the role of 
the central bank as a lender of last resort and the automatic stabilizers in the 
government budgets, it is significant to see the existence of a “deadly embrace” 
between the sovereign and the banks (De Grauwe, 2013). It refers to the case 
                                                          
1 The classic trilemma in economics relates to monetary policy (see, for example, 
Obstfeld et al, 2005). It suggests a trade off among the three objectives of a fixed 
exchange rate, monetary independence and capital market openness. 
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when falling government bond prices threaten the banks, or sovereigns are 
threatened with insolvency. As a result, when one is endagered the other 
follows. This creates a good starting point to analyzing the operation of the 
European Central Bank (ECB).  
Accumulation of private debt resulted in developing bubbles. Deleverage 
as a consequence of bursts got the deflation dymamics going thus pushing the 
economy into a deflationary spiral (Minsky,1982).  
The idea of the financial instability hyphothesis (FIH) was pioneered by 
Hyman Minsky. He argued that financial crises are endemic in capitalism. The 
model does not base on exogenous shocks to arouse business cycles of various 
massiveness, instead, it suggests that business cycles are generated from the 
internal dynamics of capitalist economies, the fragility of financial markets and 
the system of interventions and regulations, which are necessary to keep the 
operation within bounds. Capitalism is prone to move from periods of financial 
stability to instability, which is a type of market failure and needs government 
regulation. 
Minsky (1992, p.106) maintained that „To understand the short-term 
dynamics of the business cycle and the longer term evolution of economies it 
is necessary to understand the financing relations that rule, and how the profit-
seeking activities of businessmen, bankers and portfolio managers lead to the 
evolution of financial structures.” Minsky related some ideas from 
Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic Development with those in Keynes’ 
General Theory. Money and finance provide a link between Keynes’ view of 
the investment decision as a determinant of output and employment with 
Schumpeter’s view of the investment decision as a determinant of innovation 
and economic growth. 
According to Schumpeter’s theory on business cycles, „cycles are the 
essence of the organism that displays them” (Schumpeter, 1939, p.6). The 
starting point of his analysis is stable equilibrium with the aim of identifying 
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the economic factors arising from the economy itself that destroy the 
equilibrium and lead to evolution. These real economic processes are referred 
to as the „circular flow‟ and „development‟, which creates the economic 
evolution: changes in the economy that arise from itself. 
Contrary to Keynes, Schumpeter presumes that in the circular flow there 
is a constant tendency towards an equilibrium, which, under competitive 
capitalism, tends to maintain the optimal allocation of available capital and 
labour. In the „circular flow”, the role of money is to facilitate the circulation 
of commodities. It is basically entrepreneurial demand that determines the 
credit supplied by the banks, consequently the money supply is an endogenous 
variable. Schumpeter argues that in a developing economy, where an 
innovation prompts a new business to replace the old, called by him „Creative 
Destruction”, booms and recessions are inevitable. 
„Change of practice by the Federal Reserve System or by any Central 
Bank in Europe may be itself an act of business behavior and an element of the 
mechanism of cycles, as well as an external factor; and so may collective 
measures taken by the business world itself. Every such case must be treated 
on its merits, and decision may be difficult indeed” (ibid: 17). 
Minsky adopted Schumpeter’s idea of the innovating entrepreneur. 
Minsky regarded, however, financial innovations produced by financial 
institutions as the source of financial fragility leading to financial crisis and 
instability. Schumpeter contrarily stated that innovation was the main source 
of stability. Minsky concluded that Schumpeterian entrepreneurship, evolution 
and change are the most evident in banking and finance, where the drive for 
profits is the clearest factor to make a change (Minsky, 1992). 
Financial institutions were essential to Schumpeter’s theory and in the 
development of Minsky’s thought. The advanced market economies’ 
institutional arrangements are the setting within which innovation is financed 
by entrepreneurs. 
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Whalen (2009) argues that financial innovations including „exotic” 
securizations, non-bank financial intermediation, trading in derivatives, 
unconventional mortgages, hedge funds, and the globalization of finance 
markets are behind the current global economic crisis.  
Monetary policy rules on the central bank's systematic adjustment of its 
interest rate to respond to developments in inﬂation and macroeconomic 
performance referred to as Taylor rules. Taylor (1993) offers a framework for 
the analysis of historical policy and for the econometric evaluation of speciﬁc 
alternative strategies that a central bank can make. The framework links 
interest rate decisions directly to inﬂation and economic performance 
abstracting from a detailed analysis of the demand and supply of money. These 
reactive rules facilitate the discussion of systematic monetary policy.  
Parameterization of measuring the output gap and the inflation according 
to the rule appeared to describe Federal Reserve behavior well in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. The mid-1990s saw a sharp increase in economic productivity 
in the US. As a consequence, the Fed did not increase interest rates in the way 
it previously would have done. This is what was considered to have allowed 
the expansion of the 1990s to continue as an earlier tightening of monetary 
policy might not have delayed the next economic recession until it finally 
occured in 2001 (Asso et al, 2010). 
The question arises if the recent business cycles in the US and Japan can 
be explained on the basis of the Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT) since 
they display some of its signs. ABCT suggests that an economic boom is 
sustainable if it is the result of an increase in investment funded by an increase 
in savings, while an economic boom which stems merely from credit 
expansion is not sustainable.  
Excessive growth in bank credit is owing to the artificially low interest 
rates set by a central bank or through expansionary monetary policy. These 
interest rates are below the rate of the market for loanable funds that supply 
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and demand clear. As a result, the information embedded in market prices or 
interest rates is distorted. Entrepreneurial decisions are affected, which causes 
a misallocation of capital across the economy and the credit-sourced boom 
results in widespread malinvestment. 
Consequently, a sustained period of low interest rates and excessive 
credit creation leads to an unstable imbalance between savings and investment. 
The boom fed by the credit expansion turns to recession when the money 
supply contracts and eventually resources are reallocated back towards their 
former uses (White, 2006). 
Mainstream economists have concluded that the housing boom, 
subsequent to the 2001 recession, was mainly due to the Fed’s accommodative 
monetary policy. Taylor (2007) argues that between 2002 and 2005, the US 
monetary policy was far more accommodate than an approach based on an 
interpretation of inflation and output data would have called for. 
White and other Austrians predicted that a burst of an asset bubble, 
specifically the real estate bubble would trigger a crisis, while forecasts of 
some non-Austrian economists, such as Nouriel Roubini and Stephen Roach 
focused more on macroeconomic imbalances such as the current account 
deficit or the federal government debt (Roubini, 2006). 
Nevertheless, a strategy for monetary management namely inflation-
targeting policies, conducted mainly in a discretionary form have been 
considered to be capable of keeping inflation low while supporting the central 
bank’s flexibility to manage monetary policy with their independence being 
emphasized. At the same time, monetary policy is also supposed to support the 
objectives of general economic policy for the purpose of achieving sustainable 
growth and a high level of employment. Inflation targeting framework (ITF) 
sets two goals. One is the central bank’s commitment to keep inflation low, the 
other is to keep the variance of inflation right. While the ITF can greatly 
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promote attaining the first goal, attaining the second provides more room to 
debates. 
It is widely agreed that central bank transparency can make policy more 
effective. According to inflation-targeting framework, it is possible to create a 
„nominal anchor” to the price level by the communication to the public (Ábel 
et al, 2014a). The target would result in certain „psychological” market 
conditions which are favorable to reaching the very same inflation goal. The 
only way for central banks to earn credibility is to demonstrate that they have 
the tools and the willingness to curb inflation and to keep it low for a period of 
time (Bernanke et al, 2001). In addition, the element of discretion provides the 
central bank with the capacity to pursue other political objectives thought 
necessary in a certain case without compromizing the attainment of the stated 
goal. 
Public expectation from the central bank should be met, by suggesting 
that the bank has the power to expand or contract the money supply, to raise or 
to sink interest rates, to impose exchange controls, to alter the level of 
obligatory reserves, to alter the classes of assets and the conditions of granting 
access to discount facilities, and to impose new bank regulations (Mishkin, 
2001). Both critics and supporters of the ITF, including Kohn (2004), 
Friedman (2003) and Svensson (1999) claim, however, that the ITF does not 
constitute best-practice in resolving the question of other goals such as real and 
financial stability. It is in the focus of long debates if monetary policy can 
beneficially exploit the short-run trade-off between inflation and the output 
gap. Limited exploitable trade-offs view (LET) suggests best-practice policy 
can beneficially exploit short-run trade off between real activity and inflation 
(Svensson and Woodford, 2004). 
Some ITF advocates argue there are no exploitable trade-offs (NET). The 
NET view holders follow Friedman and Lucas in saying that no existing trade-
offs can successfully be exploited, so best-practice is not sure to reach nominal 
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stability. Nevertheless, stabilizing inflation is the best way to achieve that goal 
(Orphanides, 2003). The view of the ITF is suppoerted by Bernanke, Laubach, 
Mishkin and Posen commonly referred to as „BLMP”, who conclude that 
should a great supply shock of some unexpected origin in particular arise, 
missing or changing a previously communicated inflation target may even be 
justified (Bernanke et al,1999). 
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PART 3 – THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ITS IMPACTS 
BETWEEN 2008 AND 2015 
3.1. THE ASSESSMENT OF THE CRISIS: CYCLICAL AND STRUCTURAL 
COMPONENTS  
In the late 1970s, a radical financial deregulation process began that 
accelerated the evolution of financial markets. Financial innovation taking 
various forms stimulated strong financial booms that ended up in crises. The 
„New Financial Architecture” (NFA) refers to the integration of ﬁnancial 
markets with light government regulation of the era characterized above.  NFA 
created a framework for flawed practices and institutions, which can be 
regarded as the deep financial roots of the recent crisis. Governments of the 
world gave responses of similar and different kind allowing new expansions to 
start, which led to even larger financial markets and culmination of threat. 
These government interventions were unconventional. The process resulted in 
the recent crisis, which was basically due to the structural flaws in the financial 
system. This section reveals the underlying reasons and provides an assessment 
of the impacts of the crisis. 
As a result of financial innovation, complex and opaque financial 
products became available in financial markets. They lacked tranparency, 
which made it impossible to be priced correctly and therefore lost liquidity 
when the boom ended. The explosion of these securities flowing through banks 
at a high rate created large profits while destroyed the transparency, which is 
necessary to ensure market efficiency. Large investment banks like Lehman 
and Merrill Lynch were given high ratings by international rating agencies 
enabling them to borrow at a low price. Instead of exposing risk, the agencies 
systematically disguised it. Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) are 
structured financial products that pool together assets such as mortgages, bonds 
and loans that serve as collateral for the CDO.  
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The recent economic crisis was remarkable not only because of its 
severity and size, but of its nature. The true nature of the underlying situation 
seems to be difficult to reveal as trading of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives 
especially those taking the form of CDOs, accounts for confusing those who 
attempt to paint a clear picture. Derivatives are financial contracts that derive 
their value from the performance of the underlying asset, the most common of 
which contain commodities, stocks, bonds, interest rates, currencies or other. 
Derivative contracts have two groups: over-the counter (OTC) derivatives and 
exchange-traded derivatives (ETD). 
OTC derivatives are contracts that are traded without going through an 
exchange or other intermediary, while ETD derivatives are traded via 
specialised derivatives exchanges. Positions in the OTC derivatives market 
reached the amount of US$ 708 trillion in 2011. They comprised interest rate 
contracts (67.0 percent), credit default swaps (8.0 percent), foreign exchange 
contracts (9.0 per cent), commodity contracts (2.0 per cent), equity contracts 
(1.0 percent) and other type of contracts (12.0 percent) (BIS Survey, 2011). 
Since OTC derivatives are not traded in an exchange, there are no central 
counterparties (CCPs). 
As a part of the financial sector reform, non-cleared OTC transactions 
are to be shifted to central counterparties (CCPs). The transition to CCPs would 
result in better risk management and resiliency in accordance with giving more 
transparency to the OTC market. The risk of derivatives stems from using 
leverage meaning that investors can earn large returns from minor changes in 
the underlying asset’s price. On the other hand, however, they can suffer 
massive losses in case of opposite moves in price. 
Derivatives contracts, which were regarded as a bet on the price of 
something, except for ones for hedging purposes were made unenforceable 
according to the Gaming Act 1845 (8 & 9 Vict.c.109) of the United Kingdom, 
which made gaming houses illegal, similarly to the legislation in Australia and 
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the United States (Buckley, 2012). From the 1980s, derivatives began to be 
removed from the application of these laws, mainly because sophisticated 
players were expected to be able to protect themselves, which did not prove 
right in the crisis. The creation of asset-backed securities of the form discussed 
above enabled the banks to increase their leverage significantly. These 
structured financial products were particularly attractive assets for banks to 
keep, because they could be held off-balance-sheet with no capital adequacy 
requirements. 
The Third Basel Accord is a global regulatory standard on bank capital 
reserves. According to the Basel III rule, the banks are required to hold 4.5 
percent of common equity and 6.0 percent Tier I capital of risk-weighed assets 
(RWA) (Basel III Capital Rules) besides introducing additional capital buffers 
during periods of high credit. Put it differently, there was no need for a 
percentage of the value of these assets to be held as a capital reserve. CDOs, 
which were made up of loans of varied quality, and other derivatives were 
distributed widely between the dominant institutions in the financial system. 
They were perceived as relatively safe since they were given a high rating by 
rating agencies, while in fact their credit worthiness and cash flow possibilities 
were doubtful. This was an unsustainable situation. In late 2007, the whole 
financial network came under strain questioning the viability of many financial 
instruments, which led to the withdrawal of these funds from Wall Street 
investment banks and associated institutes. 
The collateralized debt obligation „market” was impossible to sustain. 
Wall Street investment banks were able to evade regulatory constraints. A 
shadow banking was constructed alongside the regulated sector. They do not 
take deposits and have no access to central bank funding or debt guarantees. 
Their activities include short-term funding on asset-backed commercial paper, 
providing cash loans against a collateral as security or long term loans like 
mortgages. They supply loans to a wide range of borrowers who might 
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otherwise be not eligible, owing to less risk aversion of the system. Shadow 
banks can contribute to increasing systemic risk indirectly as well through 
interconnectedness. Without the support of their central bank as lender of last 
resort, they are unable to refinance their short term liabilities. The shadow 
banking system is blamed for significantly contributing to the global financial 
crisis of 2007-2012 (Solt, 2015). 
The conduct of economic and financial policies is strongly affected by 
the substantial implications of financial crises (Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). A 
thorough analysis of the consequences and best responses to crises has become 
an integral part of policy debates. Crises manifest the linkages between the 
financial sector and the real economy. Theories focusing on the sources of 
financial crises have recognized the importance of sharp movements in asset 
and credit markets. 
A financial crisis often occurs together with one or some of the following 
phenomena: a remarkable change in credit volume and asset prices, disruptive 
financial intermediation, immense balance sheet problems (of firms, 
households, financial intermediaries and sovereigns) and significant 
government support (in the form of liquidity support and recapitalization). 
The question may arise why neither financial market players nor policy 
makers anticipated the risks and tried to slow down the expansion of credit and 
increase in asset prices. Such phenomena have been around for centuries. Asset 
prices sometimes deviate from what fundamentals would suggest and move 
differently from the patterns of standard models. Asset prices can also be 
affected by investors’ behavior or information asymmetries and changes in 
international financial and economic conditions. 
Information asymmetries exist among intermediaries and in financial 
markets. Safety deserves a premium and perverse spirals can be created. When 
the demand for quality assets increase, some of lower quality may experience 
a sharp decline in their prices (Barr and Pierrou, 2015). The crises in the past 
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exibit the signs of those of recent recessions when the collapse of banking 
systems was preceded by sharp increase in credit in real estate investment. 
The East Asian financial crisis for instance in the late 1990s compares to 
ones in the Northern countries. The experience of the United States in the Great 
Depression shows some similarity to the way leading to the recent global 
financial crisis in terms of an increase in household leverage or asset prices. 
Credit booms can be triggered by a wide range of factors for example 
shocks such as positive productivity shocks, economic policies, and capital 
flows. Lagged GDP growth is positively associated with the probability of a 
credit boom (Dell’Ariccia et al, 2013). Increases in international financial 
flows can strengthen credit booms. Global conditions also affect national 
financial markets resulting in asset bubbles, which easily spill across borders. 
Capital inflows can extend the availability of funds for banks leading to 
relaxing credit constraints for corporations and households. Accommodative 
monetary policies have been connected to credit booms and excessive risk 
taking. Asset prices and borrower’s value are affected by interest rates so are 
the conditions of lending. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) note that risk taking is 
higher when interest rates are lower and a shift to quality when interest rates 
rise. The rapid increases in real estate prices and household leverage are 
explained by the relatively low interest rates in the US during 2001-2004.  
Structural factors such as financial liberalization and innovation 
facilitate more risk taking and can also trigger credit booms.  Empirical studies 
found crises were often preceded by financial liberalization (Dell’Ariccia et al, 
2013). Shocks or liberalization keeps innovation in move. Regulation, 
supervision, and market discipline are not quick enough to catch up with 
greater competition and innovation. Vulnerabilities in credit markets can 
emerge. A decline in lending standards owing to stronger competition in 
financial services may contribute to financial fragility in the short run in 
particular. 
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During financial crises, asset prices and credit booms and busts differ 
from the movements of a normal business cycle: booms are shorter and more 
intense than other upturns, and crunches and busts are longer, deeper and more 
violent than regular downturns. The violent episodes last longer (Dell’Ariccia 
et al, 2013). 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) distinguish two groups of crises, both 
including two types. The first group is classified on the basis of quantitative 
definitions, the other depend mainly on qualitative and judgmental analysis. 
Currency crisis and sudden stop belong to the first group as these are 
measurable variables and allow the use of quantitative methodologies. Other 
crises are connected to adverse debt dynamics or banking system turmoil. 
Since these variables are not easy to measure, the use of qualitative 
methodologies is more appropriate. 
A foreign debt crisis occurs when a country is unable to repay or 
refinance or does not want to service its foreign debt. It can take the form of a 
sovereign or private or both debt crisis. A domestic public debt crisis takes 
place when a country does not honor its domestic fiscal obligations in real 
terms. In a systemic banking crisis, bank runs and failures can make the banks 
suspend the convertibility of their liabilities or force the government to 
intervene to prevent that by extending liquidity and capital assistance on a large 
scale. 
Research that has been conducted on the the causes of the recent crisis 
revealed some factors similar to previous crises.  Although these factors may 
differ on the exact weights in different results, features concluded in common 
are as follows. Unsustainable asset price increases, credit booms leading to 
excessive debt burdens, build-up of marginal loans and systemic risk as well 
as the slow reaction of regulation, supervision, and market discipline to greater 
competition and innovation. 
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Nonetheless, the recent global financial crisis demonstrated some new 
factors in terms of its roots: widespread implementation of complex and non-
transparent financial instruments, the high level of national and cross border 
interconnectedness of financial markets, banks and institutions, the high degree 
of leverage of financial institutions and the role of the household sector (Gál, 
2010). These new and common factors in the framework of the „New Financial 
Architecture” led to the severest financial crisis since the Great Depression. 
Restoring confidence in the financial system, if possible at all, required 
immense government participation, outlays and guarantees. As for real and 
financial implications, they are hard and show common features with other 
episodes. They include large output losses and declines in consumption, 
investment and industrial production. Financial crises have large economic 
costs. Crises impact economic activity and can trigger recessions worse than a 
„normal” business cycle recession. The average duration is longer and output 
losses are larger than those of a recession not triggered by a financial crisis. So 
is the cumulative loss, the output loss relative to the peak before recession. 
Various approaches are used for measuring the real impact of a crisis on 
output. The traditional business cycle methodology implies that recessions 
associated with credit crunches and housing busts are costlier compared to 
those associated with equity price busts. Adding up differences between trend 
growth and actual growth for some years after, the crisis can show overall 
losses, which vary in different countries. On this basis, according to Laeven 
and Valencia (2012), emerging markets tend to suffer larger losses due to the 
recent crisis than advanced economies, which can also differ significantly. An 
indication of the significant costs that crises incur is consumption and overall 
welfare. A decline in consumption during recessions associated with financial 
crises is typically seven to ten times as large as those without such crises in 
emerging markets. In recessions without crises, the growth rate of consumption 
slows down but does not fall below zero. 
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Financial variables show with large downward corrections. In advanced 
countries credit falls by about 7.0 percent, house prices drop by about 12 
percent, while equity prices decline by more than 15 percent during credit 
crunches (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011). The most remarkable hit on the real 
economy from a financial crisis is the lack of credit. Rajan (2005) and Kroszner 
(2007) point out that after banking crises sectors grow more slowly, so they 
naturally need more external financing owing to banks’ limited lending 
capacity. Recoveries in aggregate output after credit crunches tend to take 
place before the revival of credit growth and turnaround in house prices. 
Sectors more dependent on external finance grow relatively less. „Creditless 
recoveries” are more common after banking crises and credit booms. 
Financial crises are associated with reductions in investment, R&D and 
employment and firms’ giving up on growth opportunities. The timing of crises 
is more difficult (or even impossible) to predict than identifying vulnerabilities. 
The phrase „Minsky moment” refers to the situation when a market fails or 
falls into crisis after a long period of speculation or unsustainable growth 
(Minsky, 1993). What we have seen in the recent case of the financial crisis 
was a slow movement of the global financial system toward „money manager 
capitalism” - as Minsky put it - that collapsed in 2008. Wray (2011) named it 
the „Minsky half-century”. 
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3.2. MACROECONOMIC INSTABILITY AND THE INCOMPLETE DESIGN OF 
THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION 
As argued by Obstfeld (2013) and De Grauwe (2013), the financial 
dimension of macroeconomic stability was largely overlooked. The deepening 
of the financial integration and the expansion of the financial-sector at the same 
time undermined financial and macroeconomic stability. The large scale of the 
banking system balance sheets spurred national governments to use fiscal 
guarantees paving the way to the close linkage, as De Grauwe (2011) refers to 
it, „deadly embrace” between the sovereign and the banks. Converging 
sovereign yields and other interest rates in different euro area economies did 
not support differentiation between member states as for public finances. 
The phenomenon that bank portfolios from the Northern part of the euro 
area were diverted toward the periphery of economies in Southern-Europe 
strengthened risk. Low nominal interest rates and easy access to credit fostered 
demand and inflation reducing real interest rates, which had destabilizing 
effects, such as housing booms accompanied with an increase in investment of 
non-tradable construction or high government borrowing. This process ended 
up in cumulating current account deficits and external liabilities.  
The euro area's greater exposure to the global and sovereign crises 
derives from three factors. The worldwide expansion in capital flows and 
banking, both nationally and across borders was particularly strong in Europe 
in the 2000s, partly due to the deepening integration of euro area financial 
markets. Rapid growth in financial markets made it difficult to see the 
consequences of some specific features the Economic and Monetary Union 
had. These implications were not anticipated before the implementation of the 
common currency. 
The stability of exchange rates was regarded as a prerequisite to 
monetary union. To see the design flaws of EMU, it is necessary to examine 
the pathway leading to its constitution. The European Monetary System (EMS) 
36 
was created in 1979 by eight of the European Union [European Economic 
Community (EEC) at that time] member states2 as a prelude to monetary 
unification. I conclude the ERM did not seem to have laid the groundwork for 
the monetary union, and the Maastricht Treaty also has some critical points, 
which determine its operation in the long run. 
3.3. THE EVOLUTION OF THE NEW ERM 
Since inflation rates in the weak currency members had been lowered to 
the rates of the strong currency countries,3 and due to the stigma devaluation 
meant to one country, there were no realignments between January 1987 and 
1992. Strong currency was associated with economic strength and prudent 
national economic policies. The aversion to devaluation relative to the Deutche 
mark strengthened the central banks’ commitment to low inflation and placed 
the strong domestic currency in the centre of the economic policy (Cadot, 
1996).  French inflation for instance, was reduced from an average rate of 11.0 
percent to an average of 3.5 percent by this strategy from the early 1980s to 
the late. The success of this strategy made further devaluations unnecessary 
(Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1993). 
National pride transformed the system from fixed-but-adjustable to a 
fixed rate sytem. The Single European Act of 1986 set removal of all remaining 
trade barriers within the European Community. The Act includes provisions 
concerning the establishment of free flow of capital (Council Directive 88/361 
EEC, 1988 June 24). The Commission sought to abolish the general 
arrangements for restrictions on capital movements i.e. all the operations 
                                                          
2 The nine members of the EEC in 1979 were: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK  
UK became a member of the ERM (the Exchange rate Mechanism of EMS) on October 8 
1990 
3 Strong currency countries were: Germany and the Netherlands from 1979 to 1982  
Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark from 1983 to 1992 (International Monetary 
Fund data) 
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carried out either by a natural or legal person with effect from July 1, 1990 
until December 31 1992. 
Capital movement includes direct investments, investment in property, 
operations in securities, current and deposit accounts, financial loans and 
credit. Spain and Ireland were given an extension to 1992, Portugal and Greece 
to 1995. Capital controls were essential to decrease the downward pressure on 
the weak currency countries’ exchange rates before they were able to lower 
their inflation rates (Giavazzi and Giovannini, 1989). This policy instrument 
made it possible for the EMS countries to limit exchange rate volatility and 
reach a convergence in inflation rates to that of the strong currency members. 
Capital controls enabled central banks to intervene in currency markets more 
successfully, owing to insulated domestic credit markets from increases in 
interest rate. Single Europe assumes free mobility of capital.  Countries could 
have allowed it to themselves if they had been protected against the effects of 
free capital mobility.  
The success of the EMS during the 1980s was mainly ensured by capital 
controls supporting the members in achieving their goals of stabilizing the 
exchange rates and converging inflation rates toward the rate in the strong 
currency zone. Removing this instrument with fix exchange rates retained 
meant losing the prospect of achieving the objectives of convergence (De 
Grauwe, 1990). Exchange rate stability could be maintained with full 
convergence. What was created was irreconcilable. If monetary policy aims to 
achieve domestic goals, the goal of limiting exchange rate fluctuations should 
be forfeited.  
The pursuit of one economic goal often restricts obtaining the other. As 
long as capital controls were maintained, they served as another tool to attain 
the other goal. Simply put, an economic policy instrument can serve only one 
goal. Being forced to choose between two economic policy objectives, or using 
one policy instrument and trying to achieve two goals leads to tensions that 
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cannot be maintained even in the short run. Put it differently, it resulted in 
instability and can be assessed as the system’s flaw. Partly due to recognizing 
the unsustainability of that state, the members put the transformation of the 
EMS into a full monetary union on agenda according to the recommendation 
of the Delors Report. 
The signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 set a timetable for adopting 
a single currency scheduled January 1 1999 the latest. This type of a fixed-but-
adjustable exchange rate sytem developed into a de facto fixed-rate system by 
the early 1990s, as there were no realignments between 1987 and 1992. The 
inflation rates of the weak currency countries had been lowered by the late 
1980s (IMF, 1990). 
The weak currency countries’ aversion to devaluation stemmed from the 
general view that it was regarded as a sign of weak economy and faulty 
economic policy, which strengthened their central banks’ commitment to 
lowering inflation. Accomplishing the goal of low inflation made devaluation 
unnecessary. In the ERM practice, the German mark had become the „inflation 
anchor” of the system. The Bundesbank pursued monetary policies according 
to the requirements of internal balance, when a conflict emerged – payment 
surplus, appreciating mark with inflationary pressure – Germany opted for 
tight money to prevent inflation; the Bundesbank pursued its own preferences. 
The other ERM countries had to give priority to external balance that is 
stabilizing their exchange rates and keep balance of payment equilibrium, and 
use monetary policies, tightening or easing, according to that. The system had 
all the signs of a currency area, which was anchored to the mark and German 
monetary policy and was too tight for the other member states (Mundell, 1994). 
The priority of the German economic policy was to reduce inflation.  
The main concern in other EC countries was unemployment. 
Maintaining fixed exchange rates required single monetary policy. Reducing 
unemployment is far beyond having only economic implications. Exchange 
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rates had to be abandoned in favour of domestic goals.  Despite massive 
interventions of the central banks, the attempt of keeping EMS exchange rates 
within narrow bands had to be given up. Narrow bands were replaced by a 
system with 15.0 percent ranges on each side referred to as de facto floating.  
Although wide bands were considered temporary, no agreement indicated a 
return to narrow bands or supported its feasibility. 
3.4. DESTABILIZING EFFECTS THREATENING THE EURO  
The main factor contributing to the euro area crisis in 2009 derives from 
the financial/fiscal trilemma suggested by (Obstfeld, 2013). The new policy 
trilemma for currency unions is constituted by the impossible simultaneous 
maintaining of cross-border financial integration, financial stability, and 
national fiscal independence. 
Consequently, if countries sacrifice the options of financial restaint and 
capital controls, they cannot credibly backstop their financial systems without 
external fiscal support. A country reliant mainly on its own fiscal resources is 
likely to give up on financial integration as well as stability, because financial 
risks will be assessed nationally by the markets. As an alternative, if a country 
with limited fiscal space withdraws from the integrated financial market, it 
may control and insulate its financial sector in order to reduce fragility to the 
minimum level. Any diagnosis that overemphasises the lack of enforcement of 
existing fiscal rules is partial.  
Pisani-Ferry (2012) provides a useful organizational structure for 
understanding the unforeseen consequences of intense financial market growth 
and proposes an alternative trilemma based on no monetary financing, lack of 
centralized fiscal functions, and national banking systems. It is the impossible 
trinity of strict no-monetary financing, bank-sovereign interdependence and no 
co-responsibility for public debt. 
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My argument is that the turmoil in the world economy and in the euro 
area in the period after the outburst of the crisis finds its roots in financial 
vulnerabilities of the incomplete design of Economic and Monetary Union. 
Initially, architects were concerned with monetary policy, fiscal policy, and 
structural reform in nonfinancial markets e.g. labor markets, leaving the 
financial dimension out of scope. The process of financial integration, ruling 
optimism concerning risk and growth, as well as global liquidity, created credit 
conditions at the time when EMU began to work resulted in excessive 
borrowing. 
Asset price bubbles occured in housing and in the sovereign debts 
increasing banks’ exposure to the risk of collapse creating the „too-big-to-fail” 
(TBTF) issue. It means that when a systemically important financial institution 
(SIFI) fails, losses or disruptions could be severe enough to lead to failure of 
third parties. The problem is rather the fact that financial institutions are too 
interconnected to fail. Preventing TBTF banks from failing might be necessary 
for maintaining the stability of the financial system in the short run. Bailing 
out TBTFs, however, is likely to lead to a less stable financial system in the 
long run due to moral hazard. 
The theoretical basis of the creation of the monetary union is optimal 
currency area theory, which considers exogenous shocks rather than the 
endogenous dynamics of capitalism. Diagnostic failure prevailing in the North 
blames government profligacy for the euro-crisis. Both allow disguising the 
design flaws of the euro area. My argument is that endogenous dynamics of 
booms and busts work also on the level of national economies, which remained 
so within Economic and Monetary Union. The central bank as the lender of 
last resort is supposed to counterbalance the instability of capitalism, which 
stems from its nature. It implies two responsibilities: injecting liquidity in the 
banking sector and to the government bond markets. When problems in the 
government arise, sovereign bond prices drop, extend the problem to the banks 
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and cause insolvency, thus develop a vicious circle. The ECB as a lender of 
last resort in the government bond markets has an infinite capacity of buying 
government bonds. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which became 
operational in October 2012, has limited resources and cannot credibly commit 
to such an outcome. The fact that resources are infinite enables the bank to 
stabilize bond rates. It is the only way to gain credibility in the market.  
The structure of the balance sheets of both the banks and the sovereign 
is unbalanced in terms of maturity. It refers to the liquidity difference of their 
liabilities and assets, thus a collective move of distrust can trigger a liquidity 
crisis that can cause sovereign default. This also underpins the necessity of the 
central bank’s extended core responsibility. Stabilizators can be built in the 
government budget. The private sector’s post crash deleverage may carry the 
threat of a deflationary spiral (Fisher, 1933). Increased savings together with 
reduced consumption, output and national income will decline leading to the 
savings paradox. It can be offset by the goverment’s saving less and borrowing 
more. The private sector’s asset sales can trigger a downward spiral by causing 
insolvency for those holding these assets. The harmful effect can be stopped 
by the government’s taking over them. These processes moved by the 
stabilizing elements are not organized on the level of EMU. Monetary 
integration does not obviously include economic integration. 
According to the theory of optimum currency areas (OCA) (Mundell, 
1961), sufficient real wage flexibility and labour mobility can compensate for 
real divergences. The lack of those in Europe makes it less likely for the 
requirements of a sound monetary union to meet. In addition, market efficiency 
with prices fully reflecting available information has not been constituted by 
the European Union, which also suggests that monetary integration does not 
imply economic integration. Maastricht has brought the loss of two economic 
policy levers, monetary and exchange rate policies, and has left two other, the 
national fiscal policies and the EU budget itself. It means national governments 
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are restrained in reacting to asymmetric shocks, the outcome of which depends 
to a great extent on the realative phasing of business cycles between each 
member state and on the ability that cycles can be responded through the EU 
budget. Since monetary sovereignty and exchange rate tool are no longer 
accessible, fiscal latitude is needed for the members to treat shocks, 
particularly in an environment where labour migration has failed to function 
as a valve for dealing with asymmetric shocks. 
In summary, emphasizing the lack of enforcement of existing fiscal rules 
provides a partial diagnosis to the euro crisis. The euro area’s inherent 
weaknesses revealed by the crisis have made euro-area vulnerable. At the core 
of its vulnerability stands the impossible trinity of strict no-monetary 
financing, bank-sovereign interdependence and no co-responsibility for public 
debt (Pisani-Ferry, 2012). 
Secondly, the euro area has deprived itself of the shock absorbers most 
economies can lean on to reduce the negative effects of demand shocks and 
fully expect a central bank to respond an economic downturn.  
My argument is that euro-area crisis was not a sovereign-debt crisis. The 
fact that Belgium and Italy, which entered the crisis with extraordinarily high 
debts did not land in serious trouble, while Ireland and Spain, which entered 
the crisis with low levels of sovereign debt needed bail-outs, underpins this 
statement. The problem was massive capital flows across borders, which 
encouraged high levels of private borrowing in the economies which at last got 
into trouble. A reversal in those flows generated by the financial crisis made 
private borrowers and banks get into big trouble, which turned into serious 
economic downturns and bank failures and led to explosive growth in 
sovereign debt burdens. Massive sovereign debt was the symptom rather than 
the cause of the crisis. 
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3.5. THREAT OF SOVEREIGN DEFAULT IN EUROPE 
The Maastricht Treaty failed to provide enforcement mechanisms if a 
member state failed to meet the convergence criteria. Instead, the only 
provision was to prepare a report for the opinion of the Economic and Financial 
Committee, a body set up under the terms of the Treaty. Joining EMU 
promised great benefits for the nations with lower sovereign credit ratings than 
those of the strongest member states as they were enabled to borrow like 
members with excellent ratings. The use of a single currency, which prevents 
trading partners from devaluing their currencies without a centralized fiscal 
policy, requires each economy to manage its trade balance so that imbalances 
will not result in excess debt. This environment with no enforcement 
mechanism for nations failing to meet the convergence criteria and borrowing 
as if they were with excellent ratings, was incentive enough for economies to 
overload themselves with debt. (Losoncz, 2013, pp. 115-120). The 
International Monetary Fund estimated that total debt levels in the euro area 
grew 2.5 times faster than GDP from 2006 to year-end 2012 (IMF, 2012). 
In addition, owing to data revisions of a large scale done by Greece, the 
reliability of the Greek statistics on public finances is strongly questioned. 
These revisions made Greece’s admittance to EMU possible. According to 
Eurostat, Greece’s 2003 budget deficit had actually been 4.6 percent of GDP, 
rather than the previously reported 1.7 percent of GDP, which means a revision 
of similar scale in the three-year deficit figures of 2000–2002 (Eurostat, 2004). 
Yet, in my opinion, Greece cannot exclusively be to blame for the European 
sovereign debt crisis of 2009–2012. The country can be regarded as a spark to 
ignition. 
The first country to get into trouble was Greece, which did have a big 
public-debt problem in addition to other difficulties. At the level of 129 percent 
of GDP in 2009 (IMF, 2009), Greek public debt was and remained the highest 
in the euro area. The crisis response therefore focused on public debt as a crisis 
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indicator outside and inside the euro area as well. In the second section, I will 
address the issue of crisis responses in detail. 
As for the beginning, the Greek government had difficulties in selling its 
bonds to private investors in late 2009, due to high interest rates the investors 
demanded. The European Union and the International Monetary Fund 
approved a €110-billion loan package to the Greek government in May 2010 
to cover its borrowing needs through 2013. In exchange, Greece promised to 
reduce its public deficit by diminishing spending. This rescue package was 
followed by and another €130-billion package between July 2011 and March 
2012, and the debt crisis in Greece continued in 2012. 
Ireland and Portugal have required similar EU-IMF rescue packages. 
Cyprus, Italy, and Spain had difficulties in selling their bonds. Similar 
difficulties threatened other members of Economic and Monetary Union 
(Kolb, 2011). In spring of 2012, only four economies out of the 17 members 
of the euro area had long-term government bonds with the highest Standard & 
Poor’s rating, AAA.4 They were: Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands. The bonds of five countries: Cyprus, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain had junk ratings, BBB+ or lower. 
Greek bonds were not rated in 2012, since they were given the lowest 
possible rating, CCC in July 2011. In 2012, they were listed as SD, which is 
given to a borrower who has defaulted on a specific loan or class of loans, but 
not on all obligations. (Tennant and Marlon, 2016). 
Individual economies became vulnerable to sovereign debt crises in 
various ways. I will focus on the peripheral Eurozone economies, namely 
                                                          
4 Standard & Poor’s assigns sovereign borrowers one of 12 possible long-term credit 
ratings. The major categories are AAA, AA, and A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, CC, C, SD and 
D, where AAA is the highest rating and D is the lowest. Credit ratings of AAA through 
CCC may also be assigned a + or – sign to indicate relative creditworthiness within the 
major credit rating category. A borrower who has defaulted on most or all of its 
obligations receives a rating of D. A borrower who is under regulatory supervision 
because poor financial conditions receives a rating of R. 
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Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain, commonly called PIIGS. The 
peripheral euro area economies were hit particularly hard. Although fiscal 
profligacy was more or less typical, it was not the most important reason for 
having been struck by the recession so severely. 
Each of these countries was characterized by specific conditions. Spain 
responded to recession by employing Keynesian stimulus policies in 2008, 
running large public deficits that grew rapidly. Italy and Belgium had joined 
EMU with a debt level over 60 percent of GDP, which meant exceeding the 
rule, with the union’s expectation that it could be reduced due to the 
„satisfactory pace”. This pace was the result of creative accounting employed 
by France as well, constituting government expenditures and government 
revenues. Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain had two main features in 
common.  
The first is that they did not produce existing recoveries from the 2008–
2009 recessions, while the German economy started to recover, though weakly, 
in 2010 and 2011. The second, the PIIGS had large borrowing requirements 
because of high deficits or large debts or both. The need of frequently selling 
large quantities of bonds leaves the countries vulnerable to self-fulfilling debt 
crises (Conesa and Kehoe 2012). Such a crisis occurs when investors expect a 
government to have trouble in repaying its debt and they are unwilling to pay 
a high price for new government bonds. As a result, the low value makes it 
difficult for the government to repay the old bonds that become due and thus 
fulfill the expectation.  
The PIIGS had three characteristics in common related to the problems 
which occured in these economies: specific domestic instabilities, current 
account deficits and the common currency and contagion from the US.  Spain 
experienced a housing and construction boom. The fall in housing prices and 
construction jobs as well as bankruptcies of the largest construction companies 
lead to its increased budget deficit and public debt. Irish public deficit and debt 
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began to soar in 2008 and 2009, following the burst of the housing bubble 
resulting in the collapse of the six major private banks guaranteed by the Irish 
government. Greece was growing rapidly at the beginning of the 2000s and 
was accompanied by heavy government borrowing. The country used 
fraudulent accounting practices to disguise its serious violations of the three-
percent-deficit Maastricht criterion. Portugal benefitted from the low interest 
rates in terms of borrowing, nevertheless, it ended up in large public debt. The 
country had over-expenditures into large public projects including constructing 
stadiums. Mismanagement in public services and investment bubbles led to a 
rising public debt and an unsustainable fiscal position. Greece and Italy with 
sensitive public debt levels before the crisis suffered from an additional 
constraint of high level of corruption in politics. The inflow of foreign capital 
was used inefficiently to finance consumption and maintain political power. 
The second common feature was the introduction of the euro. Large 
current account deficits were induced since it became cheaper for the 
peripheral economies to borrow on the international market leading to a 
dependency on credit from abroad. When this credit flow stopped, they found 
themselves in a typical sudden credit stop (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). 
Domestic imbalances became more visible once the foreign inflow of credit 
stopped. 
Apart from worsening fiscal balances and the sudden stop of credit, the 
third contributor to trigger the sovereign debt crisis was the spread of outside 
contagion, particularly from the US. The financial crisis that started in the US 
quickly spread worldwide and brought the domestic instabilities of the euro 
area economies onto the surface. Peripheral economies which were dependent 
on low cost capital from abroad to finance their consumption and government 
expenditures were inflicted painfully.  
Peripheral euro area economies enjoyed particularly favourable 
economic conditions before the start of the crisis at the beginning of the 2000s. 
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Some of them grew well beyond their potential levels of GDP indicating that 
their economies were overheated.  Greece’s growth was fuelled by its rising 
debt and large capital inflows and was growing 8.0 percent above its potential 
GDP. Behind the growth of Spain and Ireland the driving forces were the asset 
price booms in housing and construction resulting in an output gap similar to 
that of Greece. The economies of Portugal and Italy were not so overheated 
but struggled with similar structural problems. Peripheral economies 
experienced rising current account deficits while Germany produced a large 
CA surplus in the period between the introduction of the euro and the start of 
the crisis, contrary to the fact that they used to experience CA surpluses prior 
to the introduction of the common currency with the exception of Greece. As 
for their fiscal positions, it was not until the start of the crisis that it began to 
deterioriate.  
I conlude that it was not fiscal profligacy to blame for such a severe 
sovereign debt crisis in spite of its actual existence. The combination of 
contagion coming from the outside and these economies’ exaggerated reliance 
on foreign capital inflows aggravated the systemic risk of each country. 
Running a current account deficit implies running a surplus in the capital 
account. Capital inflows can be transferred to serve various purposes. 
Investment in production allows deficit to remain. Financing consumption or 
government expenditures results in an asset price boom or an unsustainable 
fiscal position, as the example demonstrates it in Ireland, Spain and to a certain 
degree in the US or in Greece, Portugal and Italy. In summary, inflow transfers 
ended up in consumption increasing steadily with investments being more 
cyclical and volatile. 
History of debt defaults, financial contagion, inflation crises and banking 
crises of Greece before the common currency was introduced was reflected by 
its higher bond yields as a risk premium. Comparing the spreads leads to a high 
difference between Greek and German bonds. With the introduction of the 
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euro, the spread started diminishing, making the risks non-perceivable and 
Greek debt seemed to be financially as safe an investment as the German debt. 
It relates to every peripheral euro area bond in the market, owing to the ECB 
policy i.e. avoiding inflation and currency instability in these economies. 
Consequently, taking no fiscal responsibility while borrowing at low 
rates to fuel consumption driving GDP above its potential level resulted in high 
government spending in Greece and Portugal, while Ireland and Spain 
experienced housing market booms. Government expenditures also show a 
rising trend for each country (Losoncz, 2014). 
Low interest rates in the euro area and attractive investment opportunities 
in periphery economies fuelled investments in periphery economies mainly 
from the core. The risk of default was reduced by the fact that the euro was 
backed up by all euro area nations. The asset prices kept rising fuelling 
domestic asset bubbles. This process was maintained until US financial 
contagion throughout the world put an end to capital inflows. Due to the fact 
that peripheral euro area economies were no longer able to issue debt in their 
own currencies, the sudden stop in 2009 pushed them into a sovereign debt 
crisis. 
The impact of outside contagion can be summarized as follows. Banking 
crises in advanced economies lead to a decline in growth and export thus 
limiting their ability to service their debts. Slow rate of growth of the world 
economy has a downward impact on commodity prices reducing export 
earnings to their manufacturers thus affecting their debt service. A credit 
squeeze caused by banking crises in global financial centers worsens the 
emerging market economies’ access to credit facilities, which leads to 
contraction of their economic activity. Banking crises undermine investor 
confidence and prevent them from taking risk through shifting them to safe 
assets such as low-yield government securities. In the end, emerging markets 
will find themselves without borrowing and less attractive to investors. 
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Banks in the euro area were buying the peripheral debt as part of their 
zero risk-weighted assets, According to the capital adequacy rules of Basel II, 
capital requirement for holding sovereign debt was just 1.6 percent. 
Consequently, banks were to lend to sovereigns instead of businesses the 
regulatory requirement on which was 8.0 percent (Basel II Capital Rules). The 
possible outcome of an artificially created EU bank demand for peripheral debt 
would mean higher debts in Italy and Greece. High exposure of EU banks to 
peripheral debt and the deterioriating fiscal positions of these economies even 
further endangered by the Basel accords would increase the systemic risks for 
their banks as well. In addition, in case of Ireland and Spain the boom’s turning 
into a bust brought a soaring unemployment.  
Fiscal deficits and rising public debts made investors exit from euro area 
peripheral debt. Although the current account deficit proved to be the main 
reason behind their bubbles, investors make the decision to buy government 
bonds based on the government’s solvency outlook. As soon as they perceive 
signs which indicate decreasing probability of remaining solvent, government 
debts of this kind become a risky investment.  
Loss of confidence further strengthens the banks’ reluctance to lend and 
as corporations in the euro area depend on bank financing to a greater extent 
than their American counterparts, the impact of lower economic activity as a 
consequence may have serious effect on the real economy of the euro area. 
Higher bond yields or spreads over the German bonds reflect investors’ doubts 
about bond issuers’ ability to service their liabilities. Higher costs of borrowing 
and more illiquidity for these countries will inevitably lead to their insolvency.5 
The rise of bond yields in Italy, Spain and France, and the illiquidity of German 
                                                          
5 When the bond yield spread rises above 500 basis points, this implies higher costs for debt 
holders in the form of margin requirements (collateral payments when bond prices fall) and 
could lead to a further cycle of higher yields. It happened to Ireland before its bonds were 
given a “junk” investment grade. 
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bonds was a response of the markets to political incompetence. Short-term 
fixes cannot replace a strategy targeting deficit reduction and restoring growth. 
The ECB refused to act as lender of last resort as it could not replace the 
governments in restoring investor confidence. If it had done so and monetized 
debt, it might have led to higher inflation.  
A related question is why sovereign debt crises like those in Europe do 
not currently threaten countries like Japan, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States, although they also have large public debts and have suffered 
from the recent recession. One of the two main differences in the US is that the 
central government has the power to raise substantial resources through 
taxation, while the EU has not. The other is that each has its own currency the 
value of which can fluctuate freely to offset changes in economic conditions. 
In this chapter, I presented an analysis of the causes and consequences 
of the euro area crisis. The next chapters will focuse on the policy responses 
and potential remedies. 
3.6. DEFLATIONARY PRESSURE 
Below, I will discuss deflation as a negative effect in the context of the 
global financial crisis and a possible consequence of the processes and central 
bank responses in particular. 
Deflation is defined as a sustained and broad decrease in price level of 
goods and services in an economy over a priod of time. 
The IS-LM model suggests deflation is caused by a shift in the supply 
and demand curve for goods and services, particularly a fall in the aggregate 
level of demand. It increases the real value of debt and may result in a 
deflationary spiral. The process of “debt deflation”, i.e., the increase in the real 
value of nominal debt obligations brought about by falling prices, erodes the 
net worth position of borrowers (Ábel et al, 2014b). 
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A weakening financial position both affects the borrower's actions (e.g. 
the firm may try to conserve financial capital by laying off workers or cutting 
back on investment) and also, by worsening the agency problems in the 
borrower-lender relationship, impairs access to new credit. Thus, as discussed 
in detail in Bernanke and Gertler (1990), “financial distress” (such as one 
induced by debt deflation) can in principle impose deadweight losses on an 
economy, even if firms do not undergo liquidation. Debt instruments, including 
deposits, are set in money terms. Deflation thus weakens the financial positions 
of borrowers, both non-financial firms and banks. 
Bank liabilities, primarily deposits, are almost entirely fixed in nominal 
terms. On the asset side banks hold either primarily debt instruments, or 
combinations of debt and equity. Ownership of debt and equity is essentially 
equivalent to direct ownership of capital, therefore the bank's liabilities are 
nominal and its assets are real, so an unanticipated deflation begins to squeeze 
the bank's capital position immediately. 
Concerns about deflation usually emerge after big financial crises or 
asset - bubble bursts. This period was, for instance, the Asian crisis of 1997, 
the dotcom bubble of 2000-2002 and the global financial crisis of 2008. These 
concerns have been existing in recent years, owing to Japan's experiencing its 
asset bubble burst in the early 1990s. In the wake of the financial crisis, the 
Fed and the other central banks have released great amounts of quantitative 
easing6. 
Easy lending opportunity, however, have not been used for 
infrastructure, R&D or technology development. Although the unemployment 
rate is down, wage growth is lagging behind the desirable 3.5 to 4.0 percent. 
The euro area as a whole grew by only 0.3 percent in the last quarter of 2015, 
                                                          
6 Quantitative easing is an unconventional monetary policy means by which a central bank 
buys government securities or other financial assets from commercial banks or from the 
market in order to lower interest rates and increase the money supply. 
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with Finland, Italy and Greece posting a negative growth rate and Portugal and 
France virtually stagnating. It can be traced back to insufficient global demand 
for supporting current levels of production. Once consumer spending begins to 
decelerate, corporate sector begins deferring or slashing capital expenditures. 
Corporations may also begin to reduce the workforce in order to maintain 
profitability. This ends up in a vicious circle. Such contraction in consumer 
and corporate spending can trigger a recession. 
The slowdown of economic activity implies that part of the debt 
accumulated in the world economy is unsustainable. The world emerged from 
the 2008 crisis with massive private and public sector debts. The 
macroeconomic policies pursued after 2008 did not really contribute to 
reducing this debt. It was rather shifted from one sector to another or from 
some geographic area to another. Insufficient growth do not allow this debt to 
be repaid thus another crisis is likely to occur. The interconnectedness of global 
finance means that no economy is shielded from such risks. The slowing down 
of global output and trade affects stock markets through financial investment 
perceptions by questioning the profitability of many economic activities. 
Increasing fear that many of the assets that are held are overvalued may 
generate their massive sales in the market. 
One way the Fed and other central banks can combat deflationary trends 
is through Negative Interest Rate Policy (NIRP).7 It is a stimulus measure 
deployed to boost lending and consumption activity whereby the nominal 
interest rates are set with a negative value. A negative interest rate will force 
banks to transfer the increase in the cost of holding the deposits to the 
customers instead of crediting their account for holding their money. In theory, 
setting the negative interest rates will reduce borrowing costs for the 
                                                          
7 The Swiss government successfully implemented the NIRP in the early 1970s to counter 
the appreciation of the currency, as investors were hedging their positions in other parts of 
the world by buying Swiss franc. Sweden and Denmark also used the NIRP in 2010 and 
2012 respectively to prevent influx of money into their economies. 
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companies and individuals. This will provide incentive to businesses and 
individuals to invest. 
Succeeding the global financial crisis, the European Central Bank was 
the first major central bank to employ negative interest rates in 2014 to prevent 
countries in the euro area from facing a deflationary cycle. The ECB was 
followed by Japan, while the Fed was to use this policy if inflation rate in the 
US turned negative. In case the Fed decides to implement policy, the investors 
need to be aware of the logic behind NIRP how their portfolio will be affected. 
It has stayed away from manipulating interest rates, instead, they have chosen 
to implement a long term quantitative easing policy. 
The QE program i.e. the expansion of the money supply of dollar that 
lasted for nearly two years resulted in fact in no increase in the inflation rates.8 
These measures have encouraged businesses and households to hold on to their 
cash and continue to postpone their purchases. Lower spending will lead to less 
demand, which will, in turn, lead to increased job losses and lower profits. 
The question arises: why QE has been ineffective in increasing inflation? 
My argument is as follows. Market decisions are rather driven by the 
information that quantitative easing suggests about central bank’s goals in 
terms of interest rates of bonds, than the actual sales and purchases.  Put it 
differently, information as a signal drives decision making and market 
behaviour more intensely than real actions. 
I presume that central banks seem to have won the battle against deflation 
but they are not sure to win the war. 
  
                                                          
8 Despite massive central bank asset purchases in the US, the Fed is currently falling short of 
its 2 percent inflation target. Further, Switzerland and Japan, which have balance sheets that 
are much larger than that of the US relative to GDP, have been experiencing very low inflation 
or deflation. 
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PART 4 – THE RESPONSE OF MONETARY POLICY TO THE CRISIS 
4.1. REASONS FOR THE DIFFERENCES IN MONETARY POLICY RESPONSES 
The global financial crisis and associated recessions have shown the 
limits of policy measures. This chapter will discuss the ability of 
macroeconomic and financial sector policies to mitigate the costs of such 
episodes. Research has found various types of policies that attempt to mitigate 
the cost and reduce the duration of recessions. I will examine whether 
countercyclical policies can worsen or mitigate recession outcomes. Effects 
associated with expansionary policies is also worthwhile discussing.  
The European Central Bank (ECB), the Federal Reserve System (Fed), 
the Bank of England (BoE) and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) differ in terms of their 
tasks or legal statuses while they show more similarities in their institutional 
structures, monetary frameworks and in the use of instruments. These 
structural differences need to be taken into consideration when comparing 
monetary policy responses to crisis between the Fed, the BoE and the ECB. 
Central banking practices in the world have evolved towards greater 
independence, transparency and the adoption of monetary policy committees. 
This trend has contributed to reducing the differences among these three 
institutions and can also be seen among other central banks.  
The differences include communication strategies, nevertheless, the 
responsiveness of the financial market seems to be high for both the 
Eurosystem and the Fed in terms of monetary policy inclinations and views on 
the economic outlook. The Fed does not quantify its definition of price 
stability, while the ECB and the BoJ do. 
 As for the economic and financial environment, over the past two 
decades all three central banks have faced a series of diverse challenges, some 
of them were country-specific, as in the case of Japan, and others more global 
in nature. 
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The Fed made clear its objective of preventing a meltdown (Blinder, 
2012) and gained credibility in spite of the fact that it temporarily suspended 
its commitment to price stability. Euro area’s output had fallen behind that of 
the US in 2009 and had not been able to catch up.  
I conclude it was due to the delay in economic stimulus. In addition, the 
credibility of the ECB was not strengthened by its deeds (Fatas and Summers 
2015). With the core inflation rate in below one percent a year, the euro area 
slipped into a low inflation trap, well below its stated target of 2.0 percent a 
year. 
The monetary policy responses to the crisis by the Federal Reserve, the 
Bank of England and the European Central Bank have been different because 
of the large differences in their institutional set-up, structural differences in the 
financial markets and economic differences. Different use of the non-
conventional policy measures stem from these differences. I will summarize 
them below. 
The center of the crisis was located in the US during the period 2007 and 
2009. It moved to the euro area at the end of 2009 and at the beginning of 2010. 
It was the reason why monetary policy responses to the crises of Fed, BoE and 
ECB were done at different times. A decline in financial asset prices escalated 
in a financial crisis, but while in the US and in the UK, it was centered around 
subprime assets, in the euro area, it was centered around government debt. 
Subprime assets did not actually have the value they were supposed to. 
Sovereign debt was considered risk-free, which is uasually used by banks as 
collateral.  
As for monetary transmission mechanism in the US, 25.0 percent of 
corporate external financing is done by banks while 75.0 percent through 
financial markets. In comparison, in the euro area 75.0 percent of corporate 
external financing is conducted by banks and 25.0 percent through financial 
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markets. This proportion in the UK is approximately 50-50 percent (Solt, 
2018). 
In addition, the US and the UK have a single sovereign Treasury bond 
and Treasury bill market. It is easier for the Fed and the BoE to perform 
monetary policy than for the ECB, which has to deal with 19 different Treasury 
bond and bill markets. 
The ECB has one primary objective, price stability and the other goals 
are subordinated to the first.  The Fed and the BoE have more than one 
objectives, monetary stability and financial stability. The financial stability 
goal consists of a sound and stable financial system. The BoE has explicitely 
stated that financial stability is regarded as a major goal. 
„The primary objective of the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB) shall be to maintain price stability”.9 According to Article 127 (5) 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union the ESCB „shall contribute 
to the stability of the financial system”. The price stability target is set at an 
average Harmonized Consumer Price Index (HCPI), weighted by the relative 
GDP of each Member State in the Union, below 2.0 percent but close to 2.0 
percent over the medium term. 
The Fed set three main objectives besides monetary stability. They are: 
permanent economic growth, maximum employment and moderate long-term 
interest rates. „The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the 
Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the 
monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long run 
potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of 
maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates.”10 
Its target for price stability is measured by the consumer price index of 
household consumption and its present target is two percent in the long run, 
                                                          
9 Article 127 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
10 Section 2A of the Federal Reserve Act 1913, amended in 1977 
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while its present estimated long run unemployment rate aims at a tendency 
from around 5.2 percent to 6.0 percent. 
The BoE expressed the „lender of last resort” operations as a mean to 
ensure financial stability. Compared to the ECB this function is stronger for 
the BoE.  
The ESCB11 is allowed to buy debt instruments from euro area member 
states in the secondary markets,12 as the ECB has done so during the crisis, on 
the condition it is necessary to meet the ESCB objectives. To ensure liquidity 
in the dysfunctional market segments the Securities Markets Programme 
(SMP) was established. It includes interventions in public and private debt 
securities markets with the objective of restoring an appropriate monetary 
policy transmission mechanism and the effective conduct of monetary policy. 
Thus under its financial stability mandate of Article 127 Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) the Bank launched the Longer-
Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) and provided massive liquidity. The 
impact of the interventions is offset through specific operations in order to re-
absorb the liquidity injected. It implies the monetary policy is oriented towards 
price stability in the medium run. 
Another difference concerns inflation targeting framework. Central 
banks tend to follow monetary policy rules based mostly on the Taylor rule.13 
Their short-term goal is to stabilize the economy with the objective of 
maintaining long-term growth. The monetary strategy to achieve these 
objectives shows differences for central banks discussed above. The Fed 
follows a quantitative monetary strategy similar to a Taylor rule with an 
inflation targeting set at 2.0 percent in the long run. The BoE uses inflation 
                                                          
11 European System of Central Banks, The ESCB comprises the ECB and the national central 
banks (NCBs) of all EU Member States whether they have adopted the euro or not. 
12 Article 123 of the TFEU prohibits directly monetary financing of the Euro area member 
states through overdrafts and credit facilities and direct purchasing from debt instruments. 
13 The Taylor rule links policy rates mechanically to the deviation of inflation from target 
and the output gap 
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targeting with a target of 2.0 percent as well. The ECB also uses inflation 
targeting. In a monetary union there is only one common inflation target, which 
is applied to all member countries. Inflation projections are not regarded as the 
only tool to make decisions. The Bank’s economic analysis together with other 
monetary and credit forecasts are used for decisionmaking. The ECB 
communicates all its policy interventions by referring to its mandate to 
maintain an HICP14 inflation rate of close to but below 2.0 percent. 
The ECB decision making in monetary policy is done through a more 
complex system of governance than that of the Fed and even more than that of 
the BoE, taking into account the number of the ECB Governing Council (GC) 
members in comparison with that of the FeD Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) and the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in the BoE. The BoE 
Monetary Policy Committee decisions are published in detail as well as its 
latest forecasts for inflation, output growth and a record of its meetings. The 
Fed Federal Open Market Committee meetings minutes are also published 
containing the policy decisions and the overall discussions but with a delay. 
The ECB Governing Council contrarily does not publish the minutes of its 
decisions although the decision taken are explained at a press conference by its 
President. 
4.2. MONETARY POLICY MEASURES TAKEN IN THE EURO AREA 
Since the financial crisis broke out, a more active monetary policy has 
been implemented by the European Central Bank and by other major central 
banks. 
There have been changes in balance sheet policies in terms of the 
composition and expansion of assets and liabilities (Svensson, 2014). The 
adoption of a new mandate for the supervision of the euro area banking system 
                                                          
14 Consumer price inflation in the euro area is measured by the Harmonized Index of 
Consumer Prices (HICP). The HICP is compiled by Eurostat and the national statistical 
institutes in accordance with harmonized statistical methods. 
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meant a fundamental change in late 2014. The communication policy aims to 
enhance confidence and reduce uncertainty about the future growth of the 
economy. Nevertheless, some fundamental features have not been amended 
regarding the institutional framework or the independence of the Bank. The 
monetary policy strategy of the ECB has remained at its mandate to maintain 
a Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) inflation rate of close to but 
below 2.0 percent (Darvas and Merler, 2013). 
The measures implemented aimed specifically at enhancing credit 
support. They are defined as „non-standard, unconventional measures” and are 
considered part of the Bank’s toolkit, but „by definition exceptional and 
temporary in nature” (ECB, 2014, February 5). 
4.2.1. The Modified Refinancing Operations of the European Central Bank 
The ECB policy response to the crisis focused on ensuring the provision 
of the liquidity with the interbank market and other short-term financing being 
frozen. Modifications to the Bank’s operation included cutting the policy rate 
from 4.25 percent to 1.0 percent and an additional lowering to 0.15 percent in 
the periods from October 2008 to May 2009 and from December 2011 to June 
2014 respectively. „Enhanced credit support” implies allocating liquidity 
through Main Refinancing Operations (MROs) and Long-Term Refinancing 
Operations (LTROs). It covers a period between the start of the global financial 
crisis in September 2008 and April 2010. They were implemented at a fixed 
rate with full-allotment to reassure market participants that in case of 
unforeseen liquidity shortages the banks refinance through the ECB at a known 
rate for a known period according to their needs. As a result, banks had 
unlimited access to central bank liquidity with collateral requirements being 
eased several times including the extension of the list of assets eligible as 
collateral. The ECB lowered the rating threshold for collateral and agreed 
currency swaps with major CBs, including the Fed, the BoE, the Swiss 
National Bank, and the BoJ.  
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The maturity of long-term refinancing operations was extended from the 
original three months to six and, by a further extension, to one year.15 In 
December 2011 and February 2012 two massive Very Long-Term Refinancing 
Operations (VLTROs) were conducted with a maturity of three years. 
Consequently, the maturity of the ECB’s balance sheet has lengthened. The 
asset side of the consolidated balance sheet of the Eurosystem consists mainly 
of liquidity provided to the banks approximately 80 percent of which has a 
maturity of three years. The use of the Long-term Refinancing Operations 
facility shows an assymetry. Banks in Spain, Italy, Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal account for 70 to 80 percent of the total borrowing since 2010 (ECB, 
2011). 
On the other hand, banks in the North reduced their dependence on the 
ECB operations to minimum levels owing to the fact that they had capital 
inflows in quest for safety. The VLTROs were designed to be a euro area-wide 
policy but mainly the banks from the South of the euro area affected by the 
liquidity crisis to a higher degree took this opportunity. 
The excess liquidity in the euro area has dropped significantly since 2013 
and has been nearly completely re-absorbed as banks were allowed to repay 
LTRO facility credit before maturity. I have studied the empirical literature on 
Long-Term Refinancing Operations (Angelini et al., 2011), (Abbassi and 
Linzert, 2011), (Darracq and De Santis, 2013). I can conclude that this facility 
was an effective measure to deal with the liquidity crisis of 2011 and 2012. 
The facility ensured a stable three-year financing of the banks, subsidized the 
banking system, contributed to the restoration of its profitability and provided 
support to the government bond market, as banks partly used their funds for 
buying government bonds due to their higher yields. Without the facility 
                                                          
15 The ECB implemented three and six-month full allotment Long-Term Refinancing 
Operations (LTROs) in November 2008 in € 300 billion plus 12-months LTROs in June 
2009 in € 442 billion).  
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existing lending might have collapsed. Nonetheless, little did LTROs do to 
prompt lending to the private sector, as banks rather deposited ECB funds at 
the central bank or purchased government bonds instead. 
The liquidity injected in the system during the banking crisis resulted in 
a significant increase in the balance sheet of the ECB. It means an 
approximately a 30 percent rise compared to the ordinary year on year increase 
of four percent. The main change in the size of the ECB balance sheet was 
caused by the two Very Long-Term Refinancing Operations. The first was 
implemented in December 2011, with an amount of € 489 billion, and the 
second in February 2012, with an amount of € 529 billion, both with a three-
year maturity and the option for early repayment after one year. In addition to 
these measures, the reserve requirements were reduced from 2.0 percent to 1.0 
percent. 
At the end of the period between September 2008 to April 2010, the ECB 
introduced the Covered Bond Purchase Programme 1 (CBPP1)16 to promote 
the ongoing decrease in money market term rates, to encourage lending and to 
improve market liquidity in the private debt securities market. 
The first major change in communication tools of the ECB took place in 
2012 when risk premia for Spain and Italy reached their peak. Draghi17 (July 
26, 2012) confirmed that within their mandate, the ECB is ready to do 
„whatever it takes to preserve the euro.” 
The second change the ECB reflected was presented in April 2013 as 
shifting from „non-standard measures are temporary in nature” to „policy 
stance will remain accommodative for as long as needed” (Draghi, April 15, 
2013). The third change appeared in April 2014, suggesting the possibility of 
                                                          
16 CBPP1 programme reached a relatively small amount of €61 billion. In November 2011, 
the ECB launched a second CBPP with a total volume of €40 billion but interrupted it in 
October 2012 after covered bonds totalling €16.4 billion had been purchased. 
17 Mario Draghi succeeded Jean-Claude Trichet as the President of the European Central 
Bank as the on  1 November 2011. 
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implementing „unconventional instruments” owing to the risk of a prolonged 
period of low inflation (Draghi, April 3, 2014). 
4.2.2. The Securities Market Programme (SMP) and Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) 
The Securities Market Programme was initiated in May 2010. This 
period from May 2010 to August 2011 was characterized by the sovereign 
crisis mounting rapidly, the Greek crisis and the bailouts of Greece, Ireland, 
and Portugal. Nonetheless, the ECB was reluctant to act as a lender of last 
resort for sovereigns. In this phase the ECB bought Greek, Irish, Portuguese, 
Italian and Spanish government bonds to be held to maturity. The purchases 
were fully sterilized through fixed term deposits because of potential inflation 
fears. The ECB raised interest rates from 1.0 percent to 1.25 percent in April 
2011 and to 1.5 percent in July 2011. The SMP was not renewed. See Table 1. 
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Table 1 Key ECB Interest Rates 
 
With effect 
from: 
Deposit facility Main refinancing operations Marginal lending 
facility  
 
Fixed rate 
tenders 
Variable rate 
tenders 
Change 
5 
 
 Fixed rate 
Minimum bid 
rate  
 Level Change Level Level Level Change  
 1 2 3 4 6 7  
1999 1 Jan. 2.00 - 3.00 -  - 4.50 -  
 4 Jan. 2) 2.75 0.75 3.00 -  ... 3.25 -1.25 
 22 Jan. 2.00 -0.75 3.00 -  ... 4.50 1.25 
 9 Apr. 1.50 -0.50 2.50 -  -0.50 3.50 -1.00 
 5 Nov. 2.00 0.50 3.00 -  0.50 4.00 0.50 
 2000 4 Feb. 2.25 0.25 3.25 -  0.25 4.25 0.25 
 17 Mar. 2.50 0.25 3.50 -  0.25 4.50 0.25 
 28 Apr. 2.75 0.25 3.75 -  0.25 4.75 0.25 
 9 June 3.25 0.50 4.25 -  0.50 5.25 0.50 
 28 June 3) 3.25 ... - 4.25 ... 5.25 ...  
 1 Sep. 3.50 0.25 - 4.50 0.25 5.50 0.25 
 6 Oct. 3.75 0.25 - 4.75 0.25 5.75 0.25 
 2001 11 May 3.50 -0.25 - 4.50 -0.25 5.50 -0.25 
 31 Aug. 3.25 -0.25 - 4.25 -0.25 5.25 -0.25 
 18 Sep. 2.75 -0.50 - 3.75 -0.50 4.75 -0.50 
 9 Nov. 2.25 -0.50 - 3.25 -0.50 4.25 -0.50 
 2002 6 Dec. 1.75 -0.50 - 2.75 -0.50 3.75 -0.50 
 2003 7 Mar. 1.50 -0.25 - 2.50 -0.25 3.50 -0.25 
 6 June 1.00 -0.50 - 2.00 -0.50 3.00 -0.50 
 2005 6 Dec. 1.25 0.25 - 2.25 0.25 3.25 0.25 
 2006 8 Mar. 1.50 0.25 - 2.50 0.25 3.50 0.25 
 15 June 1.75 0.25 - 2.75 0.25 3.75 0.25 
 9 Aug. 2.00 0.25 - 3.00 0.25 4.00 0.25 
 11 Oct. 2.25 0.25 - 3.25 0.25 4.25 0.25 
 13 Dec. 2.50 0.25 - 3.50 0.25 4.50 0.25 
 2007 14 Mar. 2.75 0.25 - 3.75 0.25 4.75 0.25 
 13 June 3.00 0.25 - 4.00 0.25 5.00 0.25 
 2008 9 July 3.25 0.25 - 4.25 0.25 5.25 0.25 
 8 Oct. 2.75 -0.50 - -  - 4.75 -0.50 
 9 Oct. 4) 3.25 0.50 - -  - 4.25 -0.50 
 15 Oct. 5) 3.25 ... 3.75 -  -0.50 4.25 ...  
 12 Nov. 2.75 -0.50 3.25 -  -0.50 3.75 -0.50 
 10 Dec. 2.00 -0.75 2.50 -  -0.75 3.00 -0.75 
 2009 21 Jan. 1.00 -1.00 2.00 -  -0.50 3.00 ...  
 11 Mar. 0.50 -0.50 1.50 -  -0.50 2.50 -0.50 
 8 Apr. 0.25 -0.25 1.25 -  -0.25 2.25 -0.25 
 13 May 0.25 ... 1.00 -  -0.25 1.75 -0.50 
 2011 13 Apr. 0.50 0.25 1.25 -  0.25 2.00 0.25 
 13 July 0.75 0.25 1.50 -  0.25 2.25 0.25 
 9 Nov. 0.50 -0.25 1.25 -  -0.25 2.00 -0.25 
 14 Dec. 0.25 -0.25 1.00 -  -0.25 1.75 -0.25 
 2012 11 July 0.00 -0.25 0.75 -  -0.25 1.50 -0.25 
 2013 8 May 0.00 ... 0.50 -  -0.25 1.00 -0.50 
 13 Nov. 0.00 ... 0.25 -  -0.25 0.75 -0.25 
 2014 11 June -0.10 -0.10 0.15 -  -0.10 0.40 -0.35 
 
 10 Sep. -0.20 -0.10 0.05 -  -0.10 0.30 -0.10 
2015 9 Dec. -0.30 -0.10 0.05 -  ... 0.30 ...  
 2016 16 Mar. -0.40 -0.10 0.00 -  -0.05 0.25 -0.05 
           
           
Source: ECB, 2016 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/monetary/rates/html/index.en.html 
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The impact of SMP can be assessed positive, as it contributed to reducing 
the level and the volatility of government bond yields (Manganelli, 2012). The 
extraordinary operating measures of the ECB, such as the implementation of 
six-month, one-year and three-year Long-Term Refinancing Operations, 
Securities Markets Programme, Covered Bond Purchase Programme 1 and 2 
(CBPP1, CBPP2) may fall in the category of unconventional measures, as they 
use the CB balance sheet to directly affect market prices and conditions beyond 
a short-term interest rate (Borio and Disyatat, 2011). These measures intended 
to change the composition of the assets on their balance sheet, the so-called 
qualitative easing (Lenza et al 2010). 
The interest rate policy of the ECB included reducing the MRO interest 
rate to 0.75 percent in July 2011 due to bond market developments in Italy and 
Spain.  The Bank reactivated SMP and implemented Covered Bond Purchase 
Programme 2 (CBPP2). 
The ECB introduced the new Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) in 
September 2012. In fact, it was the the announcement that affected European 
bond yields as the programme had not been used. It allowed the ECB to 
purchase unlimited amounts of government bonds of member states that are 
already subject to a European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The OMT was to 
safeguard „an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of 
the monetary policy” (ECB, 2012).  
The period from August 2011 to May 2013 saw the euro area sovereign 
debt crisis accompanied with increased banking sector strain, which compelled 
the ECB to declare in August 2012 that the non-standard measures would be 
there as long as necessary. Thus the change in communication according to 
which „all our non-standard monetary policy measures are temporary in 
nature” resulted in increased uncertainty, even more liquidity demand and 
rapid deleveraging. The ECB was forced to become a committed lender of last 
resort for the banking system. 
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Between January 2013 to May 2013 with less tension in money and bond 
markets and the banks’ repaying their loans, the size of the ECB balance sheet 
and excess liquidity showed a decreasing trend. Early repayment18 of VLTROs 
implies that the banks are less reliant on ECB funds but it is the indicator of 
banks’ reluctance to credit as well.  Between June 2013 to May 2014 money 
market interest rates showed remarkable volatility, which was reflected in the 
variability of EONIA19 rate. The ECB, considering inflationary outlook as 
well, responded by reducing the MRO rate by 25 basis points to 0.25 percent 
in November 2013. The marginal lending facility rate was cut to 0.75 percent 
and deposit rate to 0.0 percent, reducing the corridor width from 150 basis 
points to 75 basis points and became asymmetric. 
4.2.3. Introduction of a Forward Guidance Strategy  
Forward guidance as a new monetary policy tool, an innovation in the 
Bank’s communication strategy, was introduced in July 2013 with the main 
idea invented by Krugman.20 It aims to clarify the future path of key interest 
rates, reduce uncertainty and the interest rate volatility (Filardo and Hofmann, 
2014). 
This policy leads to a drop in short-term rates for an extended period of 
time, while inflation expectations increase. Decreasing real real long-term rates 
boosts investment and consumption. As forward guidance is not time 
consistent, it is not credible. Its effectiveness has been undemined by the lack 
of benchmark or thresholds based on relevant variables, and by the fact that 
market participants anticipate that rates will be raised earlier. Moreover, 
forward guidance has not been strictly defined. 
                                                          
18 VLTROs were implemented with a three-year maturity and the option for early repayment 
after one year. 
19 Euro Overnight Index Average. The EONIA rate is the 1-day interbank interest rate for the 
euro area. It can be considered as the 1 day EURIBOR rate 
20Krugman (1998) analyzed the deflation and liquidity trap problem of Japan in the 1990s 
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4.2.4. The Effects of ECB Measures and Responses to the Effects 
Early repayments and the consequent decrease in excess liquidity have 
made the EONIA rate converge towards the rate of MROs since late 2013. As 
an effect of ECB decisions, the EONIA and EURIBOR21 were historically low. 
They have technically reached the zero bound. 
In the second and third quarter of 2014, the euro area economy slowed 
down unexpectedly, while some peripheral countries were falling in recession 
again. Inflation rates continued decreasing, with negative rates spreading to 
several countries and strengthening fears of price deflation. The indicator of 
inflation expectations, the five years on five years inflation-linked swap rate, 
had fallen below 2.25 percent, which the ECB took as an indication that 
medium-term inflation expectations were no longer anchored at the medium-
term price stability target. In 2014, the interest rates on MROs and on the 
deposit facility were lowered by 20 basis points, to 0.05 percent and to -0.20 
percent respectively, while the rate on the marginal lending facility was 
reduced by 45 basis points, to 0.30 percent in line with the Governing 
Council’s Forward Guidance. 
A new series of TLTROs were announced in June, with ECB funding 
tied to the credit provision to the real economy. This funding was made 
available through two windows, in September and December, and was to be 
followed by further windows between March 2015 and June 2016. It was 
provided for up to four years, initially with a 10 basis points surcharge over the 
MROs rate, which was subsequently eliminated in January 2015. 
The ECB launched two private sector asset purchase programmes In fall 
2014, an Asset-Backed Securities Purchase Programme (ABSPP) starting in 
November and a new Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP3) starting in 
October to last for at least two years. The programmes aimed to encourage 
                                                          
21 Euro Interbank Offered Rate. 
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greater lending to the private sector. The incentive to provide loans was 
strengthened by favourable conditions as loans could be securitized, and by 
facilitating bank funding. The amounts altogether took up about €32 billion by 
end of 2014, but the purchases were to continue at a monthly rate of €10 billion. 
The HCPI rate’s turning to negative for the euro area average in 
December 2014 together with weak economy outlook made the ECB 
Governing Council take up quantitative easing (QE). An expanded asset 
purchase programme (EAPP) was launched in January 2015. The programme 
included purchasing private and government securities assets in the value of 
€60 billion per month. 
In the wake of the Lehman collapse and exploding of sovereign debt 
crisis in the euro area, the unconventional measures taken by the central banks 
were mainly aimed at stabilizing specific segments of financial systems. They 
are referred to as „credit easing” They include SMP and VLTROs 
programmes, and similarly the backup facilities established by the Fed. The 
interventions were conducted well before short rates reached their lower 
bound, and can be regarded as lender of last resort function of central banks. 
4.3. UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY OF THE FED 
This chapter introduces the unconventional policy measures of the Fed. 
I have used the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports to collect 
data. 
Quantitative easing (QE) policy in the US was launched immediately in 
November 2008. Fed balance sheet has expanded from US$860 billion at the 
beginning of 2007 to US$4.2 trillion in 2015. In additional, short-term liquidity 
measures, such as the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, were introduced in 
order to support the commercial paper market and reduce the rollover risk. The 
facility included purchasing three-month unsecured and asset backed 
commercial paper of top tier credit rating. 
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4.3.1. Securities Programmes 
Term Asset Backed Securities (TALF) programme of the Fed was 
initiated in November 2008 to deal with liquidity problem in the securitization 
markets for consumer and business Asset Backed Securities (ABS) and 
Collateralised Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) with the intention to 
reopen the new-issue ABS market. The TALF programme provided liquidity 
and capital to the loan asset-backed securities market as follows. The Fed was 
lending funds against asset-backed securities, while credit protection of 
US$100 billion came from the Troubled Asset Relief Programme (TARP) of 
the Treasury Department.  The total amount of TALF loans took up US$71.1 
billion. The volume of outstanding loans was the highest in March 2010 at 
US$48.2 billion. Through the TALF programme, the Federal Reserve seems 
to have been able to prevent the shutdown of lending to consumers and small 
businesses, and could limit the public sector’s risk simultaneously. 
Additional facilities were implemented to make the banks meet their 
liquidity needs. The Term-Auction Facility (TAF) that was intended to provide 
liquidity with a maturity of one month against collateral that could be used to 
borrow overnight at the Fed’s discount window. The impact of QE1 on 
financial markets has been successful as it could reduce rates on government 
bonds, mortgage-backed securities and corporate bonds (Gagnon et al, 2011). 
The MBS purchase programme reduced mortgage rates by about 85 basis 
points in the month after the announcement, and it contributed an additional 
50 basis points towards lowering risk premia once the programme had started 
(Hancock and Passmore, 2011).  Estimating the macro impact of quantitative 
easing QE1 and QE2, it raised the level of real GDP relative to baseline by 3.0 
percent, and inflation is 1.0 percent higher than it would have been without the 
programme (Chung et al, 2011). Regarding the form of QE, Woodford (2012) 
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) found that QE is more effective when private 
assets are bought. 
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4.3.2. The Use of the Moody’s Analytics Model of the Macroeconomy in 
Evaluating the Impacts of Policy Responses 
Macroeconomic models are made to serve three basic functions: 
providing forecasts, answering hypothetical questions by calculating 
counterfactuals, and giving a clear understanding of the present and future state 
of the economy. The Moody’s Analytics model of the macroeconomy can be 
used to illustrate how growth, jobs, unemployment, and other variables might 
have evolved without appropriate policy responses to the crisis. Comparing the 
simulated and actual pathways, the differences can be identified as the policy 
impacts. In the long-run, equilibrium point the expectations are consistent with 
reality. When this has been achieved, the level of real output, interest rates and 
inflation remain stable at equilibrium, values which are governed entirely by 
the supply side of the economy.  
In the short run, a shock can cause spending and inflation to deviate from 
expectations. This results in deviations of current growth, interest and inflation 
rates from their long-run equilibrium values, giving rise to the business cycle. 
The Moody’s Analytics US Macro Model relies most on specifying, 
estimating, and then solving simultaneously a large set of equations that reflect 
the structural functioning of the US economy. This approach was used by the 
Congressional Budget Office to assess the Recovery Act.22 Figure 1 displays 
QE lowered rates supported growth. 
  
                                                          
22 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) commonly referred to as 
the Stimulus or The Recovery Act, was a stimulus package with the rationale of Keynesian 
macroeconomic theory  
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Graph 1 Quantitative Easing Lowered Rates Supported Growth. 
 
source: http://www. moodysanalytics.com/ 
Modelling the Fed’s quantitative easing programs on this basis includes 
a modified Taylor rule in which the federal funds rate is determined. The 
equation links the Fed’s interest rate policy to economic and financial market 
conditions. It includes a measure of the equilibrium funds rate, the difference 
between the unemployment rate and the natural rate, the difference between 
inflation measured by the core consumer expenditure deflator and the Fed’s 
inflation target and the VIX index23 as an approximate indicator for investor 
confidence in the stability of the financial system. See Table 2. 
  
                                                          
23 VIX index is a trademarked ticker symbol for the CBOE Volatility Index, a popular measure 
of the implied volatility of Standard & Poor’s 500 index options. The VIX is calculated by the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). Often referred to as the “fear index” or the “fear 
gauge”, it represents one measure of the market's expectation of stock market volatility over 
the next 30-day period 
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Table 2 What Explains the Federal Funds Rate? 
Dependent variable: Federal Funds Rate    
Method: Least squares    
Sample: 1979Q1 to 2014Q4    
144 observations    
Variable  Coefficie
nt 
Standa
rd 
Error 
t-
statist
ic 
Federal funds rate lagged 1 qtr 0.752  0.045  16.89  
Nominal potential GDP growth  0.258  0.053  4.91  
Difference between actual and natural 
unemployment rate 
-0.203  0.054  -3.73  
Difference between core PCE inflation and 
Fed's target  
0.429  0.084  5.08  
VIX index, 2-qtr moving avg  -0.269  0.172  -1.56  
    
R-squared 0.959    
Durbin-Watson  1.673    
source: http://www.moodysanalytics.com/ 
The nominal equilibrium funds rate equals the sum of the Fed’s inflation 
target and the economy’s estimated growth rate of real potential GDP. 24  
                                                          
24 Potential is determined endogenously using a standard Solow growth model framework, 
with total factor productivity determined exogenously. 
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Graph 2 Fitted Versus Actual Federal Funds Rate 
 
Source: http://www.moodysanalytics.com/ 
Graph 2 shows the fitted funds rate determined by the modified Taylor 
rule and the actual Fed fund rate. The Fed started reducing the funds rate right 
after the crisis broke out. The rate fell to the 0 to 25-basis point lower bound 
in December 2008, due to Fed’s announcement on its first large-scale bond-
buying program aimed to push down long-term interest rates. In the model, the 
fitted funds rate falls below zero as QE has expanded the assets held on the 
Fed’s balance sheet, which has a direct impact on ten-year Treasury bond 
yields and fixed mortgage rates. Thus the two interest rates have effects of wide 
range. As an impact of QE, the lower long-term interest rates support stronger 
economic growth in the macro model via their impact on stock prices and 
housing values and the wealth effects on consumer spending. They boost 
investment through a lower cost of capital and improve current account. 
4.4. MONETARY POLICY RESPONSE IN THE UK  
The Bank of England (BoE) was the first bank to face the negative effects 
of the financial crisis. A year before Lehman Brothers collapsed, in September 
2007 the BoE was compelled to bailout Northern Rock, as it had been unable 
to acquire liquidity in the markets. As a reponse to the intensification of the 
financial crisis, the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) 
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reduced interest rates sharply, with cuts of 3.0 percentage points in Bank Rate 
during 2008 Q4 and a further one and a half percentage points in early 2009. 
In early March 2009, Bank Rate was reduced to half percent, to its lower 
bound. Nevertheless, to meet the 2.0 percent CPI inflation target in the medium 
term, additional measures had to be taken to increase nominal spending. 
 Due to intensified liquidity problems, the BoE implemented the Special 
Liquidity Scheme (SLS) in order to increase the liquidity of the UK banking 
system in April 2008. In the framework of the Scheme, mortgage-backed 
securities were allowed to swap for Treasury bills to reduce the risks of the 
assets. In addition, the Bank widened the range of accepted collateral. Table 3 
summarizes the three different sets of collateral that are eligible in the Bank’s 
operations. The Bank only lends in its intraday and short-term monetary policy 
operations, in which the Bank requires Level A collateral. In its liquidity 
insurance operations, which provide an effective liquidity insurance 
mechanism to the financial system, the Bank also lends against Level B 
collateral and Level C collateral. See Table 3. 
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Table 3 Eligible Collateral Summary 
 Intraday 
liquidity 
Operation
al 
Standing 
Facilities 
Short
-
Term 
Repo 
Indexe
d 
Long-
Term 
Repo 
Discoun
t 
Windo
w 
Facility 
Continge
nt Term 
Repo 
Facility 
Level A  √ √ √ √ √ √ 
(eg highly liquid 
high-quality 
sovereign debt) 
      
Level B    √ √ √ 
(eg liquid 
high-quality 
sovereign, 
supranational, 
mortgage and 
corporate bonds) 
 
 
      
Level C 
(securitisations, 
own-name securities 
and portfolios of 
loans) 
   √ √ √ 
Source:http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/money/publications/redbook.p
df/pg7 
The SLS was introduced in coordination with the Government. To ensure 
that the Bank’s monetary policy goals are not endangered, the Treasury bills 
were being created by Debt Management Office. The drawdown period for the 
SLS closed on 30 January 2009. Due to the Scheme, the Bank’s balance sheet 
expanded up to £185 billion in October 2008, when the Bank announced the 
Discount Window Facilities (DWF). It was designed as an improved Special 
Liquidity Scheme to facilitate bilateral Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) 
operations. The Bank’s lending capacity through DWF was estimated at 
approximately £160 billion. The policy of asset purchases financed by the 
central bank consequently expanding its balance sheet is referred to as 
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quantitative easing (QE). The Bank of England’s asset purchases were mainly 
focused on purchasing a large amount of gilts. 
The Bank started its quantitative easing programme (QE1) at the 
beginning of 2009. The Asset Purchase Facility (APF) was announced in 
January 2009. The program included buying medium-and long-term 
government bonds from the non-bank private sector with the worth of £200 
billion in the period from January 2009 to January 2010. The purchases 
resumed in October 2011 (QE2), largely in response to the impact of the 
growing euro crisis. Further £125 billion of purchases were completed in May 
2012. 
Additional £50 billion was announced in July 2012 and completed in 
November 2012 (QE3). The value of further purchases took up £375 billion in 
2011 and 2012. (Bank of England). The asset purchases represented nearly 30 
percent of the amount of outstanding gilts held by the private sector at the time 
and approximately 14 percent of annual nominal GDP. 
The Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS) was launched in July 2012. The 
FLS is designed give incentive to banks and building societies to increase their 
lending to the UK real economy. Both the price and quantity of funding 
provided were linked to their lending performance. The FLS allows 
participants to borrow UK Treasury Bills in exchange for eligible collateral, 
which consists of all collateral eligible in the Bank’s Discount Window 
Facility. The FLS was extended in April 2013 and has been modified three 
times to allow participants to borrow from the FLS until January 2018 with 
incentives mainly targeting small and medium sized enterprises. 
Together with liquidity support measures taken earlier, these purchases 
expanded the size of the BoE’s balance sheet relative to GDP threefold, 
compared to the pre-crisis period (Cross et al, 2015). The Bank was authorized 
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by the Government to purchase high-quality commercial paper and corporate 
bonds the scale of which was significantly smaller than that of gilt25 purchases. 
The empirical literature finds that the Bank of England’s quantitative 
easing had remarkable impacts on gilt yields, on corporate bond rates and on 
the sterling exchange rate. Asset purchases equivalent to one percent of GDP 
resulted in a 0.18 percentage-point increase in real GDP and in a 0.3 
percentage-point increase in CPI after five to eight quarters (Weale and 
Wieladek, 2014). 
4.4.1. The Potential Effects of Asset Purchases Through Transmission 
Channels 
The stimulus from asset purchases to the economy comes in two ways. 
One is that it stimulates nominal spending thereby inflation generated 
domestically and expenditure. The other comes through transmission channels. 
It may affect expectations and can have an influence on bank lending 
indirectly. The channel may transmit signals on future monetary policy and on 
the Bank’s determination to meet the inflation target. Market participants may 
expect policy rates to remain low. Portfolio balance channel has its effects 
through increased asset prices owing to asset purchases by the central bank. 
Asset sellers are likely to rebalance their portfolios and buy further assets. As 
a result, asset prices increase leading to lower yields and lower borrowing 
costs. It works through reducing the spreads of longer-term interest rates over 
expected policy rates and the required return on risky assets relative to risk-
free assets. 
Liquidity, as a consequence of central bank’s asset purchases, may 
increase asset prices and have an indirect stimulating effect as well. Higher 
asset prices generate more confidence thereby consumer willingness to spend. 
A higher level of liquid assets could encourage banks to extend more new 
                                                          
25 UK Treasury bond 
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loans. Thus channels may function as transmitters of the effects that asset 
purchases can have on the economy, such as policy signals, liquidity premia, 
portfolio, confidence or bank lending effects. 
4.4.2. The Impacts of the Unconventional Monetary Policy in the UK 
The majority of the Bank of England’s asset purchases were of gilts, so 
the largest initial impact was on the gilt market. Table 4 displays a summary 
of asset price reactions to the the announcement of BoE asset purchases. The 
effects of the QE policy can be divided into two main elements: (i) the impact 
of asset purchases on gilt prices and other asset prices and (ii) the effect of 
asset prices on demand and inflation. The analysis of the QE announcement 
effects suggested that asset purchases pushed down medium to long-term gilt 
yields by about 100 basis points, there was an immediate 70 basis points fall 
in investment-grade corporate bond yields and a 150 basis points fall in sub-
investment grade yields (Joyce et al, 2011). See Table 4. 
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Table 4 Summary of Asset Price Movements 
QE1: total of £200bn purchases over 6 
announcements (Feb 09, Mar 09, May 
09, Aug 09, Nov 09, Feb 10). 
QE2/3: total of £175bn purchases over 5 
announcements (Oct 11, Feb 12, May 12, 
July 12, Nov 12). 
Asset  Change 
around QE1 
announcement
s  
Change 4 
March 2009 – 
26 January 
2010  
Change 
around QE2/3 
announcement
s  
Change 5 
October 2011 
- 31 October 
2012  
Gilts  
(5-25 year spot 
rates)  
-104bp  -9bp  +2bp  -45bp  
Corporate 
yields 
(investment 
grade)  
-69bp  -390bp  -7bp  -200bp  
Corporate 
yields  
(high yield)  
-151bp  -1938bp  -11bp  -354bp  
FTSE All-
Share  
-3%  +46%  +4%  +6%  
Sterling ERI  -4%  +4%  1%  +6%  
Source: Bank of England, (Joyce, 2013) 
It is difficult to quantify the wider macroeconomic effects of QE as other 
factors have been important in influencing the UK economy let alone the 
transmission channel effects. To determine the effects of quantitative easening, 
the reaction of longer-maturity government bond yields is to be examined 
through using a Small Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR), which 
contain the policy rate, a government bond yield, real GDP growth and CPI 
inflation. Assume that a negative shock to bond yields leads to a simultaneous 
increase in GDP and CPI inflation without having an effect on policy rates. 
They are constrained at the zero bound. In the model quarterly UK data are 
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used. Sample pre-crisis period spreads from 1992 Q1 to 2007 Q2. Have a QE 
shock of 100 basis points on the ten-year gilt yield. The result is a peak effect 
on the real GDP level of approximately 1.5 percent and on annual CPI inflation 
0.75 percentage points. 
Kapetanios et al (2012) use three different time-series models of varying 
complexity to conduct conditional forecasts under „policy” and „no 
policy”scenarios and then to attribute the difference in the result forecasts to 
the effects of the policy. 
Averaging across the models suggests that QE had a peak effect on the 
level of GDP of around 1.5 percent and a peak effect on annual CPI inflation 
of about 1.25 percentage points.  
An alternative method of estimating the effects of QE is focusing on its 
impact on the money supply. Bridges and Thomas (2011) apply two 
econometric models: an aggregate SVAR model and a linked set of sectoral 
money demand systems to calculate how asset prices and spending have to 
adjust to make money demand correspond the increase in broad money supply. 
Their model suggests that the higher money supply resulting from QE may 
have increased the level of GDP by approximately two percent and CPI 
inflation by one percent. 
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Table 5 Estimates of the Macroeconomic Impact of QE, Peak Impact on 
the Level of Output and Inflation 
Method Level of GDP 
(per cent) 
Method 
(percentage points) 
SVAR 1½  ¾ 
Multiple time- series models  1½  1¼ 
average impact  2 1 
Monatery approach 1½ -2½ ¾-2½ 
Range across methods 1½-2 ¾-1½ 
Source: Bank of England, (Joyce, 2013) 
4.4.3. Assessment and Comparison of Monetary Policy Responses 
This part is a brief summary of the key conclusions I have drawn when 
studying monetary policy measures of the ECB, the BoE and the Fed. Part five 
will address the central bank crisis mangement tools and its oucomes in Asia 
including the PBC in China and the BoJ in Japan before I go on further 
comparative analysis of monetary policy responses of these five central banks. 
When responding to the crisis as severe and long as the recent one central 
banks in the US and in Europe took „non conventional” or „non standard” 
monetary policy measures. As the short-term nominal interest rates have been 
brought down close to zero and inflation targeting and Taylor rules are not 
enough to overcome the slow pace of growth or recession. Despite intensive 
easing in the US and the UK by the Fed and the BoE, they have not yet been 
able to reduce the output gap down to the levels of 2007. 
In the euro area monetary easing has been low compared to the US or the 
UK. Several major advanced economies got close to a liquidity trap. At that 
point standard monetary policy becomes ineffective because nominal interest 
rates hit zero, both money and bills have a close to zero interest rate so they 
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become close to perfect substitutes and short-term interest rates cannot drop 
further. Given these circumstances and the economy needs more monetary 
stimulus, demand is still insufficient to reach full capacity in the medium and 
long term, the central bank deploys unconventional or non standard monetary 
policies. Negative interest rates are employed to avoid a recession after 
reaching a liquidity trap. There are theoretical options that can be considered 
to escape. Fiscal policy may function better than in „normal” times due to lack 
of „outcrownding” effect and because its multiplier becomes higher when 
economies deleverage debt (Eggertson and Krugman, 2010). 
Nonetheless, the political constraints are high in the US and the UK 
because their debt levels are higher than that of the euro area. Another option 
is the central bank’s purchasing government debt or private debt in primary or 
secondary markets. In the US the Fed has been buying Treasury bonds and 
bills and agency mortgage backed securities (MBS). Congress approval is 
needed to buy private debt. The BoE has been buying only gilts and no private 
debt. The ECB has been buying some government debt from peripheral 
Member States in the secondary markets, but sterilizes these purchases. 
Raising inflation expectations to lower real interest rates may be a radical but 
effective solution by allowing inflation to be above the central bank normal 
target at least for some time. 
Having assessed the effects of unconventional or non standard monetary 
policies I conlude that without a swift deployment of innovative policy tools 
the meltdown of the financial sector could not have been avoided. These 
measures mitigated the harsh impacts of the global financial crisis on the real 
economy in terms of output, unempolyment and inflation. As summarized in 
chapter 2.1., monetary policies display differentiating features in responding 
the crisis. It can even be perceived when examining the different transmission 
channels of the asset purchase policy. The Bank of England’s asset purchase 
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programme for instance relied on the portfolio balance channel (see subchapter 
4.4.1.). 
Taking into account its effect, purchases were targeted towards long-
term assets held by non-bank financial institutions, like insurance companies 
and pension funds, which may be encouraged to use the funds to buy other, 
riskier assets like corporate bonds and equities. Asset purchase announcements 
have an impact on long-term asset yields, interest rate futures and and measures 
of financial market uncertainty, which supports the importance of the 
signalling transmission channel. In the US, asset purchase shocks had an effect 
on long-term yields and the real exchange rate, underlining the role of the 
portfolio rebalancing channel.  
Figures 3 and 4 display the time and scale of the asset purchases deployed 
as unconventional stimulus in the US and in the UK. 
 
Graph 3                                                             Graph 4 
source: FMOC https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm 
source: MPC http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/default.aspx 
The summary below presents the main changes the ECB, the Fed and the 
BoE employed in their monetary policies to respond the challenges of the 
financial crisis. 
The ECB’s policy response to the crisis focused on ensuring the liquidity 
and restoring the bank-lending channel. To achieve its goal the bank modified 
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its existing monetary policy tools. It includes increasing the average maturity 
of its refinancing operations, easing the collateral requirements, and allocating 
liquidity at a fixed rate and full-allotment basis. These measures proved 
appropriate and effective to deal with the liquidity crisis. 
The Securities Market Programme and the Covered Bonds Purchase 
Programme were aimed to buy particular assets with a scope and impact 
limited and short-lived.  
The Outright Monetary Transactions programme was announced to 
purchase unlimited amounts of government bonds of member states subject to 
a European Stability Mechanism (ESM) programme. Although not used, its 
announcement had an impact on government bond yields within EMU. The 
programme demonstrated that the ECB is determined to maintain the integrity 
of the euro area thus it can be considered verbal intervention.  
The Federal Reserve and the Bank of England opted for a more radical 
and unconventional way in terms of monetary policy with their swift decision 
to respond the crisis by implementing large-scale asset-purchases programmes. 
These programmes were remarkable in scale, amounting up to 20-25 percent 
of GDP. The literature suggests the measures had a positive impact on financial 
variables, on GDP and inflation in the US and the UK. 
Unlike the Fed and the BoE, the ECB responded to the crisis in terms of 
asset purchasing too late and in a limited scale. The Eurosystem had to face a 
continuous decline of inflation to a level below its definition of price stability 
of close but below 2.0 percent. To bring inflation back to 2.0 percent in the 
medium term, the ECB announced a broad package of measures in June 2014 
to deal with the deflationary risks. It had been present in the euro area since 
late 2013. The measures included cutting the MRO interest rate by 10 bp to 
0.15 percent, the marginal lending facility rate to 0.40 percent and the deposit 
rate to -0.10 percent with the corridor, reduced from 75 basis points to 50 basis 
points and symmetric. Thus, the zero bound had been technically reached. For 
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first time central bank deposit rates became negative. ECB announced the 
suspension of the SMP sterilization. Another innovation is the implementation 
of Targeted Long-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO) with a four-year 
maturity aimed specifically at refinancing all types of loans to non-financial 
institutions (NFI), except for house purchases and sovereign bonds.  
The ECB did not take any explicit measures to address deflationary risks 
until June 2014 although – based on ECB statistical data– I conclude the 
evolution of money aggregates and the money multiplier (MM) ought to have 
been a clear indicator to deflationary risks. As chapter 4.2. presents the period 
(between September 2008 and April 2010) of intense banking, crisis is 
characterized by great demand for liquid assets, not only by banks, but by non-
financial corporations as well. It is reflected by a portfolio switch from M3 
(M2) to M1, the increase of which went up to 14 percent, whereas M3 increase 
became negative, falling to -2.0 percent. The second period (between May 
2010 and August 2011) demonstrates a low growth in all monetary aggregates 
corresponding the beginning of the credit crunch. Period from August 2011 to 
May 2013 shows a low growth, below the long run reference for price stability 
of 4.5 percent (ECB). Yet it was not until 2014 that the ECB announced its 
measures in June 2014. 
Chapter 4.1. highlights the reasons behind monetary policy differences. 
Turning to these differences in the bankbased financing structure gained from 
the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse according to which 90 percent of non-
autonomous assets on the ECB’s balance sheet consists of collateralised loans, 
while SMP plus CBPPs account for 10 percent, I conlude that this fact can be 
one that explains the ECB’s response to the first phase of the crisis. Simply 
put, the Bank rather changed the structure of the assets of the balance sheet 
than did expansion. The fact that the composition of the balance sheet in the 
Fed is right the opposit, underpins the statement. The ECB was reluctant to act 
as a lender of last resort until the end of 2011 and in 2012, when the Bank 
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stated that non-standard measures would be available as long as necessary, and 
placed EUR1 trillion VLTROs (see chapter 4.2.1.).  
The Fed and the BoE had implemented QE long before. The ECB has 
one primary objective, price stability and the others are subordinated to the 
first, while the Fed and the BoE have more than one, monetary stability and 
financial stability. This difference may provide an explanation to ECB’s 
hesitant reaction. The measures implemented by the ECB can be framed as 
endogenous credit easing because of the focus on relaxing bank collateral 
requirements and funding liquidity constraints.  
In the following parts, I will examine the impact of the global financial 
crisis on China and Japan and the response measures of their economic policies 
and central banks: the People’s Bank of China and the Bank of Japan. Due to 
the specific features of the Asian economies, I will analyze this region 
separately before making my comparative analysis of the five leading central 
banks. 
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PART 5 – CHINA AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: POLICY 
RESPONSES, OUTCOMES AND KEY INFLUENCING FACTORS 
This part focuses on the impact of the global financial crisis on the largest 
developing economy, China. I examine its crisis management strategies with 
special regard of the the People’s Bank of China and assess the effectiveness 
of the response of the economic policy and the central bank. 
The current global financial crisis has had a significant negative impact 
on the Chinese economy affecting exports, foreign exchange reserves and 
structural adjustments. Since China is over-dependent on exports to stimulate 
its economic growth, weakening external demand means an adverse impact on 
the Chinese economy. In November 2008, China’s continued GDP growth was 
disturbed by both losses in export-led manufacturing and reduced forign direct 
investments from the international capital market. At the end of 2008 the 
Chinese central bank held foreign exchange reserves worth US$1.95 trillion,26 
the majority of which were denominated in US dollars comprising mainly US 
treasury bonds and agency bonds (Han, 2014). The deepening of the subprime 
crisis meant a potential threat of devaluation and downgrade of its US bonds 
thus eroding the international purchasing power of China’s foreign exchange 
reserves. In addition, to prevent a slowdown of economic growth, the Chinese 
government had to consider postponing or even cancelling some structural 
adjustment policies necessary to ensure the sustainability of the growth of the 
economy such as bursting the price bubble in the real estate sector and 
increasing the flexibility of the RMB’s exchange rate mechanism. 
                                                          
26 Although the People’s Bank of China does not disclose the proportion of currency and assets 
of its foreign exchange reserves, I made a rough estimate based on external data according to 
the IMF’s COFER statistics The asset composition of China’s foreign exchange reserves can 
also be estimated through the statistics disclosed by the US treasury on the overseas holdings 
of US securities. 
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The Chinese Government’s economic policy reaction to mitigate the 
impact of the global financial crisis include stimulating household 
consumption effectively, reducing the pressure of unemployment and 
diversifying China’s foreign exchange portfolio.  
From the second half of 2009 the largest developing country managed to 
regain its previous GDP growth levels while most advanced economies were 
still struggling to recover. The global crisis affected China only for a limited 
period, from late 2008 until late 2009. The Chinese Government’s reaction had 
proved effective in boosting short-term economic growth, but was insufficient 
to ensure sustainable long-term development and to avoid new risks from 
arising. The structural problems of the economy were exposed further by the 
he crisis. 
China was one of the first major economies to recover from the spillover 
effects of the crisis. Thus its economic policy responses, particularly those of 
the People’s Bank of China are assumed to have been effective. Nonetheless, 
the global fnancial crisis challenged the Bank to such a degree that explicit 
government intervention seemed to threaten China’s continuing market-
oriented reforms. While demonstrating proactive risk management, the bank 
remained constrained by political domination. The Chinese government has 
intensified direct controls over both the central bank and wider financial 
markets. 
5.1. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA’S GROWTH PATTERN 
 China’s high export dependency stems from China’s export promotion 
policy, which had been in place for decades prior to the global financial crisis, 
during the period of 2002–2007 in particular. From macroeconomic 
perspectieve it is attributable to China’s overcapacity caused by over 
investment. Fixed asset investment and exports fuelled China’s growth with 
the the average annual growth rate of 24 percent and 29 percent respectively. 
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The combined contribution of fixed asset investment and net exports to GDP 
growth was over 60 percent in 2007 (Yu, 2007). The economy had been 
running current account and capital account surpluses. 
The crisis found the Chinese economy in a non-steady state. By 
definition, a steady state means that (i) aggregate demand is equal to aggregate 
supply and so are their growth rates; (ii) the growth rates of all components of 
aggregate demand are equal; (iii) the shares of all components of aggregate 
demand are constant; (iv) a growth process in a steady state is sustainable. As 
a result of the expansionary fiscal and monetary policies implemented since 
the Asian financial crisis the growth rate of gross fixed investments had 
outpaced the growth rate of GDP. Consequently, excess demand had surfaced 
gradually since 2002. Sudden acceleration of the growth rate of fixed asset 
investment will create excess demand for a period of time and when the rate 
has reached a certain level, the economy will shift from overheating to 
overcapacity. 
Despite the fact that China’s overcapacity pressure was building up until 
the onset of the US financial crisis, the rise in the growth rate of gross fixed 
investments and the accelerating growth rate of exports on strong external 
demand were maintained at the expense of a widening imbalance between 
growth of investment and exports and that of consumption. From the third 
quarter of 2007 China’s inflation rate deterioriated rapidly. The Chinese 
economy became increasingly reliant on external demand and the share of the 
current account surplus in GDP had been rising. In 2007, the trade surplus 
accounted for 10 percent of the GDP (Yu, 2007). The strong external demand 
prevented overcapacity from surfacing for a relatively long time. Export 
demand is highly unstable and owing to the expansion of the Chinese economy, 
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it had become increasingly difficult for the global market to absorb China’s 
excess capacity.27 
When external demand collapses, overheating caused by strong 
investment demand and strong export demand will turn into overcapacity, and 
inflation into deflation, immediately. It was the case in September to October 
2008 since in the second half of 2008 export demand collapsed due to the 
global financial crisis causing the overcapacity come to the surface.  
I conclude that the global economic crisis exposed the vulnerability of 
China’growth pattern. The overcapacity of its economy would have surfaced 
and called for correction without the global financial crisis as well. The 
investment-driven and export-led growth pattern is not sustainable as the 
investment rate cannot increase forever and the growth rate of China’s exports 
cannot stay persistently higher than that of the global economy. 
5.2. CHINA’S FOREIGN CURRENCY RESERVES AND ITS IMPACT ON US-
CHINA ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
In this chapter, I will analyse the direct impacts of of the economic policy 
responses to the global crisis; the implications regarding the trade, economic 
and political relations in the long run would exceed the scope of this 
dissertation. My research aims at examining and comparing central bank 
responses including the People’s Bank of China. To understand the central 
bank’s role and tools in the crisis management the general features of China’s 
economy and the trade and economic relation between the United States and 
China have to be presented. 
 As a response to the subprime crisis the US applied loose fiscal and 
monetary policies. The Troubled Asset Relief Program, stimulus package and 
trillion financial stability plan together created a record-high fiscal deficit of 
                                                          
27 China had become the world’s number one steel producer. 37 per cent of global crude steel 
was provided by China in 2007 (Yu, 2007). 
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US$1.75 trillion in 2009, over 12.0 percent of the US GDP. From the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008 to the end of the year, 
the Fed’s balance sheet has grown from US$950 billion to US$2.27 trillion 
(Hancock & Passmore, 2011).  Either issuing more treasury bonds or becoming 
the buyer of last resort the Fed and the U.S. government’s crisis management 
meant a potential risk for the international purchasing power of China’s 
portfolio of US dollar-denominated assets. 
China’s response to the crisis had implications for the US - China 
economic relations. Using its huge foreign currency reserves China has been 
able to inject massive amounts of capital into its economy to stimulate growth 
and productivity. As for trade relations with the United States the stimulating 
package has escalated trade tensions even leading to sanctions by the US to 
offset the subsidy to domestic industries producing goods for export to the 
United States. The two economies have fallen into a classic „codependency 
trap” since they are increasingly reliant on each other for ensuring economic 
growth. China enabled the US to disregard the perils of insufficient saving, 
vague household income growth and reckless fiscal policy. Anchoring its 
currency to the dollar, China has accumulated a significant stake in US 
Treasuries. 
Allowing its currency to float under market conditions or appreciate 
would increase the price of China’s exports and might result in a decrease in 
exports at a time when China was seeking to increase exports as part of its 
recovery from the global financial crisis. In addition, critics argue that China 
is not reciprocating in its trading relationship with the United States. The 
tension may have determined the relation of the two economies even in the 
long run. 
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5.3. EXPOSURE TO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
China’s exposure to the global financial crisis is moderated by its lack of 
direct exposure to the subprime mortgage issue. The economy applies 
numerous restrictions on capital flows, particularly outflows of capital. 
Limiting the ability of the Chinese citizens and private firms to invest abroad, 
the policies compel them to invest domestically. Even if these restrictions 
could be evaded by some who invested abroad in subprime mortgages the 
extent of this investment is unclear and is probably relatively small.  
Although the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) government made a 
bulk of foreign investment overseas owing to China’s massive foreign 
currency reserves most of these investments went to safe, low-yielding 
instruments, such as US Treasury securities28 (Ma and Liu, 2012). PRC 
officials are cautious and conservative by nature in their investment strategies, 
they are unlikely to invest in mortgage-backed securities and other innovative 
financial instruments, which they do not know or may be viewed as 
speculative. 
While China’s direct exposure to subprime mortgages seems to have 
been limited, the impact of the subprime mortgage problem did affect China 
via its harsh impact on the economies of China’s two largest trading partners: 
the United States and the EU. Economic downturn in the economies 
throughout the world made the Chinese economy slow down significantly due 
to their lower purchases of Chinese exports, which began to decline. So did the 
FDI inflows. In April 2009 the FDI inflows to China fell by 22.5 percent as 
compared to April 2008, when FDI rose by over 70 percent (Zhang, 2009). 
  
                                                          
28 In June 2008 the U.S. Treasury Department estimated that China’s holdings of U.S. 
securities totaled US$1.2 trillion, up from US$922 billion in June 2007. Of this total, US$527 
billion were in long-term US. government agency securities, US$522 billion in U.S. Treasury 
securities, and the remainder in corporate securities and debt. 
92 
5.4. THE STIMULUS PACKAGE 
In November 2008 the Government introduced a RMB4 trillion stimulus 
package for 2009 and 2010. See Table 6. 
Table 6 Breakdown of the 4Trillion Yuan Stimulus Package 
(billion yuan) 
Construction of houses for low-income urban households 280 
Increased spending on rural infrastructure and boosting rural incomes 370 
Expenditures in transportation network construction 1800 
Increased investment in medical services, culture and education 40 
Increased spending on ecological protection 350 
Technical innovation and economic restructuring 160 
Sichuan post-earthquake reconstruction 1000 
Total 4000 
Source: National Development and Reform Commission(NDRC) 
www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwzx/xwtt/t20090521_280383.htm  
The amount of the the stimulus is very large at 14.0 per cent of GDP in 
2008. In March 2009 the People’s Congress approved the Government’s new 
budget for 2009. According to this budget in 2009 total government 
expenditure (central and local) would be 7.635 trillion Yuan, 22.1 per cent over 
the previous year. In 2009 the total government deficit would be 950 billion 
Yuan the highest in six decades, compared with 111 billion Yuan in 2008. The 
Central Government deficit would be 750 billion Yuan, 570 billion Yuan more 
than in the previous year. The State Council would allow local governments to 
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issue 200 billion Yuan worth of government bonds through the Ministry of 
Finance (Zhang, 2009). 
As for the sources of the 4 trillion RMB package the Central Government 
finances 25 percent in the form of direct grants and interest rate subsidies. 
Central Government-sponsored projects are financed with the approval of the 
National Development and Reform Comission (NDCR) and by the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF). The second most important source of finance is bank credit. 
Local governments also proposed their own stimulus packages of 18 trillion 
Yuan worth. The local-government proposed projects were to be fianced by 
Commercial bank credit. 
The success of the expansionary fiscal policy found its reason in China’s 
very good fiscal position in the years prior to the stimulus package: the 
economy ran a small budget surplus in 2007 and a small budget deficit of 0.4 
per cent of GDP in 2008. 
With a fiscal position like that, China could afford such an expansionary 
fiscal policy to supplement the lack of demand caused by the fall in export 
demand and in non-governmental investment. 
Before turning to my main research field of analyzing the response of the 
monetary policy, I will give a short summary of the potential long-term impacts 
of this expansionary fiscal policy. Based on literature (Zhang, 2009), (Yu, 
2007) and statistical data, I conclude that the infrastructure-oriented stimulus 
package will have a negative impact on China’s long-term growth through the 
fall of investment efficiency. Due to the overcapacity, government-financed 
investments focused on infrastructure, which takes long time to create revenue. 
Investment in infrastructure rather than in manufacturing resulted in low 
investment efficiency. The incremental capital–output ratio became too high: 
from 4.1 of the previous years it had gone up to over 6.0 in 2009 while in case 
of Japan it was 3.0. Bold government investments may endanger China’s fiscal 
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position in the future. In addition investment led by local governments may 
promote a sub-optimal allocation of resources. 
5.5. FROM CENTRALLY PLANNED TO MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMY: THE 
PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA UNDER CHANGE 
The People’s Bank of China (PBC) was established on 1 January 1948. 
It is the youngest out of the five central banks in my comparison. This chapter 
will first review its two-tier relationship under change during China’s market-
oriented reform before the assessment its crisis management solutions during 
the global financial crisis. 
After three decades of liberalization, the PBC is still a government-
owned central bank which, together with specialized regulators, continues to 
manage China’s underdeveloped financial markets. To demonstrate this, I will 
provide an outline of China’s financial sector before the reform. This is 
followed by an overview of the PBC’s reform. China’s financial regulatory and 
supervisory system is argued to have borne structural weaknesses from the 
outset. By comparing relevant laws and rules one can conclude that China’s 
economic reforms led by the Party embraces selected market principles, which 
has ensured continued political domination enabling the government to 
continue its direct control over the central bank and the economy as well. 
5.5.1. The PBC under the Soviet Model 
China first took over a predominantly Soviet model. The ultimate 
decision-making power was politically centralized in the central government, 
representing the Party, and political agencies enterprises were directly 
controlled by political agencies. In the financial sector, the central bank was 
the only bank with monitoring responsibilities and it also controlled cash, 
credits and settlement transactions. Fiscal and monetary management at that 
time included only the state budget and the cash and credit plans. Money was 
simply categorized into currency and transfer money. The monetary 
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management aimed to control cash in circulation and the bank credits to 
support the state sectors. On one hand, the Bank pursued its task as a central 
bank, on the other hand, it took deposits and offered short-term loans, i.e. acted 
as a commercial bank. 
5.5.2. The PBC under the Maoist Ideology 
When the shortcomings of the Soviet model and structural imbalances 
became obvious, China rethought its socialist revolution and the Maoist 
ideology aimed to reshape the economy through organization and 
modernization reforms berween 1966 and 1976. Monetary policies were 
administratively controlled by the Central Party Committee and the State 
Council, while the central credit plan was decentralized, with banks, which 
were required primarily to support local development. The PBC’s role was 
further weakened when it streamlined its organizational structure and halved 
its staff (Yeung, 2009). The PBC was thus subject to the State Council, with 
the responsibility for cash management and credit supervision. With the 
Cultural Revolution, China’s economic conditions further destabilized. The 
PBC was targeted for anti-bureaucratism reform, and repositioned as the 
MOF’s cashier and accountant, while branches were controlled by local 
governments (Shen et al, 2010). 
5.5.3. The PBC During the Economic Reform 
Until the late 1970s China had been an isolated economy with low 
inflation, small budget deficits and minor external imbalance, dominated by 
political fragmentation, administrative orders, and centrally controlled 
economic activities (Chow, 1999). This chapter will highlight some key 
features of China’s reform since 1978. 
China’s reform aimed at building up a socialist market economy with 
Chinese characteristics, including reforming the economic system and opening 
up to the world. It is claimed to be a comprehensive transformation including 
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both financial liberalization and legal reform. Centralized planning would be 
replaced by market principles and would resolve the problems inherited from 
the Soviet model and Maoism. 
It was not until 1984 that China’s financial liberalization was launched, 
when sudden inflation displayed the distorted pricing system. Up to then, the 
government had played the role of financial disciplines. Stable market 
economies require independent central banks, flexible interest rates and 
efficient revenue systems. 
The reform should thus resume the functions of the financial sector to: 
(i) work as a medium of exchange and a store of value, or simply a payment 
mechanism; (ii) function as the medium to mobilize savings for productive 
investment; (iii) resolve difficulties caused by the mismatch of different 
maturities; and (iv) transform and diversify evident risks. The reformed 
financial sector was supposed to be more effective in allocating credit and 
integrating into international markets encouraging greater depth during 
economic transition. 
For decades, the PBC was the only bank controlled by the Ministry of 
Finance, with limited functions under centralized planning. As required by 
market economy, it should assume independence to make policy decisions and 
move towards conducting monetary policy and prudential regulation of the 
financial markets. The reform started with separating the Bank from the MOF, 
as well as central banking functions from commercial banking operation. 
In 1984, the newly established Industry and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC) replaced the PBC to take deposits from, and make loans to households 
and to industries for commercial purposes. Then non-banking financial 
institutions (NBFIs) and foreign banking institutions gradually gained legal 
approval in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. Specialized banks were freed 
to provide financial services and the PBC began to focus on macroeconomic 
control by administering interest rates under the central credit plan. The PBC 
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could only operate to meet the requirements under long-term economic 
strategies and priorities for funds allocation determined by the MOF (Han, 
2015). 
To liberalize the markets, the PBC gradually removed credit quotas and 
pre-specified margins under the central plan, while still administering interest 
rates by stimulating maximum business loan rates and minimum deposit rates. 
As regulator and supervisor, without clear authority and sufficient instruments, 
the PBC and its branches engaged in managing day-to-day operations of 
specialized banks, policy banks and trust companies, rather than implementing 
its own monetary policies. The Provisional Regulation 1986, formulated by the 
State Council, made the PBC subordinate to the State Council in administrative 
affairs, and the financial markets were made subordinate to the PBC for 
business purposes. 
Provisional Regulation 1986 was replaced by a central bank law from 
the National People’s Congress (NPC) in 1995, paving the way for further 
market orientation. 
The PBC was defined as a state-owned government institution with 
capital invested and owned by the state; losses were totally compensated by 
the Treasury. 
As a state central bank, it began to have clearer objectives: to design and 
implement monetary policies, improve macroeconomic management and 
supervise financial markets with special regard of preventing financial risk, 
supporting economic development and maintaining domestic currency value. 
Under Article 7, the PBC was independent „in fulfilling its duties without 
disruptions from local governments, other administrative authorities or 
agencies”. Nonetheless, it did not possess either political or operational 
independence. The governor and deputy governors were nominated by the 
Premier of the State Council. 
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From the late 1990s, domestic reform regarding financial liberalization 
and globalization was accelerated by external factors, including the Asian 
Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1997 and China’s WTO accession in 2001. In this 
context, the PBC Law 1995 was amended in 2003 (PBC Law 2003). 
In summary, the PBC continued to be a government-controlled central 
bank with powers of direct intervention in financial markets. China’s market-
oriented reform was led by the state and characterized by the Party’s absolute 
leadership. The Bank continued to control markets through direct management 
over prudential regulation. It was in fact identified as an executive of the State 
Council, and its independence as granted by law but it has been fundamentally 
weakened by the political system behind. 
To assess its functions as the bankers’ bank and its nature as the 
government’s banker, it is necessary to understand the conditions under which 
the global financial crisis reached China: incomplete financial liberalization 
and government control. This context affected the Bank’s policy responses and 
the subsequent outcomes as well. 
The following chapter will address the PBC’s performance in managing 
the crisis. 
5.6. THE PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: 
POLICY RESPONSES AND OUTCOMES 
The bank was challenged by the spillovers from the GFC from late 2008, 
but China regained significant GDP growth a year later while most advanced 
economies were still struggling to recover. The previous chapter defined the 
PBC as a government-owned central bank in China’s market-oriented reform. 
Its relationship with the government and with the market is affected by political 
domination.  
This chapter will provide an overall assessment of central bank crisis 
management by the PBC. I will demonstrate that the Bank is a proactive 
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financial regulator under the direct control of the government. Secondly, while 
Chinese government intensified direct controls over both the PBC and the 
financial markets, market-oriented financial liberalization was suspended and 
monetary policy was used to support the fiscal stimulus, the structural 
problems were further exposed by the global financial crisis.  
Between 2003 and 2007, China recorded two-digit GDP growth rates 
resulting from excessive investment and net exports. In early 2008, fearing of 
an overheated domestic economy, certain measures were taken to rebalance 
growth, including slowing the pace of new investment. In this context, the PBC 
had executed a tight monetary policy prior to the global crisis, but rapidly 
revised this; for example, both interest rates and required reserve ratios had 
increased up to June 2008. In September 2008, the PBC reduced both of them: 
the interest rates then were continuously cut until December 2008, and the 
required reserve ratios declined to 15.5 percent (Morrison & Labonte 2011). 
At the same time, the PBC voluntarily stopped issuing central bank bills, 
which had until then been purchased mainly by major State-Owned 
Commercial Bank (SOCBs). Excess liquidity thus caused problems for the 
interbank market and real interest rates declined further. More remarkably, the 
loan quota mechanism – introduced to control economic overheating between 
late 2007 and early 2008 – was removed, in an attempt to encourage further 
lending. Accordingly, in response to the potential risk from the external shock, 
the PBC loosened monetary policy by easing lending. The total increase in 
bank loans was targeted at RMB4 trillion with an extra RMB100 billion 
allocated to policy banks. Following the announcement of the stimulus 
package in November 2008, bank loan growth „exploded”. For instance, the 
first week of 2009 saw a record RMB600 billion bank loans, and the figure 
increased up to RMB4.6 trillion by the end of March, more than the entire 
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stimulus package envisaged. M2,29 the broad money supply, increased 27.7 
percent, taking up 178 percent of GDP. 
5.6.1. The Challenge of the Global Financial Crisis to the PBC  
Unlike the central banks in the US and the UK, the PBC was not the 
centre of intensive criticism nor of massive legal reforms during the financial 
crisis. This is partially due to China’s limited losses in the context of 
incomplete liberalization, which affected the outcomes of the chosen crisis 
management solutions. Owing to China’s resilience after 2009, the PBC had 
conducted crisis management solutions for a limited period only, and measures 
for further financial liberalization, particularly after 2012, were not directly 
linked to the crisis. Limited losses reduced the challenge for China’s financial 
regulator and supervisor from the origin; both the PBC and the CBRC have 
strengthened their use of more direct instruments, although they should have 
developed prudential regulation as required by market-oriented liberalization. 
Before the global financial crisis, the PBC was a central bank in a 
transition economy with incomplete financial liberalization, employing both 
direct and indirect tools. Due to the GFC, direct controls were reset as risk 
management solutions, and further market-oriented principles gave way to 
administered interest rates and exchange policy. 
After China’s resilience, the PBC’s policy instruments included: (i) 
conventional monetary policy instruments aiming at modifying market 
liquidity; (ii) re-introduction of certain suspended pilot programmes; and (iii) 
introduction of new facilities. During the crisis, direct government intervention 
evidently increased, which continued to limit the PBC and other regulators 
while brought further uncertainty into China’s market-oriented reform. 
Furthermore, the limits of government intervention also emerged. For 
                                                          
29 Broad money supply: www.pbc.gov.cn:8080/publish/goutongjia 
oliu/524/2011/20111115190311532831963/20111115190311532831963_.html  
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example, following downward pressure between July 2007 and 2008, the 
Chinese property market quickly returned to its previous growth rates, and 
attracted disproportional commercial loans within the fiscal stimulus package. 
Without considerable deposit interests and diversified investment products, 
household savings were continuously invested in the property and stock 
markets, which made government intervention scarcely successful (Ahuja et 
al, 2010). 
5.6.2. Crisis Management and Financial Sector Development 
My hypothesis that one leading goal for central banks in developing 
countries is to support financial sector development has been testified. During 
the global financial crisis, China’s domestic financial liberalization and 
marketization continued and a new supranational financial strategy was 
implemented. Nonetheless, the introduction of market-oriented principles was 
delayed and low-speed liberalization was employed as an instrument against 
moderate external shocks. 
China’s financial liberalization did not develop evenly in terms of 
institutions, or instruments, or market principles either before or during the 
global financial crisis. While further reform measures were applied to financial 
institutions and instruments, marketization in some areas was suspended until 
the crisis shock was eased. The reform measures in the period of 2009-2014 
are summarized below. 
The Monetary Policy Department II was established within the PBC in 
November 2009, and the objective of focusing on RMB issues including 
exchange rates, as well as cross-border currency trade and cooperation. To 
improve transparency the PBC began to report financial stability annually. 
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Regarding the banking sector, reforms were adopted for all major State-
Owned Commercial Bank (SOCBs)30 (Cheng, 2009). Restructuring reform 
was implemented for rural financial institutions and the Postal Savings Bank 
of China from 2011. 
In terms of the instruments, the PBC formally introduced a pilot 
programme of the Dynamic Adjustment of Deposit Reserve Ratio in early 
2011. The ratios were allowed to vary gradually on a quarterly or monthly basis 
(Ma and Liu, 2011). 
With regard of China’s slowing economic growth, the PBC designed a 
range of new and creative tools to affect liquidity. It launched the short-term 
liquidity operations (SLOs) complementing the Open Market Operations 
(OMOs), and also the Standing Lending Facility (SLF) in January 2013 to offer 
financial support in temporary liquidity shortage. In June 2014, the Pledged 
Supplementary Lending (PSL) was utilised to channel credit to the China 
Development Bank for low-cost housing. In September the PBC introduced 
the Medium-term Lending Facility (MLF) to support market liquidity. 
The financial market development includes the improvement of the 
pricing mechanisms in the Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate (SHIBOR), which 
increased the number of the participants in the interbank market. To assess bad 
loans disposal, the PBC and the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC) initiated stress tests in 2007, which was completed in 2011.31 
China’s securities market had been underdeveloped and only limited 
progress has been made. The Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) was launched 
in May 2009, certain controls over cross-border investment were relaxed, and 
                                                          
30 It began with injecting RMB1.3 billion into the Agriculture Bank of China in November 
2008 by the Central Huijin Investment Company Limited (Huijing). From 2011, 
commercialization-oriented reform extended to restructure rural financial institutions and the 
Postal Savings Bank of China. 
31 Data were not accessible. 
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the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) relaxed the conditions 
for qualified foreign institutional investors. 
In terms of the bond market, the PBC and the MOF announced that the 
Bank would initiate creating a market for newly issued critical term bonds, 
with pilot programmes to trade Treasury bonds. 
As for RMB convertibility, the PBC first suspended its gradual reform 
as a proactive crisis management solution. The RMB had been pegged against 
a basket of currencies with a 0.3 percent daily fluctuation from 2005, but the 
PBC pegged it back to the US$ in July 2008. Further reform was not announced 
until July 2010, and the floating range of the RMB US$ rate was widened to 
2.0 percent on 17 March 2014 (Morrison and Labonte, 2011).  The PBC thus 
displayed uncertainty about currency liberalization, triggering the expression 
of concerns, especially from the US (Buckley, 2012). 
 Interest rates liberalization, which was initiated in 1996, had slowed 
since 2004, as accumulated liquidity restricted the commercial banks’ ability 
to raise lending rates over the benchmark rate. Interest rates continued to be 
determined by non-market factors, mainly by the PBC, ensuring that the loan-
deposit rate margin was between the loan rate as the floor and the deposit rate 
as the ceiling. It was changed in June 2012 including gradual narrowing of the 
floating ranges and in October 2013 the mechanism for loan prime rates was 
officially announced. It applied to selected banks, while the PBC continued to 
set basic interest rates for loans as a transition arrangement. 
 In contrast to the excessive securitization in the sophisticated financial 
markets, some securitization was initiated in China in 2005 and was suspended 
at the end of 2008. The PBC resumed and updated the pilot programmes of 
securitization for high-quality credit assets with the approval of the State 
Council from 2011 (Wang, 2014). 
With regard of law reforms, the PBC clarified that financial behaviour 
should be regulated. Legal reform occurred with the revision of old rules and 
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the drafting of new ones and reinforced China’s rule-based regulatory 
framework (IMF, 2011).32 
In summary, while China’s market-oriented reform was not terminated 
by the crisis, certain forms of liberalization were suspended as instruments 
against external shocks. With further developments occured unevenly, the 
reforms regarding interest rates and exchange policy were not resumed before 
the crisis eased. Direct and indirect tools existed together to ensure the effects 
as planned, owing to the PBC’s direct control over the financial sector. 
5.7. THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND CHINA’S SUPRANATIONAL 
FINANCIAL STRATEGY 
China is the largest creditor of US securities, and the RMB was pegged 
back to the US$ in July 2008. It is estimated that a depreciation of the dollar 
by 20.0 percent would generate a $300billion loss in China’s reserves (Zhang, 
2009). To reduce its over-dependence on the US dollar in foreign trade, cross-
border capital flows and foreign reserve exchange management, China 
launched a three-tier strategy, combining RMB internationalization,33 regional 
monetary cooperation and the reconstruction of the international monetary 
regime. In a country conducting gradualist economic reform, such as China, 
internationalization can be achieved by gradual regionalization (Li, 2004).  
Before the global financial crisis, the PBC had participated in two Asian 
bond funds in 2003 and 2004 by organizing working taskforces so as to 
promote currency multilateralization. During the crisis, the Bank extended 
bilateral local currency swap schemes with Emerging Market Economies 
(EMEs) to central banks in advanced economies, including the BOE in June 
2013 and the ECB in October 2013. 
                                                          
32 E.g.financial holding companies (FHCs) were not included in formal legal frameworks 
despite pilot programmes. 
33 currency internationalization is exercised after full convertibility in both current and capital 
accounts. 
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In my view, internationalization helps strengthen and diversify domestic 
financial markets, and this pathway presents a leading solution in China. 
The PBC promoted pilot programmes to use RMB in cross-border trade 
and formalized the relevant rules between 2012 and 2013. The Bank intensified 
its two-way flexibility by trading RMB directly with other currencies. 
The global crisis called for cross-border cooperation, and the inter-
nationalization progress continued towards further Asian regionalization. 
Trusts and funds were established to offer liquidity support for the systemwide 
risk, including a Credit Guarantee and Investment Fund (CGIF), an Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) trust fund and the Associations of Southeast Asian 
Nations „ASEAN+3” Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) (Chin, 
2012). The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) gradually developed throughout the 
crisis period, from a bilateral US dollar-denominated exchange arrangement to 
a multilateral facility. 
The establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
which has attracted economies outside Asia as well, indicates that China has 
reached a new stage of financial integration.  
As for developing and emerging economies, reform of the international 
financial architecture has been put on agenda. Certain countries continued to 
rely on international financial aid in case of liquidity shortage although their 
selective policy responses focused on such problems as countercyclical 
macroeconomic policy and international capital flows. 
The PBC expressed34 its intention to rebuild the entire international 
monetary architecture. As a matter of fact fact China had already begun to 
diversify its reserves, including commodities, strategic petroleum reserves and 
IMF bonds in particular. The three-tier strategy and the RMB convertibility 
triggered intense debates, with excessive government intervention in the focus. 
                                                          
34 In the open speech of the PBC Governor, Zhou Xiaochuan, titled „Reflections on Reforming 
the International Monetary System” (2009) 
106 
When pursuing its goal of financial leadership, China has a strong 
interest in preventing its neighbouring countries, regarding strong trade 
relationship with them. Nonetheless, its active role in CMI and the initiation of 
AIIB was taken as a challenge to the IMF and the power of the US in Asia. 
5.8. ASSESSMENT OF THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT SOLUTION OF THE PBC 
Assessing the monetary expansion of the PBC, I claim that the PBC took 
some proactive measures. Ther is little evidence to indicate contagion, as 
neither exports nor FDI incurred any major losses until November 2008, three 
months after the first interest rate cut.  
The Bank managed to add loanable funds by cutting benchmark interest 
rates and rates for mortgage loans, as well as by varying chosen preferences 
and requirements. The lower requirements of reserve rations applied to other 
saving institutions before they were extended to major SOCBs. The PBC 
influenced monetary policies in a gradual and carefully negotiated manner. It 
also gave preference to agriculture and exports, as well as the countryside and 
earthquake-struck areas. To some extent, China’s central bank still pursues 
selected quasi-fiscal responsibilities and/or administrative guidance for the 
wider public welfare (Lardy, 2010). 
China’s crisis management enabled the economy to achieve the set GDP 
growth targets in both 2008 and 2009. In January 2010, the GDP growth rate 
of over 10 percent exceeded previous years on average. The Shanghai Stock 
Exchange Composite Index rose by 45 percent and, on a yearon-year basis, in 
April 2010, retail sales rose by 14.8 percent, industrial output by 7.3 percent, 
and investment in real estate by 6.4 percent (Morrison & Labonte 2011). In 
this respect, Chinese policy responses to the global crisis appeared to be highly 
effective.  
From the perspective of incomplete economic reform, the PBC’s 
contribution was remarkable. Monetary policy instruments had been employed 
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prior to the fiscal stimulus package, the package is considered to have 
stimulated China’s GDP growth. From the end of 2008, fiscal and monetary 
stimuli reinforced each other: the PBC adopted various monetary instruments 
to make funds available, and the fiscal package channelled loanable funds. 
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PART 6 – JAPAN AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: POLICY 
RESPONSES, OUTCOMES AND KEY INFLUENCING FACTORS 
Modern times have often seen irregular up-and-down fluctuations, with 
boom generally lasting longer than bust. Japan experienced a decade-long 
„growth-recession” following more than a decade of prosperity. As a central 
bank in domestic crisis, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) was first challenged by Non-
performing Loans (NPLs) and bank failures, and then by the global financial 
crisis, deflation and economic recession in particular. The BoJ employed 
unconventional monetary policy instruments to support the financial markets 
more directly with fundamental regulators remaining unchanged. The 
government supported financial markets through fiscal stimulus packages of 
remarkable sizes and continued to direct the BoJ explicitly. 
Having renewed its policy tools to offer liquidity the BoJ promoted better 
risk management of financial institutions. The crisis management solutions, 
examined from different aspects and selected by the BoJduring in two periods: 
during the domestic crisis between 2001 and 2006 and during the global 
financial crisis, can be seen below. 
Economic environment:  
 2001-2006: Lasting deflation and economic stagnancy after a boom-
bust cycle. 
 During the global financial crisis: Short-lived economic recovery 
with recapitalized banking sector, uncollateralized overnight call rate 
maintained at 0.5 percent. 
Interest rate reductions: 
 2001-2006: ZIRP was introduced in 2001 and extended from 2002 with 
clarified objectives, commitment and timescale. 
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 During the global financial crisis: Virtually zero interest rate policy 
would be kept at 0–0.1percent from October 2010, the BoJ explicitly 
linked its ZIRP with inflation and price stability. 
Asset purchases:  
 CLF; Extended maturities of funds supplying operations, Credit easing 
by purchasing long-term JGBs, Asset-Backed Commercial Papers 
(ABCPs) and ABSs; Outright purchases of stocks from banks’ equity 
portfolios. 
 During the global financial crisis: the BoJ purchased CPs, corporate 
bonds, ETFs, J-REITs and longer maturity Japanese Government Bonds 
(JGBs) against a wider range of collaterals; Various facilities to directly 
support banks and corporate financing, such as CDF, SFO FCF, and 
loan support programme; Shaped Quantitative and Qualitative 
Monetary Easing (QQE) in April 2013. 
Regulation and supervision: 
 2001-2006: Dealing with NPLs and bankruptcy through limited on site 
examination; off-site surveillance and LOLR facilities. 
 During the global financial crisis: micro-prudential regulation: 
monitoring liquidity risk at the firm level; macro-prudential regulation: 
managing financial imbalance. 
Framework of monetary policy conduct:  
 2001-2006: Uncollateralized call rate  
 During the global financial crisis: the BoJ introduced numerical 
inflation targeting and shifted to the money base as the target of 
monetary framework. 
Cross-border cooperation: 
 2001-2006: Not accessible 
 During the global financial crisis: Swap lines with selected major 
central banks, acceptance of selected government bonds as collaterals. 
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Comparing the two periods summarized above, it can be seen that the 
Japanese government did not launch any massive legal reforms during the 
global financial crisis, partly attributed to the relative stability of Japanese 
banks after continuous recapitalization. 
As Japan still suffered huge losses, the BoJ was required to pursue 
unconventional measures. Regarding these two points, the selected crisis 
management solutions were similar, including interest rate cuts, clarified 
commitment and asset purchase programmes, but monetary easing was more 
aggressive during the global financial crisis. In terms of its effect, it is 
empirically estimated that asset purchases under the QE were aimed at 
stabilizing financial markets allowing for further monetary easing, while their 
impact on inflation and outputs was limited. 
As for the timing the BoJ was late to deal with the bubble economy and 
its consequences, but it acted proactively during the 2008 crisis, in cross-border 
cooperation in particular. During a financial crisis, a central bank is likely to 
have to sacrifice part of its independence. This was the case with the BoJ while 
it increased its direct control over financial markets. As the bankers’ bank, by 
taking over credit risks from the private sector, the BoJ directly affected 
resource distribution. By providing commercial loans to contracted institutions 
the Bank ensured liquidity while intensified its on-site examination and off-
site monitoring in order to assist to improve liquidity risk management at the 
firm level. 
6.1. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE BOJ AND „A BANK IN CRISIS” 
The legal framework strictly restricted the independence of the Japanese 
central bank and the crisis further intensified the government’s direct control. 
Although the BoJ Act of 1998 made the bank independent in formulating and 
implementing currency and monetary controls, as well as business operations 
its overall authority was restricted by this legislation. In practice, its 
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relationship with the government was more complex than prescribed by the 
legal provisions. The MOF maintained its authority to an obvious degree 
(Mikitani and Kuwayama, 1998). 
After World War II, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) was Japan’s major 
financial regulator, controlling interest rates and capital flows through 
regulatory and administrative directions. When dealing with troubled 
institutions the BoJ made liquidity available and the MOF required that „based 
on forgiveness and forbearance” stronger institutions would either support the 
weaker ones or merge with them. (Cargill et al, 2000, pp. 46–47). 
The boom-bust cycle caused increasing unemployment and business 
failures in both private and public sectors. Based on forgiveness and 
forbearance, Japan’s bank system channelled credit to weak corporations and 
banks and non-bank financial institutions confronted the NPLs problem 
aggravated by the adoption of the strict capital adequacy ratio of the Basel 
Accord 1988. 
The BoJ had to deal with Japan’s domestic crisis since the mid-1990s. 
The Bank began to directly influence the credit creation of financial institutions 
and the overall money demand (BoJ, 2003). It reduced interest rates to 0.25 
percent in September 1998. On 12 February 1999, the Policy Board decided to 
reduce the uncollateralized call rate to virtually zero; this was the zero interest 
rate policy (ZIRP).35 
The expectations of recovery appeared to be false, and the Policy Board 
raised the rate to 0.25 percent in August 2000. As this action resulted in the 
threat of an economic recession, the ZIRP was brought back March 2001. The 
ZIRP was to continue until the CPI inflation rate became zero or above for a 
few months and there was no forecast by the Board members of falling back 
to deflation.  
                                                          
35 Data source: www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/ssi/cgi-bin/famecgi2?cgi=$graphwnd_En 
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In the context of prolonged deflation neither monetary expansion nor 
fiscal stimulus can effectively help support economic recovery. Under such 
circumstances the Policy Board officially announced quantitative easing. 
Japan’s economic recovery stabilized between November 2005 and March 
2006, the core CPI inflation turned positive and the BoJ raised the 
uncollateralized overnight call rate to 0.25 percent. Quantitative easing policy 
was ended but the Bank continued to keep the call rate at that low level (Cargill 
et al, 2004). 
6.2. THE BANK OF JAPAN UNDER THE CHALLENGE OF THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Compared with the US and the UK, severe housing collapses or banking 
failures did not hit Japan during the global crisis. Japanese banks were less 
innovative and continuous recapitalization rather than profitability created a 
sound financial environment. The Japanese stock market indicated the external 
instability by gradual sustained decline. It had a negative impact on balance 
sheets and the capital adequacy ratios of commercial banks and limited their 
lending from mid 2008. Exports fell by 12.5 percent in late 2008, with another 
36.8 percent drop by 2009 and real GDP shrank by 12.1 percent (Ando and 
Kimura, 2012). 
Owing to its over-dependence on exports thus being vulnerable to 
external shocks, Japan underperformed its peers and the emerging economies 
in Asia in 2008 and 2009. (BIS, 2013). As foreign banks largely reduced their 
investment in the interbank market and their holdings of Japanese stocks, 
negative outward portfolio investments increased from 2007, while inward 
portfolio investment turned negative in 2008 and 2009, which lead to a credit 
crunch on Japan. Japan’s economy turned into a serious economic recession 
from late 2008.  
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Fiscal stimulus and monetary expansion were employed to deal with the 
global crisis. The key crisis management solutions can be summarized as 
ample liquidity provisions, support for credit market functioning, 
macroeconomic stimulus and injections of public capital and elimination of 
balance sheet uncertainties (Shirakawa, 2009). 
Under the ZIRP, the BoJ maintained the uncollateralized overnight call 
rate at 0.5 percent until 31 October 2008, and reduced it to 0.1percent at the 
year end to maintain quantitative easing until the country came out of deflation 
(BoJ Statement, 2009).  Further cuts were made to around 0 to 0.1 percent by 
October 2010. 
The spillover effects from the global crisis to Japan required the BoJ to 
explore more Unconventional Monetary Policy (UMP) tools summarized 
below (Han, 2015). 
Between 2008 and 2010: 
 Quantitative Easing from the BoJ including purchases and sales of 
JGBs with repo agreements with extended maturities and wider ranges 
of eligible collaterals;  
 Corporate Financing Support covered Complementary Deposit 
Facility (CDF) to pay remuneration to excessive reserves;  
 Special Funds-Supplying Operation to Facilitate Corporate Financing 
(SFOFCF) to provide an unlimited amount of funds against the value 
of corporate debt at loan rates equivalent to the target for the 
uncollateralised overnight call rate;  
 Outright purchases of corporate financing instruments including 
commercial papers (CPs) and short-term corporate bonds against a 
wider range of eligible collaterals;  
From October 2010: 
 Comprehensive Quantitative Easing (CQE) in the framework of the 
New Asset Purchase Programme including the BOJ purchasing CPs, 
corporate bonds, ETFs, JREITs, and longer-maturity JGBs; 
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March 2011:  
 Injecting ¥15 trillion into the interbank market 
 Great East Japan Earthquake Quasi-fiscal support to provide 
temporary financial support to affected areas for public welfare; 
From 2013:  
 BoJ New Framework includes numerical price stability target to link 
monetary policy directly with economic recovery;  
 Quantitative and Qualitative Easing (QQE): the BoJ shifted to the 
money base control as the target of monetary framework; 
 Regular assets purchases 
6.3. ASSESSMENT OF THE RESPONSES OF THE BOJ 
In its UMP tools, the BoJ focused on facilitating corporate financing, 
while supporting the banking sector and export-led growth. The quantitative 
and qualitative monetary easing is expected to work through transmission 
channels, such as longer-term interest rates and asset prices, and change the 
expectations of markets and economic participants. The QQE would help 
achieve recovery though both a quantitative increase and qualitative changes 
in the BoJ’s balance sheet. The Japanese recovery strategy demonstrates that 
the government’s plan to achieve economic recovery implies giving the BoJ 
additional requirements to stimulate growth.  
Price stability with inflation targeting was formally introduced by the 
BoJ from 2013, which reflects an increasing awareness regarding the 
importance of flexibility in the conduct of monetary policy in Japan. In the 
meantime, the BoJ began to purchase assets regularly and also expressed its 
commitment to strengthen cooperation with the government. The principle of 
the Bank of Japan’s monetary policy is price stability, contribution to the sound 
development of the economy and responibility for maintaining financial 
system stability. 
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With regard of cross-border cooperation, the BoJ made some proactive 
currency transactions with other central banks and international organizations 
from late 2007, which were followed by further central bank actions, including 
large-scale swap lines with the US Fed, as the crisis became more intense. The 
BoJ actively participated in strengthening the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) 
mechanism in Asia (BoJ, 2012, pp. 206–208). The Basel III was introduced in 
2012 and implementation began from March.  
Responding to the global financial crisis brought more government 
intervention to the central bank, and financial markets got under more direct 
regulation. Under the crisis challenge, the Bank’s role as a government-driven 
monetary authority further strengthened and so did its function to promote the 
government’s strategy. 
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PART 7 – COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE FIVE CENTRAL 
BANKS IN MANAGING THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: POLICY 
RESPONSES, FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION AND 
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 
In the previous parts, I analyzed the environment, in which the global 
financial crisis challenged central banks. I focused on five banks: the ECB, the 
Fed, the BoE, the PBC and the BoJ and examined their tools and measures in 
their responses to the financial crisis. My presentation demonstrates that 
similar policy instruments applied by central banks did not guarantee similar 
outcomes. It is evident that the crisis challenged these central banks differently 
and changed key distinctions between market-oriented and government-
controlled central banks. 
Since its foundation, the central bank has been the Government’s banker 
and since the late 18th century, it has been banker to the banking system more 
generally, the bankers’ bank. Put it differently, a central bank is positioned 
within a two-tier relationship: with the government and with the market. (Han, 
2015 p.32) 
Having studied a wide range of relevant literature I can state that there is 
still little consensus as to the definition of financial stability. It is widely 
accepted that systemic risk is a critical threat to financial stability. This became 
obvious during the global financial crisis. Systemic risk can be analysed from 
its origins, transmission channels, outcomes, prevention and resolution.  
Risks which potentially extend negative effects beyond any individual 
institution, are regarded as contagion, and thus the degree of probability on 
which a certain risk will exert a systemic aftermath will determine the nature 
of the risk (Han, 2014). Such a hypothesis refers to a risk allocation as risk 
with domino effects. Systemic risks have contagion effects at the core with 
different forms of externalities. Transmission mechanisms are important 
factors in understanding systemic risk, In interdependent banking networks, 
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the strong linkage will increase the chance of a systemic risk, while the weak 
linkage will reduce its occurence. 
 This part will identify the signs of convergence or divergence and the 
multiple pathways in the character and conduct of these central banks’ 
approaches to facilitating systemic stability. In this part, I will compare some 
key aspects of the five central banks selected in the dissertation. Comparisons 
have been made from the perspectives of their independence, monetary policy 
and other objectives, financial regulation and their crisis management 
responding to the crisis.  
Convergence had often co-existed with divergence in central banks’ 
history.  Despite their similar legal frameworks, they had operated with 
different two-tier relationships, causing some different outcomes in these 
central banks in the crisis. 
The relationship between the central bank and the government is more 
complicated than the principal legal provision alone. Similar operational 
independence was granted by law, but the actual levels of autonomy 
distinguished market-oriented from government-controlled central banks. Less 
definite differences existed between the US Fed and the BoE, which have been 
strengthened by the global financial crisis. For decades, without evident 
statutory changes, the US Fed maintained its independence within the 
government, while the BoE did not gain operational independence until the late 
1990s, with HM Treasury remaining influential upon both monetary policy and 
financial regulation. 
When it came to the global financial crisis, the Dodd–Frank Act left 
central bank independence intact but with enhanced and extended transparency 
and oversight from both the Treasury and the GAO. In the UK, however, the 
power of HM Treasury was explicitly expanded by nationalizing private 
enterprises and leading the new regulatory regime. In contrast, both the 
government-controlled BoJ and PBC came under further direct political 
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control, but their statutes did not reflect their changed relationships with the 
governments. Overall, the global financial crisis expanded certain divergences 
between the four countries. Between the US Fed and the BoE, more differences 
in independency and financial regulatory regimes became evident, while 
further gaps emerged between market-oriented and government-controlled 
central banks. Meanwhile, the independence of the ECB is specific. As an 
autonomous institution, the ECB cannot be instructed by third parties, i.e. 
governments or international political councils; it is not responsible to any 
subordinate organization nor to any legitimising body.  
The two-tier relationship has changed due to the crisis as follows. 
i.) Before the global financial crisis the five central banks operated within 
similar legal frameworks but in fact with different levels of independence 
and at varying distances from the financial markets. 
ii.) During the crisis, crisis management solutions, including monetary 
policy adjustments and LOLR facilities, simultaneously moved the 
central banks towards the governments and the financial markets. 
iii.) Following the crisis, reforms have intended to rebuild their two-tier 
relationships. For the market-oriented central banks, independence was 
still desirable, with an increasing focus on systemic stability, but the BoJ 
and the PBC faced domestic challenges, rather than the crisis-driven 
changes in the US and the UK. 
I have concluded that the two-tier relationship is relatively dynamic. The 
global financial crisis made it evident that in terms of convergent crisis 
management solutions that the five central banks in the examination had 
different focuses and approaches.  
In summary, within similar legal frameworks, the five central banks 
operated during the global financial crisis in different relationships with their 
governments and the markets; they relied on different approaches and focuses 
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to restore financial stability; and accordingly, their two-tier relationships have 
been affected by the crisis in different ways. 
In order to restore financial stability, central banks apparently tried every 
possible remedy but applying the rule of law (White, 2010). It was thus argued 
that legal reforms should limit the US Fed’s illegal expansion and improper 
direct intervention into private sectors. Central banks are generally bound to 
their legal mandate.  
During the global crisis, most banks did not limit themselves to the 
orthodox policies for crisis management, but explored new unconventional 
monetary policies. For instance, in the US special rules and procedures exist 
for bankruptcies of financial institutions. If those known rules had been 
complied with, the failing institutions should have been acquired or liquidated, 
rather than bailed out, which had been made by the authority. 
Government intervention in Japan and China emerged more visibly and 
directly, whereas few material statutory changes really affected the core two-
tier relationships of their central banks. As a result, the gap between their 
respective legal frameworks and the real two-tier relationships increased, and 
their governments have been able to increase the depth of their intervention 
more easily. 
With regard of independence, the legal independence of the ECB is based 
on four pillars based on the Treaty. 
 The ECB is independent as an institution; that is to say, being an 
institution sui generis it holds legal personality distinct from that of the 
EU. 
 It is independent with respect to its internal personnel policy. 
 It is independent from any financiers. 
 Most importantly, it is independent with regard to its primary goal of 
preserving price stability. 
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The ECB has undertaken extraordinary measures during the financial 
crisis. In my opinion, independence is not only a question of the legal 
framework but of the actual implementation of monetary policy as well. The 
Bank explicitly pledged to do "whatever it takes" to preserve the euro as the 
common currency.  Draghi (July 26, 2012) confirmed that within their 
mandate, the ECB is ready to do „whatever it takes to preserve the euro.” (see 
page 48). It has added a second, and potentially contradictory goal alongside 
its primary mission of achieving price stability. From an economic standpoint, 
central bank independence is only valuable as long as it helps to improve 
macroeconomic achievements. While the ECB has to support the economic 
strategies of the euro area, it can only do so to the extent that the goal of price 
stability is not threatened. 
I have compiled a table, which displays the five central banks in terms 
of their monetary policies and other objectives, as well as of their financial 
regulation and supervision reforms. See Table 7. 
Having made the comparison of the five central banks, I found that the 
global financial crisis has widened the existing divergences, as well as the gaps 
between their respective legal frameworks and prevailing two-tier 
relationships. 
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Table 7 Comparison of the Five Central Banks 
Central 
Bank 
ECB Fed BOE PBC BOJ 
Monetary 
policy 
objectives 
Maintaining 
price stability 
Maintaining 
stable prices 
and 
moderate 
long-term 
interest rates 
Maintaining 
price stability 
Maintainin
g the 
stability in 
the value 
of the 
currency 
Maintaining 
price 
stability 
Numerical 
targeting 
Y N Y N N 
Other 
objectives 
Achieving the 
goal of 
economic 
stability and 
convergence 
of the 
member states 
Boosting 
employment
and 
supporting 
economic 
growth 
Supporting 
government’s 
economic policy 
for growth and 
employment 
Promoting 
economic 
growth 
Enhancing 
the sound 
development 
of the 
economy, 
and 
achieving an 
orderly 
payment and 
settlement 
system 
Reforming 
financial 
regulation 
and 
supervision 
during the 
Global crisis/ 
institutional 
structure 
 Divisions: 
 Financial 
Regulation 
 Financial 
Stability 
Surveillance 
 Macro-
Financial 
Linkages 
 Macro-
Financial 
Policies 
FSOC was 
established 
to control 
systemic 
stability; 
 
OTS was 
abolished; 
 
US 
Fedextended 
its oversight 
scope 
FSA was 
abolished; PRA 
and FCA were 
established as a 
twinpeak model 
for prudential 
regulation and 
conduct of 
business 
regulation; BOE 
embraced 
macro- and 
microprudential 
regulation, and 
banks’ failures 
N N 
/Changed 
approaches 
Single 
Supervisory 
Mechanism 
(SSM)  
Macro-
prudential 
regulation 
focused 
upon 
systemic 
stability; 
Macro-
prudential 
regulation 
focused upon 
systemic 
stability; 
Banks’ failures 
managed  
Political 
coordi-
nation 
mechanism 
Macro-
prudential 
regulation 
to control 
financial 
imbalance 
source: Author 
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PART 8 – CHANGES IN CENTRAL BANK BALANCE SHEETS AND 
THE EXIT STRATEGY 
In this part, I examine the implications of the unconventional monetary 
policy measures from the aspect of expanded central bank balance sheets and 
the exit strategy. 
In response to the crisis, central banks have expanded and dramatically 
changed the composition of their portfolios. It may carry the potential for much 
greater interest rate and credit risk. Who will bear the loss the central bank 
takes? From this aspect, the risks associated with the balance sheet are 
important to deal with, when it comes to assessing the non-traditional activities 
of central banks. Managing the larger and more complex balance sheets also 
means new challenges to central banking for some time to come. Table 8 
displays the structure of the central bank balance sheet. 
Table 8 A Central Bank Balance Sheet 
A CENTRAL BANK BALANCE SHEET 
Assets Liabilities and capital 
Net foreign assets Reserve money 
Net domestic assets Currency in circulation 
 Reserves of commercial banks 
 Non-monetary liabilities 
 Central bank securities 
 Others 
 Equity capital 
Source: Author 
At normal times, there is relatively little attention paid to central bank 
balance sheet composition. In normal circumstances, central banks are to hold 
safe, liquid assets, short-term government securities on their balance sheets and 
have an impact on the financial system and inflation through monetary policy’s 
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traditional transmission mechanism. With a financial system working properly, 
the central bank can actually buy any asset necessary to conduct monetary 
policy. These purchases inject liquid reserves into the system, which find their 
ways to demand through the intermediaries, which can determine how to 
allocate credit. Through this traditional mechanism, liquidity and credit can 
flow relatively freely to its highest-valued uses. 
In case of a breakdown of financial intermediation, the liquidity provided 
by the central bank may not generate credit that flows to its highest-valued 
uses, thus its impact on the system becomes less as the reserves do not move 
to generate credit flows through the system. Owing to this, the central bank 
must inject liquidity directly into where demand is high and where it can ensure 
the stability of the system the most. The conventional way of buying short-
term government securities to provide more reserves to the banking system 
does not seem to be plausible and the central bank may need to use non-
traditional tools to give new strength to the functioning of the financial system. 
Non-traditional measures result in not only an increase in the size of the central 
bank balance sheet but cause significant changes in its composition as well. 
8.1. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NON-CONVEnTIONAL ACTIONS FOR 
CENTRAL BANK BALANCE SHEET 
The implications include broadening the range of collateral, extending 
the maturity of lending and the issue of eligible counterparties. The appropriate 
collateral for lending includes instruments with low credit and interest rate risk, 
such as short-term government securities. In case of a breakdown of financial 
intermediation, however, the central bank may have to broaden the range of 
collateral to provide liquidity directly, thus exposing itself to more credit risk. 
This was the case for the Fed with asset-backed commercial paper, mortgages, 
and commercial properties. The ECB accepted different types of government 
paper. Risk to the central bank can be mitigated by overcollateralization, higher 
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interest rates, and other charges. Consequently, other institutions could get into 
a first-loss position. Let’s take the example of the Term Asset Lending Facility 
(TALF) in the US. The Fed provided financing into a facility that was 
capitalized with funds from the Troubled Asset Repurchase Program (TARP), 
which put the Treasury in the first-loss position by providing a 10.0 percent 
cushion against potential losses. 
Extending the maturity of lending is a sensible response to lack of 
liquidity during the crisis, but it certainly involves greater risks for the central 
bank including default risk, collateral or interest rate risk. At normal times, 
central banks provide short-term – typically overnight – financing against 
proper collateral to institutions experiencing liquidity pressures. 
As far as the eligible counterparties are concerned, most of the central 
banks were constrained in terms of entities to whom they could lend: in 
general, they provided lending to institutions with commercial bank charters 
only. 
The size and composition of the balance sheet can become a primary tool 
of monetary policy when interest rates are at or near the zero-lower-bound. 
However, only very few central banks provided a detailed guidance in a timely 
manner, concerning their forecasts of how the size and composition of the 
balance sheet were to change over time. Since the portfolio is important to 
monetary policy, giving information on the different types of securities, e.g. 
mortgage-backed securities and on the maturity of government debt as well as 
central bank intentions would be just as much sensible as forward guidance on 
interest rates. 
8.2. THE ROLE OF CENTRAL BANK BALANCE SHEET 
As a credible lender of last resort, the central bank can create monetary 
liabilities, which can be used to provide liquid assets to a bank in difficulty 
during times of financial turmoil.  Contrary to the 2008 global financial crisis, 
125 
in the 1930s, the major central banks failed to tackle the consequences of debt 
deflation. They could not use their balance sheets sufficiently to lower long-
term rates, which contributed to the deepening of the Great Depression. 
Balance sheets got out of the focus of central bank monetary policies in 
advanced economies by the 90s. During the time the “Great Moderation” 
inflation was low and stable and monetary policy focused on policy interest 
rates. Balance sheets rather played an operational role in the implementation 
of policy. The change came with the shocks. The Asian financial crisis of 
1997–98 resulted in a massive increase of foreign exchange reserves to build 
protection against future crises. Forex reserves held by central banks in Asia 
(China, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, Japan is excluded) rose from $2 
trillion to over $5 trillion from January 2006 to December 2011 exceeding 45 
percent of GDP (IMF, International Financial Statistics). 
The extended build-up of the assets side of central bank balance sheets 
also required an increase in domestic liabilities, changing the process of 
domestic financial intermediation. Due to the potential implications of these 
alterations for monetary and financial stability, central banks had to structurize 
their local liabilities carefully as their foreign assets increased. The recent 
financial crisis, which had its origin in the advanced economies, ruined 
confidence in financial institutions and products thus destroying global 
financial markets. The financial markets’ normal function got damaged and the 
transmission of lower policy rates to the economy stopped. Central banks 
reacted to this by buying „unconventional” assets. In the beginning, they 
bought short-term lending or short-term assets then moved to purchasing long-
term papers. 
Large-scale asset purchase programmes became the primary tools to 
avoid havoc, as the effective zero lower bound for policy rates was reached. 
These policies gave additional monetary stimulus by lowering the long-term 
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interest rate on government bonds when short-term interest rates were close to 
zero. 
8.3. THE RISKS OF THE EXPANDED BALANCE SHEETS 
Large balance sheets have longer-term implications. The central bank’s 
balance sheet becomes more exposed to changes in the market.  The value of 
their assets can be reduced due to a fall in the value of foreign assets or an 
increase in long-term interest rates, while the value of their liabilities will 
remain unchanged. If the capital of the central bank is put at risk, it does not 
only undermine the central bank’s credibility but threatens the financial 
strength needed to perform its functions. It is not the matter of profit - or loss 
implications for the central bank’s balance sheet. 
It is important to analyze balance-sheet-related risks as it can help design 
proper „exit strategies”. It implies risks that the expanded balance sheets can 
create, such as inflation, financial instability, financial market distortions or 
government debt issues. 
Regarding the inflation, central banks so far have been able to expand 
their balance sheets without losing their credibility for price stability. 
Nevertheless, the very high and growing levels of public debt in many 
economies raise the issue of creditworthiness or dominance of the sovereign. 
Sizeable balance sheets made base money increase significantly relative to 
GDP. Very liquid banking systems require the appropriate tools and their 
timely use for draining liquidity in order to decrease central bank balance 
sheets. In my opinion, a smooth and gradual exit can be expected by the 
financial markets, but an unprecedented size of drain of excess bank reserves 
require considering dimensions of financial conditions, expectations, political 
economy or pressures, which would be too much for a challenge for central 
banks even if they have the techniques to perform the task. 
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Central bank balance sheets may carry financial stability risks as well. 
Excessive credit expansion can be fostered by the increase in the banks’local 
currency assets, which are the major counterpart of the rise in the foreign 
currency reserves. If strerilization is incomplete, the risk will be sustained. 
Relying on reserve requirements to limit the expansion of bank credit impose 
a big burden on banks, which may also drive intermediation out of the 
regulated sector into the unregulated sector, the „shadow banking”. If the 
central bank issues higher-yielding, longer-maturity paper, which makes 
sterilization more effective, holdings of such paper by the banks may tend to 
crowd out bank loans to the private sector. Central bank actions on asset 
markets impact financial market outcomes with cross-border spillover effects. 
For instance, extended asset purchases by the Fed have lowered US long-term 
yields, which made the yields sink in overseas markets as well.  
Conflicts of interest may also arise when the central bank purchases or 
sells longer-term sovereign debt. Strong coordination of monetary authority 
actions and sovereign debt issuance is needed to manage these occurences, 
which underpins the significance of considering central bank balance sheets 
when formulating policy. Put it differently, the implications of balance sheet 
developments cannot be ignored. 
8.4. THE EXIT STRATEGY FROM THE UNCONVENTIONAL POLICIES 
Based on my research on the unconventional measures introduced by the 
Fed, I have concluded that a natural, market-driven exit is likely to make the 
particular facility decline if the exit strategy is thought about and the policies 
are structured even from the beginning. This statement is underpinned by the 
fact that all of the short-term lending facilities that the Fed introduced at the 
end of 2008 and resulted in a rapid growth of Fed balance sheet from $800 
billion to $2.4 trillion disappeared by mid-2009. No action by the Fed was 
needed as the new liquidity facilities were structured with charging an 
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extraordinary premium for market players to borrow from the Fed. In 
extraordinary times, if the risk premiums in the private markets were higher 
than the very high premia charged by the Fed, market participants rather 
borrowed from the Fed. As soon as markets normalized, market players would 
turn to private sources, which were cheaper. These programs were consciously 
structured and could go down without the Fed taking any other action. 
The Fed’s balance sheet became higher due to the large-scale longterm 
asset purchases subsequently. Nevertheless, it can become a lot more difficult 
for central banks to get out of these programs as political pressure tries to make 
them continue a program and support a certain area of the markets, unless the 
program is structured to run off, when pressure is less likely to maintain it. 
8.5. ISSUES RELATED TO THE EXIT STRATEGY FROM EXTRAORDINARY 
MONETARY POLICY 
The Exit Strategy from Extraordinary Monetary Policy raises the 
questions whether flexible inflation targeting will remain the preferred strategy 
for central banks and how they will remain independent in a world, where their 
responsibilities concern areas that are inevitably political.  
In normal times, the central banks ensure sufficient reserves for 
commercial banks given the interest rate, thus the size of central bank balance 
sheet is chosen by commercial banks. When markets „disappeared” during the 
crisis, central bank balance sheets played the role of substituting them. This 
role is maintained until the markets return to their normal function. Central 
banks will have to shrink their balance sheets so as to let markets do their job. 
Or will they have to decrease it in order to be ready for the next crisis?  
The transition means challenges and will have economic and political 
aspects. Shifts in the direction of policy is a sensitive issue, particularly when 
they are changes from accommodative policy stances toward tightening. 
Timing and pace of tightening can have large impacts on financial stability, the 
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fiscal stance of the government and capital allocation. In addition, central 
banks will be exiting at different times, according to the needs of their 
individual economies. The exit will also have spillover effects, risks and 
impacts will be global in character. 
Exit requires two connected decisions: when to stop easing, then when 
to start tightening. The first would mean a decision to stop expanding the 
portfolio, the second decision would mean to raise the short-term policy 
interest rate and begin the portfolio adjustments. They are separate decisions. 
These decisions should be determined by economic and financial conditions. 
When the central bank can see that the inflation is moving back toward its 
target and the economy is on a path towards better use of resources in a 
sustainable way, portfolio expansion may be stopped. It is important to spell 
out the exit, as early as in the „entry” stage of policy. 
Central banks can deploy different tightening techniques.  The main 
method for starting a tightening of policy for the central bank is to raise the 
interest rate on the deposits they hold. This rate forms a floor for the overnight 
interbank rate.  
In the US the tool has not been used before. The federal funds rate, 
however, has traded below the rate on deposits at the Federal Reserve, 
therefore it would require draining of great amounts of reserves simultaneously 
to tighten control over the policy rate. The Fed has invented to do the draining 
by converting overnight central bank deposits into longer-term obligations as 
a new technique.  
Central banks can limit the duration of the new securities added to their 
balance sheets so that the assets can be non-existing quickly when policy shifts. 
Adjusting the balance of supply and demand for reserves when tightening 
begins is to increase demand by raising reserve requirements. In the US, the 
reserve requirement „tax” has been reduced by the payment of interest on 
reserve deposits, which makes this option attractive. Central banks with assets 
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of long duration in their balance sheets will need to decide whether to sell 
excess securities as they exit from zero interest rates, or let them mature. 
Tightening policy does not require selling securities and decreasing the balance 
sheet. Increasing the rate paid on reserves thus raising short-term rates tighten 
financial conditions and slow the growth of demand. If the central bank opts 
for keeping the longer-duration securities, it may need to rely on shorter-term 
reserve draining techniques to keep closer control over the policy rate. These 
techniques change the composition of liabilities from bank reserves to other 
types without reducing the size of the balance sheet. 
The option of the central bank will impact the term structure of rates and 
the reaction of longer-term interest rates to the exit. Selling securities will raise 
long-term interest rates faster than letting the securities run off. Expectations 
on selling also make the rates increase, which means tightening financial 
conditions. The effectiveness of exit will depend on the sequence in which the 
steps are taken. It is also important to communicate the steps clearly to public 
and reduce confusion and uncertainty. 
Exchange rates will also be affected by the exit strategy and the timing 
of exits. As the exchange rate is a transmission channel of monetary policy, 
international coordination has become an important issue. Considering the 
expansionary policy of Japan, it can be stated that when a depreciation is the 
way to increase inflation, other economies may experience an extreme 
exchange rate appreciation. This is the case for the US if the Fed is the first to 
exit. 
Considering the timing of phasing out of extraordinary monetary 
policies, the optimal exit would be that the fiscal authorities phase out earlier. 
They should tighten their budget to generate a surplus to avoid destabilizing 
the debt-to-GDP ratio when the central bank starts increasing the interest rates. 
I conclude that the longer the central banks maintain the accommodative 
monetary policy, the more difficult the exit will be. From this aspect it means 
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that through the low interest rates, the central bank places no pressure on the 
fiscal authorities to do so. 
8.6. BALANCE SHEETS ARE STILL INCREASING 
At the end of 2017, global central banks had $21.7 trillion in assets. 
(YCharts). Figure 5 displays G4 central bank assets between 2012 and 2017 as 
a percentage of GDP. According to Thomson Reuters datastream, the Fed’s 
total assets take up 23.0 percent of GDP, this is 40 percent for the European 
Central Bank and 93.0 percent for the Bank of Japan. The Swiss National 
Bank’s assets account for 127 percent of GDP. 
The Fed has not only the least amount of assets relative to gross domestic 
product, but there is very little credit risk in its holdings as well, owing to the 
composition of its portfolio. It includes mostly US Treasuries, government 
agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities. In June 2017, at its policy 
meeting, the Fed announced it would start reducing its balance sheet by $10 
billion a month (Fed, FOMC, 2017). As a result, its assets dropped from $4.476 
trillion to $4.439 trillion, which does not represent a significant decrease with 
regard of the over $3 trillion increase between 2008 and 2017. 
The Swiss National Bank’s (SNB) assets total 127 percent of GDP 
(Yardeni Research, Inc.,2018). Apart from the Fed, there is a growing risk in 
the assets of these central banks. For instance, approximately 94 percent of the 
Swiss National Bank’s balance sheet assets lie outside the country, 20 percent 
is invested globally in equities, including $88 billion in US stocks (SNB). In 
case of the ECB, both the size and the composition is a risk factor. While its 
assets total $5.2 trillion (Yardeni Research, Inc.,2018), the Bank has been 
purchasing corporate bonds since 2016 now amounting $152 billion. It holds 
26 bonds rated below investment grade, or „junk”, in the value of $21.2 billion. 
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Graph 5 G4 Central Bank Assets as a Percentage of GDP 
source: Bloomberg https://www.bloomberg.com 
One important impact of the crisis will be the emergence of an area where 
fiscal dominance may arise when inflation starts to be driven by fiscal policy. 
The Euro are has not managed to create an institution that would act as a single 
fiscal authority. The crisis shed light on its consequences. It means that having 
a monetary union requires more integration than economies entered into, when 
they adopted the euro. 
Exitig from the unconventional monetary policy back to ordinary or 
„normal” policy would require reducing the size of the central bank balance 
sheet and raising interest rates. The Fed and the BoE have already stopped 
expanding their balance sheets and the Fed started reducing it, which could be 
regarded as the first stage of an exit strategy. Nevertheless, their balance sheets 
have increased to such an extent, that even a gradual reverse does not seem to 
be feasible. As far as the inflation outlook is concerned, in normal economic 
conditions, the inflation is around 2.0 percent per year.   Due to the structural 
shanges in the globalized economy, it is the risk of deflation rather the inflation 
which is likely to threat. The exit process and normalization takes longer than 
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expected. Steps regarding putting an end to quantitative easing or rate increase 
have been delayed. The risk of low real growth rather than that of high inflation 
has become central bankers’ main concern.  
Graph 8 displays the increase in balance sheets of five central banks: the 
Fed, the BoE, the BoJ, the ECB and the SNB in the period of 2007 and 2016 
and the composition of assets for the Fed in the first quarter of 2017 and the 
end of 2016 for the ECB and the BoJ. 
 
Graph 6 Increasing Central Bank Balance Sheets and Composition of 
Assets 
source: BIS Statistics 
Assets comprise Government securities, Asset- backed securities (ABS) 
in case of the Fed, Lending to financial institutions in the ECB and the BoJ, 
Other assets and reserves in all the three central banks. 
Prior to the crisis, central bank assets mainly comprised foreign 
exchange, but by 2016 most major central banks became holders of Treasuries. 
As a response to the crisis, they used their balance sheets in a similar way. 
The expansion of central bank balance sheets affected the financial 
markets in different ways as follows. Central banks are the main holders of 
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sovereign bonds. The expected excess returns of stocks over bonds is due to 
the extraordinarily low bond yields. The equity risk premium is high and the 
reason is not the returns they are expected to produce, but rather the difference 
in yields compared to bonds. The short- and medium-term volatility of asset 
prices were also affected by central bank actions by lowering the risk and thus 
the risk premia, connected with owning assets. As a result, the link between 
monetary policy and asset prices have been strengthened. The increasing 
impact of central banks is reflected by their determinant role in prices and 
market expectations. 
8.7. THE EXIT STRATEGY AND THE FUTURE OF MONETARY POLICY 
As shown in chapter 8.6., central bank balance sheets are still increasing. 
If exit strategy were associated to returning to the monetary policy prior to the 
crisis, it would imply shrinking the size of their balance sheets and raising 
interest rates to the Taylor rule level. Nonetheless, the size of assets has grown 
to a level – five to nine times as large as previously in case of the Boe and the 
Fed respectively– that it could hardly be moved backwards, even if they have 
put an end to increasing their balance sheets.  
As explained in chapters 8.3., 8.4., and 8.5, exiting unconventional 
policy involves risks – and the greater the size of QE, the riskier the exit. 
As far as the inflation outlook is concerned, normally, the inflation rate 
is around 2.0 per cent a year. Due to structural changes in the world economic 
environment, the risk of deflation is more threatening than the risk of inflation. 
With potential growth remaining lower, long term interest rates are unlikely to 
hike.  
Some central banks have begun purchasing assets other than government 
bonds, for instance, the ECB owns bonds of non-bank corporations, while the 
BoJ has been buying equity and real estate Exchange-traded Funds (ETFs), as 
part of its Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing programme. It refers 
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to a move from quantitative easing to qualitative easing. It implies placing the 
emphasis on the character of assets purchased instead of their amount.  
Changing the composition of liabilities from bank reserves to other types 
of liabilities, allows more space to set the short-term interest rate. The option 
of selling longer-term securities will have an effect on the term structure of 
rates and on the response of longer-term interest rates to exit. The fall in term 
premia is to turn around, while long-term interest rates are to rise faster than 
by just running off over time. Expectations relating to their selling may 
increase their rates as exit is closer, which equals tightening financial 
conditions.  
Nevertheless, not selling securities and preventing long-term rates from 
rising implies a need to increase short-term rates faster to reach the same 
macroeconomic results, which means there is a certain trade-off between them. 
In case of a return to short-rate targeting and follow that with actions to 
redesign and shrink the portfolio, clear communication to public and reducing 
confusion and uncertainty about exiting from unconventional policy actions is 
inevitable. 
The fifth hypothesis that central bank balance sheets have got a special 
emphasis in their role as the new tool of monetary policy instead of interest 
rates has been partly supported by the examination of the exit strategies and 
the role of the central bank balance sheet in this part, as there is a trade off 
between holding on to the balance sheet portfolio and increasing short-term 
rates. Monetary policy has come to a new stage, which is characterized by the 
special role of balance sheets with diversification of the assets held on them. It 
does not mean giving up tightening by hiking short-term rates even if it has 
special implications due to the post crisis economic environment.  
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PART 9 – AUTHOR’S STATISTICAL RESEARCH. RESULTS AND THE 
ASSESSMENT OF THE HYPOTHESES 
9.1. THE SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF STATISTICAL RESEARCH 
Within the framework of this research, first I examined the economic 
performance of the economies subject to my dissertation during the global 
financial crisis and in the subsequent years. The aim is to present the impact of 
the central banks’s unconventional measures on the economies of these 
countries.  
Then my research focuses on central banks’ macroprudential tools in 
ensuring financial stability through examining the data of financial statements 
of nine systemically important banks. The aim is to display to what extent the 
ratios indicate the changes of the past five years concerning capital adequacy 
rules and reducing risks that is how central bank performs its new task of 
ensuring financial stability. 
9.2. MEASURING ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE PERIOD OF 2009 - 
2016 
This chapter presents the changes in economic performance indcators - 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the unemployment rate - during the 
global financial crisis and in the subsequent years. 
9.2.1. The Methodology of Research 
When measuring economic performance during secunder research, I 
used open data sources and a database of financial statement data of nine 
systemically important banks in Hungary. Open access to data sources 
comprising data of eight years was limited, which made the research more 
diffcult to conduct. Both the GDP and the unemployment data were gained by 
country for each year. Breaking the interval of nine years to two parts was 
necessary to show the period of the financial crisis (2008-2011) and the 
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subsequent period (2012-2016) separately. Measuring economic performance 
includes EU, China, Japan, the US and EMU member states. 
Besides GDP, I collected data on the unemployment rate of the selected 
economies. Gross domestic product and unemployment are affected by 
different factors. Nevertheless, referred to as Okun’s law, changes in 
unemployment have a consistent and predictable relationship with changes in 
GDP, which became a standard tool for monetary policymakers. 
9.2.2. Gross Domestic Product 
The graphs in this chapter display the changes in the GDP in EU, EU 
area, China, Japan, and US between 2009 and 2016; in EMU between 2009 
and 2011 and in the period of 2012-2016. See graphs 1, 2, 3. The graphs made 
by the author are based on data of: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/National_accou
nts_and_GDP; 
 http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/setupDownloads.do 
 respectively. 
 
Graph 7 Gross Domestic Product at Market Prices (EU, EU area China, 
Japan, US 2009-2016 
source: Author 
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US GDP amounted US$18 624.48 billion in 2016. As the leading 
economy – taking up 25 percent of the world economy – preceeds the 
economies of China with its GDP of US$11 232,11 billion and Japan with a 
GDP of US$4 936.54 billion https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/gdp.) 
The economy of China is special from many aspects. While in 2018 one-fifth 
of the world population lives in China (1.39 billion), the US population is 328 
million. Producing GDP concentrates in the developed regions of North 
America and Western Europe with a smaller proportion of population, while 
the majority of world population lives in the developing regions of South-and 
East Asia.  These significant differences in GDP per capita result in anomalies 
in particular regions and the standard of living within the country. Despite the 
dynamically increasing economic performance of China, the value of GDP per 
capita is lagging behind that of the US or the EU.  
Graph 8 displays the changes in GDP in the economies of EMU:36 
                                                          
36 EA-11 (1 January 1999 - 31 December 2000): Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Finland (FI), 
France (FR), Germany (DE), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), 
Portugal (PT), Spain (ES); 
EA-12 (1 January 2001 - 31 December 2006): EA-11 + Greece (EL)  
EA-13 (1 January 2007 - 31 December 2007): EA-12 + Slovenia (SI)  
EA-15 (1 January 2008 - 31 December 2008): EA-13 + Cyprus (CY) and Malta (MT)  
EA-16 (1 January 2009 - 31 December 2010): EA-15 + Slovakia (SK)  
EA-17 (1 January 2011 - 31 December 2013): EA-16 + Estonia (EE)  
EA-18 (from 1 January 2014): EA-17 + Latvia (LV)  
EA-19 (from 1 January 2015): EA-18 + Lithuania (LT)  
139 
 
Graph 8 Gross Domestic Product at Market Prices in EMU 2009-2012 
Source: Author 
The global financial and economic crisis reached the EU economies in 
the second half of 2008. It resulted in a fall in GDP value in all EMU member 
states in 2009 compared to the previous year and was followed by slight 
upturns in the next period. 
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Graph 9 Gross Domestic Product at Market Prices in EMU 2012-2016 
source: Author 
Year 2012 did not see significant results, while 2013 - following 
sovereign crises and slight upturns and downturns - showed a modest increase, 
which accelerated by 2015.  In general, it was due to the effectiveness of the 
measures aiming to mitigate the negative impacts of the financial crisis. 
Despite visible differences in the performance of the member states, year 2016 
can be ragarded as the year of stabilization. 
9.2.3. Unemployment 
The graphs in this chapter display the changes in the unemployment in 
China, Japan, and US between 2008 and 2016; in EMU between 2008 and 2011 
and in the period of 2012-2016. See graphs 4, 5, 6 . Graph 10 shows 
unempolyment in EMU in 2008 and in 2016. The graphs made by the author 
are based on data of: 
 https://www.japanmacroadvisors.com/page/category/economic-
indicators/labor-markets/unemployment-rate/ 
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 https://www.statista.com/statistics/193290/unemployment-rate-in-the-
usa-since-1990 
 https://knoema.com/atlas 
 
 
Graph 10 Unemployment Rate in China, Japan and United States 2008-
2016 
source: Author 
While the US economy was adversely affected by high unempolyment 
rate reaching its peak of 9.6 percent in 2010, the rate in China with 3.9 percent  
the lowest and 4.3 percent  the highest and in Japan 3.2 percent the lowest and 
5.2 percent the highest showed a stabile value. Due to its relatively closed 
banking system, the crisis did not affect China through its financial sector. The 
performance of the Chinese economy is basically determined by its export and 
import, being the leading exporter of the world since 2009. 
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Graph 11 Unemployment Rate in EMU 2008-2011 
source: Author 
Unemployment rate in EMU member states in 2008 varied between 3.7 
percent and 7.7 percent . Slovakia was the outlier with its rate of nearly 10 
percent (9.6).  2009 is regarded as the first year of the crisis. Despite the 
differences in the member states, the increasing rate of unemployment in 
consequence of the crisis shows apparently. The rate varied between 3.7 
percent and 7.7 percent in Germany, Malta, Austria, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands, while  in Estonia, Greece, Spain, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia 
it was as high as 15 percent or over. The responses of economic policies were 
of two kinds: they included austerity measures or fiscal expansion. 
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Graph 12 Unemployment Rate in EMU 2012-2016 
source: Author 
Following the crisis, in the period of 2012-2016, unemployment rate 
decreased gradually to values under 10 percent again by 2016, except for 
Greece, Italy, Cyprus and Portugal. 
 
Graph 13 Unemployment Rate in EMU in 2008 and in 2016 
Source: author 
Graph shows the rates’ taking up values closer to those prior to the crisis, 
which policy measures seem to have been successful. 
A period from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s is known as the Great 
Moderation. Economies in the world saw a decline in the volatility of output 
and a reduction in inflation at the same time. The Okun correlation typically 
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was large before the Great Moderation, which means that one percentage point 
increase in the unemployment rate was associated with approximately a three-
percentage-point in output growth. Countries, however, showed great 
differences within the average value. 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, the average Okun correlation 
gradually dropped to nearly one-to-one at its lowest point and differences 
across countries narrowed remarkably (Gordon 2011).  
The global financial crisis both raised the country Okun correlation and 
increased its variability across-countries as countries adopted different labor 
market policies to adjust output. The global financial crisis affected labor 
markets differently. In the US, the Okun correlation is lower than in some 
European economies, e.g. in Greece or Spain. In the US, the unemployment 
rate nearly doubled from its level before the crisis. In 2009, the observed 
decrease in GDP corresponded to a higher increase in the unemployment rate 
than Okun’s law would predict.  
The unemployment rate increased much less in the UK and hardly 
changed in Germany, despite larger drops in gross domestic product. 
Relationships between output and unemployment were more 
homogeneous across countries since the 1970s. The global financial crisis, 
however, turned the cross-country convergence of the Okun relationship 
backwards. It reflects the different pathways countries responded to the crisis. 
9.3. EXAMINATION OF FINANCIAL STABILITY SUBSEQUENT TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE PERIOD OF 
2012 – 2016 
Central banks are increasingly responsible for meeting both „traditional” 
monetary objectives and macroprudential objectives aimed at ensuring 
financial stability. Financial stability is a state in which the financial system is 
resistant to economic shocks and can smoothly fulfil its basic functions: the 
intermediation of financial funds, management of risks and the arrangement of 
payments. An unstable financial environment can hinder the sound and 
sustainable development of the economy even if shocks do not result in crises. 
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The ultimate goal of macroprudential policy is to mitigate excessive systemic 
financial risks.  
Significant progress has been made in this field. At the structural level, 
policies have been designed to alleviate the „too big to fail” problem. A set of 
common rules has been agreed on at the international level; the measures have 
been implemented. At the cyclical level, the countercyclical capital buffer is 
the instrument of choice at the international level (Basel III). Systemic risk can 
be defined as „a risk of disruption to financial services that is caused by an 
impairment of all or parts of the financial system and has the potential to have 
serious negative consequences for the real economy” IMF (2009 October, p.2). 
Systemic financial risks can be divided into two types: cyclical and structural 
systemic risks. Market imperfections in financial intermediation and vague risk 
perception lead to excessive risk-taking, which may be, in a financial crisis, 
replaced by excessive risk aversion. Cyclical systemic risks refer to 
this phenomenon. Structural systemic risks refer to the contagion effects, 
which means that the crisis can spread fast due to the interconnectedness of 
financial participants. 
The new macroprudential responsibilities had to bring new policy tools, 
which raised principal policy design problem for central banks. Based on 
systemic risk phenomena, macroprudential policy objectives can be defined 
as follows:  
i. Preventing excessive credit growth 
ii. Managing liquidity risks 
iii. Restricting excessive concentration 
iv. Dealing with SIFIs to avoid moral hazard 
v. Strengthening the resilience of financial infrastructures. 
 
Countercyclical prudential policies that reduce systemic risks and 
include countercyclical capital regulation and loan loss provisioning 
requirements are the components of the new framework. This research aims to 
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examine how macroprudential policies can strengthen the resilience of the 
global financial system.  
The prevailing EU bank regulatory framework is based on the regulation 
on prudential requirements for banks and financial institutions (Capital 
Requirements Regulation – CRR, and on the directive on the prudential 
supervision of these institutions (Capital Requirements Directive IV – 
CRDIV). 
9.3.1. The Methodology of Research 
 This chapter examines the effectiveness of capital adequacy rules 
through financial statement data. Limited access to accounting databases of 
central banks made the research difficult. Nevertheless, I managed to get 
access to financial statement data to nine systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs) with headquarters in Hungary, the national bank of which 
(MNB), as macroprudential authority, uses its reinforced mandate proactively. 
Using that database enabled me to analyze the annual changes in the relevant 
ratios in each of the selected banks.  
Although the research does not create a basis to international 
comparisons, in view of the findings, its extention to other economies may be 
reasonable. 
I examined 11 ratios, out of which I dealt with two profitability indicator 
ratios: the Return on Net Assests (ROA) and the Return on Equty (ROE) in 
detail. They are commonly used in the international practice. I used R 
statistical software and adapted panel regression to make my analysis. 
Analyzing panel data enabled to reveal the cause-effect relation in financial 
statement data of the selected banks. As a particularity of the method, it enables 
us to divide the dependent- and independent variables relation i.e. to examine 
idiosyncratic effect.  
Based on balance sheet and profit and loss statement data, my research 
aimed to find out whether there is significant divergence in the stability and 
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risk-taking of the examined banks. The interval of the analysis spans five years. 
I set 2012 as a base year, as the impact of the crisis was quite strong then. The 
interval of five years allows to present the changes in relevant ratios both by 
years and banks. Thus heterogenity could be examined in terms of banks and 
years. 
Panel data analysis is a statistical method, widely used in econometrics 
to analyze two-dimensional, typically cross sectional and longitudinal, panel 
data. Panel data or longitudinal data are multi-dimensional data involving 
measurements over time. Panel data contain observations of multiple 
phenomena obtained over multiple time periods for the same firms or 
individuals. It is a useful tool in modelling comlex economic relations. These 
are models that combine cross-section and time-series data.  
In panel data the same cross-sectional unit (industry, firm and country) 
is surveyed over time, so we have data which is pooled over space as well as 
time (Wooldridge, 2010). It is better in detecting and measuring the effects 
which cannot be observed in either cross-section or time-series data. Panel data 
enables the study of more complex behavioral models – for example the cause-
effect relation in financial statement data of the selected banks that I examined. 
It makes detecting and measuring the effects which cannot be observed in 
either cross-section or time-series data possible. A further reason for using 
panel data is that by combining data in two dimensions, it provides more data 
variation, less collinearity and more degrees of freedom. 
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Panel data analysis has three techniques: 
(i) Fixed effects models: fixed effects model is used when there are unique 
attributes of individuals that do not vary across time. 
(ii) Between effects models: between effects model is employed when there 
are unique attributes of individuals that vary across time. 
(iii)Random effects models: random effects models can be regarded as the 
combination of the models mentioned above, and the key assumption is 
that the variables observed are constant over time, but there are differences 
across units; or the opposite: they vary over time but are constant across. 
Fixed effects (i) and Random effects models (ii) take the form of: 
itit
T
ititit uxy      (i) 
where 
yit = dependent variable 
xit = independent variable 
i =1,….n indice for individuals 
t =1,….T indice for time 
uit = the individual (xi) error term  
 
When modelling individual-specific effects, the assumption is that 
error term in the modell consist of two independent parts, one out of which 
depends on individual and do not vary over time.  
ititit
T
ititit uxy      (ii) 
where 
εit = idiosyncratic error term 
 
The algorythm applied to the model depends on the properties of the two 
error terms. The εit idiosyncratic error term is assumed not to correlate with the 
xit independent variable or the uit error term. Contrarily, uit error term either 
correlates or does not correlate with the xit independent variable. The method 
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for estimating the model is determined by whether there is a correlation 
between the uit error term and the xit independent variable or not (Greene, 2012, 
p. 383). In case of correlation, it is a fixed model, put differently, a Least 
Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) model, and the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) method is applied to estimate it. If the uit error term and the xit 
independent variable do not correlate, random effects modell is useful, with 
the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) or Feasible Generalized Least Squares 
(FGLS) estimation methods, which use the estimated variance-covariance 
matrix (Croissant and Millo, 2008). 
One advantage of the random effects model is that it can manage the 
autocorrelation between the two error terms (vit = uit+ εit), with the help of the 
two methods mentioned above The estimation of the random effects model is 
more difficult than that of the fixed effects model, as with no correlation 
between the variable observed and the uit error term, 
strong assumption of exogeneity should hold. (Wooldridge, 2013). According 
to the strong assumption of exogeneity, the probability that the current values 
of the data in the sample are influenced by errors from the past, can be 
excluded. In this regard, the fixed effects model is less restricted than the 
random effects model. 
The Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978) helps evaluate if a 
statistical model corresponds to the data. According to the alternative 
hypotheses of the Hausman test (see table 9), fixed effects model is consistent, 
while random effects model is inconsistent. The test evaluates the consistency 
of an estimator when compared to an alternative, less efficient estimator, 
which is already known to be consistent. 
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Table 9 The Hypotheses of the Hausman Test 
 H0 is true H1 is true  
REestimator Consistent 
Efficient 
 
Inconsistent 
FEestimator Consistent  
Inefficient 
Consistent 
source: Tarnóczi, T. – Fenyves, V. – Bács, Z.  –   Bácskei, E. (2015) 
In the null hypothesis of the Hausman test, with no correlation between 
the error term and independent variable, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), 
the Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) and the Feasible Generalized Least 
Square (FGLS)  methods are consistent, out of which, the first one is 
inefficient. 
In alternative hypothesis, the Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) 
method is consistent, the Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) method 
is inconsistent (Greene, 2012, p. 420). 
The alternative hypothesis is rejected when the Hausman test p-value 
is higher than 0.05, which means that the random effects model is consistent. 
The coefficient of determination (R-squared) is used to assess the 
goodness-of-fit of panel models, put it differently, to measure how close the 
data are to the fitted regression line. It is the percentage of the response variable 
variation that is explained by a linear model: 
R-squared = Explained variation / Total variation 
R-squared is always between 0 and 100%: 
 0 percent indicates that the model explains none of the variability of 
the response data around its mean. 
 100 percent indicates that the model explains all the variability of the 
response data around its mean. 
In general, the higher the R-squared, the better the model fits the data.  
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9.3.2. The Examination of the ROA and the ROE Ratios of SIFIs with 
Headquarters in Hungary 
Statistcal analysis was made for the nine relevant SIFIs with 
headquarters in Hungary based on their financial statement data for the period 
of 2012-2016. The institutions are as follows. 
 Budapest Bank 
 CIB Bank 
 ERSTE 
 FHB 
 Unicredit Bank 
 MKB 
 OTP 
 Raiffeisen Bank 
 Sber Bank 
I used R statistical software plm module to do panel regression for 
financial ratio relations. Both fixed effects and random effects panel 
regressions were run with calculating their unidirectional and two-directional 
versions. R includes different variance estimation methods for random effect 
panel regression: the default method Swar (Swamy and Arora, 1972), Walhus 
(Walace and Hussain, 1969), Amemiya (Amemiya, 1971) and Nerlove 
(Nerlove, 1971) methods. I employed Swar and Amemiya methods. I used the 
Hausman test to select the panel model best corresponding to data in the 
examination. 
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Table 10 The Effect of Total Ratios of the Banks in the Examination 
 
  
Effect 
Degree 
of 
freedom 
Pillai 
test 
F 
estim
ation 
Numerator 
degree of 
freedom 
Denominat
or 
degree of 
freedom 
Significance 
 P-value 
Significance 
Effect 
of total 
ratios Bank 8 
3,751
6 
3,002
5 80 272 0,000% *** 
  Residuum 36       
source: Author, based on the database of the banks (with R software) 
Based on their financial statement data, I examined the most relevant 
indicators of the 9 SIFIs in the examination. One objective of the research was 
to demonstrate to what extent the ratios indicate the changes of the past five 
years concerning capital adequacy rules and reducing risks of the banks. Based 
on examining the effect of total ratios of the banks in the examination, the 
result shows significant differences between banks. 
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Table 11 The Effect of Individual Ratios of the Banks in the Examination  
Ratio Effect 
Degree of 
freedom  
Sum of 
squares  
Mean 
squared 
deviation 
F-test 
 value 
Significance 
P-value 
Significance 
ROA 
Bank 8 0,0113 0,0014 3,43 0,494% ** 
Residuum 36 0,0148 0,0004    
ROE 
Bank 8 1,4900 0,1862 2,97 1,168% * 
Residuum 36 2,2581 0,0627    
Loan / Deposits 
Bank 8 7,2112 0,9014 3,04 1,024% * 
Residuum 36 10,6768 0,2966    
Loans / Total 
assets 
Bank 8 0,3945 0,0493 4,75 0,049% *** 
Residuum 36 0,3738 0,0104    
Net interest 
income / Total 
income 
Bank 8 0,6971 0,0871 5,02 0,031% *** 
Residuum 36 0,6250 0,0174    
Cash / Total assets 
Bank 8 0,1175 0,0147 6,36 0,004% *** 
Residuum 36 0,0831 0,0023    
Provisions/ 
Liabilities 
Bank 8 0,0005 0,0001 0,52 83,006%  
Residuum 36 0,0043 0,0001    
Loan capital / 
Equity 
Bank 8 1,3255 0,1657 3,86 0,227% ** 
Residuum 36 1,5449 0,0429    
Intangible assets 
and goodwill / 
Total assets 
Bank 8 0,0005 0,0001 4,96 0,035% *** 
Residuum 36 0,0005 0,0000    
Total operational 
income/ Total 
assets 
Bank 8 0,0716 0,0090 13,09 0,000% *** 
Residuum 36 0,0246 0,0007    
Net provision and 
fee income / Total 
income 
Bank 8 0,3864 0,0483 12,78 0,000% *** 
Residuum 36 0,1361 0,0038    
Source: Author, based on the database of the banks (with R software) 
Examination refers to 11 ratios. Significant differences are displayed 
except for Provisions/Liabilities ratio. My research deals with two relevant 
profitability ratios: ROA (Return on Net Assests) and ROE (Return on equty)  
in detail. 
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9.3.2.1 The Examination of the ROA Ratio 
The ROA ratio is the most common profitability indicator used 
internationally. It is calculated to see how effectively a company deploys assets 
to generate sales and eventually profits. It measures the net income produced 
by total assets during a period by comparing net income to the average total 
assets. 
 
Graph 14 The Value of ROA Ratio of the Banks in the Examination 
Source: Author, based on the database of the banks (with R software) 
The trend lines fittted to ROA ratio values clearly demonstrate that the 
ratios of the Unicredit and the Budapest Banks stably present values above 
0.00.  The most dynamic rise was produced by CIB; by 2016, it had approached 
the earning ability of the other banks starting from the value of – 0.08. The 
FHB is the only bank to show a declining trend, which demonstrates that the 
earning ability of its assets constantly decreased between 2012 and 2016. 
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Graph 15 Heterogenity of the Banks Related to the Value of the ROA 
Ratio 
Source: Author, based on the database of the banks (with R software) 
Graph 15 on the heterogenity of the banks clearly demonstrates the rising 
trend of the ratio in case of the CIB. The least deviation can be seen in case of 
the Unicredit, the Sber and the FHB. For the latter one, however, the ratio 
deterioriated, though slightly. 
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Graph 16 Heterogenity of the Years Related to the Value of the ROA 
Ratio 
Source: Author, based on the database of the banks (with R software) 
Yearly examination of heterogenity shows a decrease in the deviation of 
the ratio relative to the base year of 2012; furthermore it presents an improving 
value. In 2014, however, there was a slight break owing to the low value of the 
FHB, as the the ratio worsened the most in that year. 
9.3.2.2. The Examination of the ROE Ratio 
Return on equity (ROE) is the amount of net income returned as a 
percentage of shareholders’ equity (net income/average shareholder's equity). 
ROE is useful when comparing the profitability of a company to that of other 
firms in the same industry. It shows how effectively the company turns the 
cash put into the business into greater gains and growth. The higher the return 
on equity, the more efficient the company's operations. The ratio measures a 
corporation's profitability by revealing how much profit a company generates 
with the money the shareholders invested. 
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Graph 17 The Value of ROE Ratio of the Banks in the Examination 
Source: Author, based on the database of the banks (with R software) 
When analyzing this ratio, it is useful to follow the change related to the 
previous years. Similarly to the ROA ratio, the value of the ROE ratio shows 
a staedy increase in the years of the examination. Regarding this ratio, the FHB 
is the only bank to present a declining trend contrary to the other banks in the 
examination. The trend lines fittted to ROE ratio values clearly illustrate that 
the ratios of the Unicredit and the Budapest Banks present steady values above 
0.00. 
I terms of both ratios, year 2012 still reflects the effects of the financial 
crisis, while the subsequent years show a progressive improvement. 
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Graph 18 Heterogenity of the Banks Related to the Value of the ROE 
Source: Author, based on the database of the banks (with R software) 
ROE values are outstanding for the Unicedit, the Budapest Bank and the 
OTP, regarding that deviation was the least in case of the Unicredit and the 
OTP. Deviation was similar in FHB, nevertheless, similarly to the ROA ratio, 
the ROE ratio presents a deterioriating trend in this bank. Minus values of this 
ratio in the CIB, the Sber and the MHB (-0.8; -0.7) indicate that their 
investments carried a relatively high risk, however, they have moderated by 
now. 
The most dynamic rise was achieved by the CIB, while the MKB and the 
Sber produced a remarkable pace of growth as a result of which, the MKB 
could show a positive value of the ratio by 2016. 
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Graph 19 Heterogenity of Years Related to the Value of the ROE 
Source: Author; based on the database of the banks (with R software) 
The examination of the heterogenity of the years supports the results 
presented above that banks’ capital adequacy ratio shows a clear improvement. 
It value is close to 0.00 on the whole, with slight standard deviation. Findings 
obviously underpin the improving trends of the past years. This mainly stems 
from the prudential regulation of solvency capital, which gained special 
importance by the development of measuring and managing risks. It is is the 
level of capital requirement that is able to face all quantifiable risks to which 
an financial institution is exposed and sets limts to excessive risk-taking. Basel 
III is intended to strengthen bank capital requirements by increasing bank 
liquidity and decreasing bank leverage. Furthermore, Basel III introduced two 
additional capital buffers: 
i.) A mandatory „capital conservation buffer”, equivalent to 2.5 percent of 
risk-weighted assets 
ii.) A discretionary „counter-cyclical buffer”, allowing national regulators 
to require up to an additional 2.5 percent of capital during periods of 
high credit growth. 
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The impact of prudential regulation is clearly seen in the performance of 
the banks; in 2017, all large banks became profitable in Hungary. The 
improving trend even had an impact on institutions that had been typical loss-
makers since the financial crisis. At the end of 2017, only seven institutions of 
all banks and branches reported losses after-taxation, which is an improvement 
compared to the nine institutions at end of 2016. The share of loss-making 
institutions weighted by balance sheet total fell from 5 percent to 3.3 percent 
in annual terms (MNB 2018). 
As macroprudential authorities, the central banks have the opportunity 
to enhance the shock resilience of the financial system and to address or 
prevent the build-up of systemic risks. 
9.4. THE ASSESSMENT OF THE HYPOTHESES 
My first hypothesis that the global financial crisis has widened the 
existing divergences, as well as the gaps between the respective legal 
frameworks and prevailing two-tier relationships of the central banks has been 
testified by comparing the selected five central banks. The prevailing two-tier 
relationship has been changed by the financial crisis: by sacrificing some 
independence, the central bank moves closer to government, while increases 
its direct control over the markets. The two-tier relationship has changed due 
to the crisis as follows. 
i.) Before the global financial crisis the five central banks operated within 
similar legal frameworks but in fact with different levels of 
independence and at varying distances from the financial markets. 
ii.) During the crisis, crisis management solutions, including monetary 
policy adjustments and LOLR facilities, simultaneously moved the 
central banks towards the governments and the financial markets. 
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iii.) Following the crisis, reforms have intended to rebuild their two-tier 
relationships. I have concluded that the two-tier relationship is 
relatively dynamic. The global financial crisis made it evident that in 
terms of convergent crisis management solutions, the five central banks 
had different focuses and approaches.  
In summary, within similar legal frameworks, the five central banks 
operated during the global financial crisis in different relationships with their 
governments and the markets; they relied on different approaches and focuses 
to restore financial stability; and accordingly, their two-tier relationships have 
been affected by the crisis in different ways. 
My research has provided evidence to the second hypothesis of the study 
that the incomplete design and the structural weaknesses of the EMU 
constrained its fiscal and monetary policy maneuvering. The euro was 
designed in response to the „old” trilemma of the impossible maintenance of 
free capital flows, stable exchange rates and independent monetary policies at 
the same time. Countries with independent currencies can in principle turn to 
money creation to support their financial systems in times of stress. Countries 
without independent currencies, in the same way as countries that borrow in 
foreign currency, are more prone to default. At the core of EMU’s vulnerability 
stands the impossible trinity of strict no-monetary financing, bank-sovereign 
interdependence and no co-responsibility for public debt. 
The examination of the central banks from different aspects supports the 
third hypothesis that with the global financial crisis in general and its impact 
on financial stability in particular, the independence of central banks was 
weakened by their respective govenments. Reduced independence can mitigate 
the central banks’ market-oriented principles. 
The relationship between the central bank and the government is more 
complicated than the principal legal provision alone. Similar operational 
independence was granted by law, but the actual levels of autonomy 
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distinguished market-oriented from government-controlled central banks. My 
research revealed that the global financial crisis expanded certain divergences 
between the five selected economies including EMU. Between the US Fed and 
the BoE, more differences in independency and financial regulatory regimes 
became evident, while further gaps emerged between market-oriented and 
government-controlled central banks, the BoJ and the PBC. For the market-
oriented central banks, independence was still desirable, with an increasing 
focus on systemic stability, but the BoJ and the PBC faced domestic 
challenges, rather than the crisis-driven changes in the US, the UK and the 
European Monetary Union. The crisis enhanced the triangular relationship, i.e. 
the government and the central bank worked more closely towards controlling 
financial markets, and the changed two-tier relationship became characterized 
by reduced central bank independence and increased government intervention 
in the markets. 
The study on the PBC, the BoJ and their environment evidenced the 
fourth hypothesis on the main goals of central banks in developing countries. 
This crisis has brought central banks closer to the broader policies of their 
governments, and also to the financial markets. In my dissertation, I focused 
on two Asian economies with some specific features in common: both had 
state-led economic growth: they had progressed from underdeveloped 
financial markets, weak legal systems, dysfunctional governance and 
unbalanced industry policies, and their governments played an active role in 
their rise.  
The recent crisis has forced changes that have reshaped the role of central 
banks, challenging the ways in which they continue to commit to their 
orientations. 
It has been further confirmed as a reform principle for developing 
countries in the post-crisis era that one leading goal for central banks in 
developing countries is to support financial sector development. 
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The examination of central banks’ exit strategies from the 
unconventional monetary policies and the study on the role of central bank 
balance sheet supports the fifth hypothesis that central bank balance sheets have 
got a special emphasis in their role as the new tool of monetary policy, but does 
not support that setting interest rates will be replaced by balance sheet portfolio 
actions. More precisely, I conclude that the short-term intersest rate will 
continue to be a monetary policy tool, which can be effectively exercised by 
changing the composition of liabilities from bank reserves to other types of 
liabilities. In addition, it is the central bank’s option whether to sell longer-
term securities and affect the term structure of rates or to raise short-term rates. 
Although there is a certain trade-off between the two techniques, the right order 
of their employment is vital to achieve the same macroeconomic goals. 
9.5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In terms of the euro area, the search for solutions to the euro crisis is 
based on a partial diagnosis and a misdiagnosis. The first overemphasises the 
lack of enforcement of existing fiscal rules.  The second places the blame on 
government profligacy. It is true that the euro area has suffered from a lack of 
fiscal discipline. But this is not the source of the crisis. Non-effective solutions 
stem from these two mistakes. The vulnerability of the euro area is caused by 
the impossible maintaining of no co-responsibility for public debt, no-
monetary financing and sovereign interdependence: the „trinity”.  
Governments in the euro area are individually responsible for the debt 
they have issued. This principle, known as the „no bail-out” clause is to prevent 
moral hazard. The philosophy behind suggests a definite separation between 
fiscal and monetary policy. The ECB does not have a strong financial-stability 
mandate that could justify intervention. Whereas the euro area is integrated 
monetarily, banking systems are still national. It implies that the member states 
are vulnerable to the cost of banking crises. 
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There are legal and political obstacles to broadening the mandate of the 
ECB similar to other major central banks.  
The new governance instruments for the euro area comprise the EU’s 
fiscal response to the crisis. Its main elements are rescue plans, reinforcement 
of fiscal discipline and macroeconomic surveillance represented by the Six 
Pack, the European semester, the Euro Plus Pact for economic policy 
convergence and the European Stability Mechanism. All those response 
measures to the crisis could not prevent it from expanding, and were unable to 
curb the spiral of the euro crisis.  
The instruments addressed wide range of fiscal and macroeconomic 
issues, which could threaten the sustainability of the economic and monetary 
union. The measures have one thing in common: they seem to have avoided 
the core problem i. e. the level of political and economic integration the euro 
area member states are prepared to accept. The crisis let real structural 
weaknesses come to the surface and be perceived. 
The incomplete nature of EMU and the member states’ refusal to commit 
to a closer political integration is an aggravating element in the crisis. In 
addition, the fact that the member states are differently involved in EMU 
indicates that the different elements of the new governance cannot be 
integrated in an overall project due to different levels of constraint and 
commitment. Consequently, all the stages of the management of the crisis have 
focused on austerity, discipline, surveillance and sanctions.  
It is not budgetary indiscipline that was at the origin of this crisis. The 
pre-crisis figures compared with those after its emergency clearly show that. 
In 2007, the average budget deficit of the 27 member states was 0.9 percent of 
GDP, substantially below the 3.0 percent threshold. The rise of this level to 
above 6.0 percent in 2009 and 2010 was due to the the financial crisis and its 
economic consequences. The average public debt of the member states from 
1999 to 2007 went from 65.7 percent of GDP to 59.0 per cent, which is also 
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below the threshold. From 2008 to 2010 the crisis raised it to 80.1 percent (De 
Grauwe, 2011).  
It is likely that the wrong diagnosis of the reason for the crisis led to 
austerity measures and later to the austerity spiral. In my opinion austerity 
might be a tool as long as it counterbalance profligacy. Generalized austerity 
only serves to deterioriate the sovereign and private debt crisis. If the main 
goal was to reassure the financial markets so that they would trust in the euro 
area again, the new European economic governance and budgetary rigour were 
effective.  
To see whether the goal of economic stability was achieved, the euro 
area economies need to be analyzed in terms of the macro stability pentagon 
i.e. economic growth rate, unemploymentrate, inflation rate, budgetary balance 
and current account balance. Research has revealed some improvements in 
budgetary and current account balance (Żuchowska, 2013), (Armingeon and 
Baccaro, 2012), (Hurduzeu and Lazar, 2015) nonetheless, the euro area faces 
inflation that is too low, with several countries registering negative rates, that 
is expected to last and high unemployment according to Annual Growth 
Survey 2015. 
Central Banks in general were set up to deal with the inherent instability 
of capitalism. They were not created to maintain price stability. The instability 
of capitalism arises because financial institutions are involved in the cycles. 
The central bank as lender of last resort provides liquidity not only to the 
banking sector but to the government bond markets as well. When problems in 
government arise, sovereign bond prices drop extending the problem to the 
banks causing insolvency resulting in a vicious circle. 
Optimal currency area theory considers exogenous shocks rather than the 
endogenous dynamics of capitalism. Endogenous dynamics of booms and 
busts effect on the level of national economies even within the Monetary 
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Union. Central bank as the lender of last resort is supposed to counterbalance 
the instability of capitalism stemming from its nature.  
Countries with independent currencies can turn to money creation to 
support their financial systems in times of stress. Economies with a common 
currency as well as economies that borrow in foreign currency are more prone 
to default. 
My argument is that the turmoil in the world economy and in the euro 
area in the period after the outburst of the crisis stems from the financial 
vulnerabilities of the incomplete design of the Economic and Monetary Union. 
I argue that financial integration and independent national fiscal policy does 
not create financial stability. 
Central banks have developed around their changed two-tier 
relationships. Increasing independence, they have moved away from strict 
banking regulation and supervision, and their two-tier relationships have 
generally been changed by financial crises, enhancing interaction between the 
government, the central bank, and the banking sector. 
With more frequent cross-border financial crises, central banks have had 
to increase regional and international financial cooperation. 
To deal with systemic risk, both private and public solutions can be 
viewed as inevitable. Public resolution techniques may include preventive 
solutions, which focus on reducing risks before they undermine banks by 
monitoring their management, capital, solvency, liquidity standards, and large 
exposure limits. These are protective skills, also called „rescue packages”, 
which in practice target the most affected parts within financial markets. 
Prudential regulation is widely employed between these two systems.  
With strong authority and the proper means to manage financial systemic 
risks, central bank commitment in terms of financial stability implies:  
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i.) Monetary policy instruments are primarily aimed at monetary stability; 
ii.) Rising lending under the lender of last resort facility enables support of 
financial institutions and the markets;  
iii.) Prudential regulation to maintain systemic stability. 
Central banks operate different policy instruments during financial crises 
and at other times, but their tasks are similarly related to financial stability. 
The traditional role of central bank balance sheets, which is to ensure 
interbank liquidity through open market operations, has changed since 2008. 
To avoid the risk of a credit crunch and mitigate the negative impacts of the 
fall in economic growth, central banks applied unconventional tools. These 
meaures include using negative rates and expanding and changing the 
composition of their balance sheets. Owing to central banks’ increasing impact 
and changed role, I conclude, prices and market expectations rather depend on 
central bank actions than on fundamentals of the real economy. 
9.6. THE NEW SCIENTIFIC RESULTS OF THE DISSERTATION 
The crisis brought about important changes and reforms to the central 
banks and beyond. Demanding reinforced central bank regulation in order to 
achieve system-wide stability, the financial crisis changed their pre-existing 
two tier relationships, and also modified the ways in which the five selected 
main central banks converged with and diverged from each other.  
The crisis has changed the government–market relationship in the West, 
while raised the level of direct government intervention in Japan and China, 
which requires a re-examination of the market or government orientation for 
these central banks. 
Central banks are first and foremost institutions responsible for 
designing and implementing monetary policies. Further developing their 
organizational structures and replacing the strict hierarchy through functional 
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reorganization, they can be more diverse towards flatter management to deal 
with financial stability. 
Central bank orientation can be affected by domestic vulnerabilities or 
external shocks; in the example of China it is rather domestic vulnerabilities 
that continue to affect the PBC’s orientation. 
 The crisis has confirmed the importance of transparency with regard of 
the financial markets; most central banks have been required to improve their 
communications and transparency, the optimal level of which is difficult to 
determine due to the discretion granted by law.  
The dissertation has revealed the factors lying at the core of the 
vulnerability of the euro area and aimed to find options ensuring its 
sustainability. I have concluded that EMU's fiscal and monetary policy 
maneuvering was constrained by its structural and operational weaknesses. 
As for the ECB, the central bank of euro area member countries, it is 
fundamentally different from those of the other four selected central banks. 
Consequently, its legal governance as a supranational central bank for 
Europe’s single currency places outside the same framework of the two-tier 
relationship.  
The Fed and the BoE had implemented QE long before the ECB did; it 
has one primary objective, price stability and the others are subordinated to the 
first, while the Fed and the BoE have more than one, monetary stability and 
financial stability. This difference may provide an explanation to ECB’s 
hesitant reaction. 
The new governance instruments for the euro area comprise the EU’s 
fiscal response to the crisis. The instruments addressed wide range of fiscal 
and macroeconomic issues, which could threaten the sustainability of the 
Economic and Monetary Union. Further coordination of the macroeconomic 
policies of the member states is necessary to promote the convergences of these 
economies. Owing to its specific status, the ECB can only be successful in 
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conducting monetary policy, which is burdened with additional responsibilities 
stemming from the crisis, if it relies on the fiscal policy to a greater extent in 
order to achieve the goals mentioned above. 
Related to the macroprudential responsibility, the indipendence of 
central banks was weakened by their respective governments. Reduced 
independence can mitigate the central banks’ market-oriented principles.  
Relationships between output and unemployment were more 
homogeneous across countries since the 1970s. The global financial crisis, 
however, turned the cross-country convergence of the Okun relationship 
backwards. It reflects the different pathways countries responded to the crisis.  
Central bank balance sheets have got a special emphasis in their role as 
the new tool of monetary policy. Due to the limits of central bank balance sheet 
expansion, qualitative easing is likely to replace quantitative easing in shaping 
the monetary policy. 
9.7. FURTHER RESEARCH WORK 
The assessment of the responses of the monetary policies conducted by 
the five central banks examined in this study opens new avenues for further 
research work from many aspects.  
With respect of interest rates, I presume that there is a connection 
between the ECB and the Fed in terms of their interest rate decisions. I would 
use statistical anlysis to demonstrate this relation. Further research is necessary 
to reveal whether the ECB interest rate decisions could be explained by the 
influence of the Fed’s interest rate decisions or vica versa. I would go beyond 
staistical analysis in explaining the reasons.  
My further research work will address the role of the common inflation 
target in a monetary union added to the various costs and benefits of forming 
a monetary union. Data collection will precede quantifying the ECB’s optimal 
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inflation target. Country-specific data on price adjustment and estimates of 
members’ optimal stand-alone inflation targets are necessary to obtain.  
The global financial crisis has questioned the optimal model for central 
banking regarding the requisite institutional environment and design with good 
governance and institutional structures. 
The essential relationship between central bank regulation and financial 
stability would require more comprehensive interdisciplinary study to analyze 
central bank regulation with special attention of maintaining financial stability. 
One outcome from the post-crisis reforms confirms that central banks 
have taken up a reinforced macro-prudential regulation role with enhanced 
focus upon systemic stability. Further research questions may address the 
„twin-peak” model of market regulation. 
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